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Abstract 
As technological and business demands have transformed the operation and demands on 
news and entertainment media, celebrity activists have proliferated.  Only a few years ago, the 
notion that these celebrities were anything other tan opportunistic was laughable.  Less likely 
was the prospect that celebrities might have real power to change minds or affect outcomes.  It is 
difficult enough for politicians to set public agendas.  Can celebrities compete?  This dissertation 
compares celebrities to politicians and focuses upon one key area of potential power:  media 
agenda setting.  If celebrities hope to change the public agenda to focus on the issues they think 
are important, can they gain attention for those isue  and are they persuasive?  The results of a 
time series analysis and an experimental study conclude that they are capable of not only 
competing with politicians in “spotlighting” and persuasion on political issues, but may at times, 
exceed their abilities.  These findings potentially upend what many political scientists assume 
about power, particularly scholars who study policymaking, policy entrepreneurship, and social 
movements.   
According to the data presented in this dissertation, celebrities produce larger spikes of 
media attention when advocating on a public issue than politicians do, a relationship that bears 
out across media types.  More celebrities generates more media attention, while 
politician/celebrity joint interventions seem to have mixed results, implying that politicians 
benefit more from the public attention celebrities g nerate than celebrities benefit from public 
association with politicians.  Moreover, celebrities are capable of persuasion on political issues 
of public importance, despite whatever personal feelings people have for them.  The more 
perceivably important the issue, the more likely the celebrity is to be persuasive.  However, 
celebrities are more likely to persuade on issues that are less polemic.  Celebrities do not have 
iv 
 
the legitimacy or credibility/expertise of politicians, but many make up for these weaknesses by 
allying with credible transnational advocacy groups.  The more institutionalized they are, the 
more likely they are to be able to persuade target audiences.  Finally, the more they are perceived 
to be “authentic” based on their skills and talents, the more effective they are at persuasion.   
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Chapter 1 - The President Meets the Rock Star 
 “George Bush is a comedian….I walk down the corridr, he comes out and stands to 
attention.  ‘Here’s the President,’ he says.  ‘What do you want us to do this time, Bono?’” 
Bono, the lead singer of the rock group U2, was allowed free access to the 2005 G8 
summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, where he attended meetings and lobbied United States President 
George W. Bush and other world leaders to aid the dev loping world.  Bono picks up the story 
after Bush’s comedy routine:  “Now this is a guy who knows where I stand on the war—a long, 
long way from where he stands—who knows there are so many things we could never see eye to 
eye on, and yet the leader of the free world lets us into the room and we’re there for an hour, 
shaking the tree at the last minute, pushing malaria and pushing girls’ education, making sure it 
ends up in the communiqué.”  Bono also lobbied British Prime Minister Tony Blair to persuade 
G8 leaders to sign a communiqué pledging fifty billion dollars of debt relief to some of the 
poorest countries in the world (McCormick et al. 2006, 342). 
As the lines between popular culture and politics have blurred, and the media has 
diversified and grown in influence, celebrity activists have proliferated, involving themselves 
intimately in political organizations in order to advance various causes (Street, Hague, and 
Savigny 2008).  According to one count, 62.8% of celebrities were engaged in advocacy for an 
average of 1.8 causes and involved in an average of 1.8 groups.  Those on Forbes’ “100 Most 
Influential Celebrity List” were 90% likely to be involved in advocacy, involved in 4.16 issues 
and 3.45 groups (“The World’s Most Powerful Celebrities List” 2013; Thrall et al. 2008, 367).  
There is also an increase in celebrity political donations, and celebrities testifying before 
Congress (Lester 2010, 157; Thrall et al. 2008, 374).  Some, such as Bono, have even gained 
direct access to policy makers and the policy process.   
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Bono is not an elected politician—the indebted countries he claims to represent are not 
paying him and they did not choose him to be their spokesperson.  Bono and his organization did 
not offer Bush money for political campaigns.  His main US constituency, so to speak, consists 
of those who buy U2 records and attend concerts.  Yet he gained rare access to some of the most 
powerful leaders in the world and persuaded them to sign a landmark pledge for a substantial 
sum.  Bono’s quote articulates a puzzle in political science:  why would the president of the 
United States give a rock star an hour of his time to lobby him directly on international debt 
relief?  What does a celebrity have to offer the world’s most powerful leaders?    
Perhaps the answer is nothing.  Outspoken US Olympic runner Nick Symmonds, in an 
interview expressing support for gun control and opposition to discrimination toward homosexuals, 
explains the challenge of being an athlete and an advocate: 
Too often, athletes go into a press conference and are asked difficult questions and they 
say ‘no comment’ and I never wanted to be that kind of athlete.  I have opinions on 
everything and I have logical reasons why I have come to those conclusions and I’ll tell 
you why I feel that way….they said, you know, you're an athlete.  What makes you 
qualified to speak out about anything?  Or some people have gone as far as to say I'm a 
disgrace to America and I shouldn't be allowed to represent the country because I can't 
keep my mouth shut.  And I just laugh at these people….First Amendment is the right to 
free speech.  And as an American, I'm going to exercis  that right domestically and 
internationally, barring getting arrested in Russia for speaking out against their laws, 
where my First Amendment doesn't necessarily apply (Ashlock, 2013).  
 
Symmonds’ quote summarizes the attitude of many celebrities toward politics: as 
citizens, they do not have to have expertise, credibility, or even an effective voice, but they have 
the right and perhaps obligation to express their concerns as citizens and will do so when given 
the opportunity (Symmonds, 2013).  He does not expect to change minds or to influence the 
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powerful, but he does want to speak his conscience.1 Symmonds suggests that he has nothing 
more to offer the public discussion than any other American citizen. 
During a joint interview with Senator Russell Feingold, actor Ben Affleck, attempting to 
raise awareness of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, echoes the cynicism 
that celebrity activists receive from some citizens.  Unlike Symmonds, he explains how his 
position as a celebrity makes him unlike most American citizens: 
I think there is a deeply ingrained cynicism in culture and particularly, with all due 
respect, in the media toward celebrity activists…there is the opportunity to be involved 
with causes that, you know, do more for you than you d  for the cause…  I shared some 
of that skepticism and resentment….  I'm not an expert.  I'm a person who's spent a lot of 
energy and dedicated a lot of my time to this issue…  What I am is an advocate, and a 
human being, and a director, and an actor, and someb dy who cares deeply about this, 
and wants other people to know about it….  we live in a society that gives a very, very 
high profile to even the most mundane activities of entertainers, and so I'd like to take 
some of that interest and focus it on something substantial (Greene 2014). 
 
Despite Symmonds’ self-professed humility about his personal views, there are clear 
reasons why the aforementioned quotes are in the public domain.  The first is that Affleck is 
correct.  Symmonds would never likely attract the kind of attention he is receiving if he was not 
an Olympic athlete.  He is not just any American citizen.  Most American citizens are not 
regularly watched by multiple media organizations ad dmired by millions of sports fans and 
information consumers.  There is a presumption that when Symmonds or Affleck speak that 
someone will pay attention.  If they receive attention for their statements, perhaps someone in 
power will pay attention and that will shift the public agenda.   
                                                
1 Granted, some scholars are cynical about celebritis’ motives for involvement.  Some celebrities may appear 
beneficent as they opportunistically use issue advocacy as a way to burnish their public image (Tsaliki, 
Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011) and it does not hurt to be on the Forbes Top 100 Most Powerful Celebrity 
list (Becker 2010, 95).  On the other hand, in one study, celebrities who make candidate endorsements are liked less 
after the endorsement than before, which is somewhat consistent with Symmonds’ perceived personal experience 
(Lammie 2007). 
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The second unspoken reason is that Symmonds and Affleck at least implicitly hope that 
they will be persuasive.  In the first example, Symmonds did not write an op ed in Runner’s 
World or publicly dedicate “his silver medal to his gay and lesbian friends,” enduring criticism 
from pundits if he did not hope or expect to change some minds (Ashlock 2013).  In the second 
example, either Feingold or the interviewer, David Greene, believed that the audience would be 
more interested in hearing about Africa from the next Batman rather than from Feingold because 
68 of the spoken words in the interview were Feingold’s, while 963 were Affleck’s.  The 
interview was almost entirely directed toward Affleck, and Feingold did not attempt to intervene 
in the conversation.  From this example, one could conclude that reporters and politicians alike 
may believe that celebrities are better at getting attention and making a case than a politician is.  
If Symmonds or Affleck had an audience with President Barack Obama, both would not just 
state their opinion.  They would actively make an effort to persuade the president and they might 
just be effective at doing so.  Therefore, if Symmonds or Affleck or Bono, were directly asked, 
“What does a celebrity have to offer the worlds’ most powerful leaders?” their answers would 
certainly not be “nothing.” 
 
Good intentions versus reality 
Celebrity hopes and expectations do not necessarily translate to attention, persuasion, or 
changes to the public agenda.  Any celebrity can speak on any issue s/he likes.  Symmonds might 
give an interview or write an op ed on homosexual rights or gun control.  It does not mean that 
the media will suddenly pay more attention to these is ues.  It does not mean that conservatives 
will change their strongly held beliefs.  It does not mean that he will be invited to lunch with 
President Obama.  If he was invited to lunch at the White House, what prevents the event from 
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being more than a chance for a politician to get an autograph?  Indeed, if Symmonds’ polemic 
political statements hurt his own credibility with certain audiences, why would certain public 
officials want to be seen with him?  Could the involvement of both celebrity and politician in 
advocacy potentially bring them both down?  At the end of the day, perhaps Symmonds, for all 
of the money, fame, and attention he receives for being an Olympic athlete, may be little 
different in his abilities to politically persuade than any other citizen. 
Much of the limited literature on this topic echoes thi  pessimism.  Celebrities can be 
helpful to advocacy groups, but may not be powerful enough to influence the public agenda.  
Celebrity involvement creates some headlines, but represents “just one small piece of the media's 
attention to these larger political issues or causes” (Becker 2010, 96; Thrall et al. 2008).  
Celebrities are more likely to conveniently and cyni ally “jump on the bandwagon” after a 
politician has already focused media attention on an issue, or if the issue is already generally 
salient across media sources (Hawkins 2011).  At best, c lebrities may be more effective at 
attracting attention of niche audiences rather thanbroad segments of the population (Thrall et al. 
2008).  According to these scholars, the assumed eff cts of celebrities’ media interventions are 
exaggerated.  As a result, the literature says little about conditions where celebrities may be 
successful in their media campaigns.  If celebrities do not produce a strong measurable effect in 
the media, by definition one cannot specify how they might be successful. 
More has been written about the question of persuasion, particularly in the advertising 
literature that focuses upon celebrities’ abilities to sell products (Atkin and Block 1983; Boorstin 
1992, 162; Gamson 2007; Miciah and Shanklin 1994).  Far less has been written about whether a 
celebrity can sell anything of a political nature.  Among this literature, the most common studies 
focused on the effectiveness of celebrity endorsements of candidates (Boon and Lomore 2001; 
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Brubaker 2011; Garthwaite and Moore 2008; D. J. Jackson and Darrow 2005; Lammie 2007; 
MediaVest USA 2004; Meyer and Gamson 1995; Nownes 2012; Pease and Brewer 2008; Powell 
and Cowart 2012; Wood and Herbst 2007).  However, very little has been written on the 
effectiveness of celebrities in issue advocacy.  What scholarship that does exist offers some 
cautious and limited optimism for the possibilities for celebrity persuasion.  Becker (2010, 96) 
argues that “issue advocacy efforts can strengthen public agreement with accepted political 
arguments and in some cases can also make unpopular political statements seem more 
acceptable—especially among members of an attentive or captive audience” (D. J. Jackson and 
Darrow 2005).  Moreover, the more well-liked and credible the celebrity, the more likely 
individuals will agree with their arguments, particularly if they match the target individual’s 
political orientation (Brown, Basil, and Bocarnea 2003; D. J. Jackson 2008).  These studies offer 
an initial look at celebrity persuasion in issue advocacy.  However, scholars generally agree that 
much more study is necessary.  
It is not difficult to understand why a celebrity would want to speak his/her conscience.  
It is much more difficult to understand why anyone i  the public would care.  Yet the story of 
Bono lobbying the world’s most powerful leaders is becoming less exceptional.  How have 
celebrities gained access to public officials and policymaking?  Are they simply entertaining and 
novel?  Or do they bring something to politics that tr ditional politicians cannot gain?  
Ultimately, are celebrities effective at getting the media to focus on political issues and at 
persuading target audiences to accept their position on those issues? 
The small but growing body of literature on celebrity and politics does not offer very 
satisfying solutions to this puzzle.  If celebrities have little media impact beyond their own self-
promotional abilities, and if they tend to opportunistically take their cues from public officials, 
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why would politicians find them useful?  One could argue that celebrities’ abilities to make 
unpopular messages seem more acceptable is beneficial.  But is this enough to make a president 
listen to a rock star?  The current scholarship on the subject presents such a weak and 
inconsistent picture of celebrities that it fails to answer the question.  Important pieces to this 
puzzle are still missing.  The extant literature implies that the increase in celebrity involvement 
and engagement with politicians is a peculiar phenomenon, not a logical trend given the current 
political and media environment, or the characterisics of the celebrity. 
 
Celebrities, Power, and Agenda Setting 
Unless a busy politician is fishing for autographs, perhaps the answer is that celebrities 
possess power.  Politicians do not gain or keep political office without power.  They are unable 
to achieve solutions to public problems without it.  Democratic institutions are infused with it.  
Political scientists have long assumed that public off ials crave power in order to achieve their 
objectives.  Might celebrities have some “powers” not available to the ordinary politician?  
Public officials who are powerful and at least to some degree pursue pragmatic self-interest 
would solicit the help of others who are powerful.  What powers might Bono have, for example, 
that Bush might not? 
The purpose of this dissertation is to probe the questions of whether celebrities can 
successfully attract and amplify media attention toward political issues and whether they are 
capable of persuading target audiences.  Both of these questions not only test the power of 
celebrities’ abilities to effectively engage in agenda setting, the “politics of selecting issues for 
active consideration” (R. W. Cobb and Ross 1997, 3).  They also address the central question of 
where a celebrity’s power lies.  This is the primary focus of the next chapter.   
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Chapter 2 introduces a framework for explaining celebrities’ powers.  If there is logic to 
this modern marriage between celebrities and politicians, and in the public’s interest in them, it 
must lie within either environmental factors or some particular traits or qualities that celebrities 
possess.  Thus, this chapter explains why the public has become increasingly interested in the 
activities of celebrities by detailing the changes in the media and business environment.  
Advances in technology and marketing have turned celebrities and politicians alike into 
identifiable brands—sellable market commodities—that a willing media, desperate for news 
content to fill the demand for constant coverage and heightened stimulation, feeds to the public 
to maintain its business model.  The commodification of celebrities and politicians alike has 
blurred the distinctions between the two and increased their level of exposure.  It has not, 
however, changed the nature or perception of politicians’ power.  Politicians still hold the 
legitimate reins of power, expertise in public policy, the means to coerce or reward others in 
order to achieve ends, the ability to command media attention on issues of major public concern, 
and, at least, just enough charisma to get themselve  lected.  At first glance, celebrities may 
have few of these powers—perhaps they are likable, charismatic, and can garner some media 
attention for their own pet projects—but one would not expect them to have adequate levels of 
power to compete with public officials on political issues.   
To evaluate this proposition, chapter 2 directly compares the power of politicians to 
celebrities according to French and Raven’s power typology (Costa and Martins 2011; French 
and Raven 1959; Raven 1993) and specifies an approach t  test whether celebrities are capable 
of agenda setting.  Obviously, celebrities do not have legitimate power because they do not hold 
public office.  Operationally, this makes celebrities’ powers more comparable to activists rather 
than politicians.  They operate as political entrepreneurs, engaging in outsider strategies to focus 
9 
 
public attention toward the issues and general solutions they favor and/or insider strategies to 
gain access to public officials in order to lobby the powerful and to narrow the scope of options 
that form a final policy.  Unlike politicians and activists, credibility and expertise may not be a 
source of celebrities’ power, nor may it be necessary for them to achieve their ends.  Instead, 
celebrities may compensate for a lack of expertise by pursuing first-hand experience of an issue 
(such as gathering information on the ground or visiting the victims they hope to defend) and/or 
by allying with a transnational advocacy network in order to benefit from its resources, 
connections, and expertise.  The real potential for celebrity power, and particularly in their 
potential to set the public agenda, lies in their ab lity to affect and control information, including 
increasing exposure to an issue and potentially persuading audiences.  This may be achieved 
through their likability, charisma, or perceived authenticity.  However, the current literature does 
not uniformly support the propensity of celebrities to “put the spotlight” on political issues or to 
persuade target audiences.2  Thus, the subsequent chapters offer methods and dta for evaluating 
celebrities’ powers of spotlighting and persuasion. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the effect of celebrity involvement on media coverage.  If celebrities 
publicly involve themselves in political issues, is there an increase in coverage on that issue?  If 
there is an increase in reporting on that issue, it illustrates an ability to raise awareness.  This 
hypothesis was evaluated using content analysis of various media sources and a time series 
analysis.  The results indicate that celebrities can, with a high degree of certainty, command 
attention on political issues.  In individual cases, they outperform politicians and presidents 
across broadcast and print media alike.  Moreover, a discrete event or series of celebrity 
interventions can increase total media coverage on that issue, even increasing the number of 
                                                
2 The spotlight analogy is further developed in chapter 2 and sourced in Crosby and Bender (2000, 14) and 
Richardson (2002). 
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stories that do not make direct reference to the celebrity him/herself.  The effect is also evident 
across media types.  In other words, if the broadcast media has an interview with George 
Clooney that does not receive direct coverage in the print media, there may still be a burst of 
media attention in newspapers.  Chapter 3 also poses some remaining questions introduced by 
the data.  Clearly, celebrities do not outperform politicians in all circumstances.  What conditions 
make celebrities most likely to spotlight issues? 
This question is the subject of chapter 4.  When evaluating all cases in the dataset, what 
combinations increase a celebrity’s likelihood to focus attention on an issue?  Do celebrities have 
an independent ability to gain attention, or are they better served in joint appearances with 
politicians?  Are they more effective in broadcast news or in newspapers?  Chapter 4 
operationalizes political actors’ “wins” and “losse” as a dependent variable, analyzing whether 
an intervention resulted in a statistically significant “bump” in media coverage.  I then compare 
total wins and losses of celebrities to politicians cross media type.  In the cases selected, 
celebrities have more “victories” and are higher ranked than politicians across cases.  Using 
logistical regression, results indicate that celebrities are more successful than politicians at 
attracting media attention in broadcast news and newspapers alike.  In addition, the more 
celebrities that are involved in an intervention, the more likely they are to generate a positive 
spike in coverage.  The same effect does not hold for more politicians at an intervention.  If a 
celebrity and a politician engage in a joint intervention, newspapers are more likely to increase 
coverage on the issue in question, but broadcast media are not.  For example, if George Clooney 
and Barack Obama meet at the White House to discuss Darfur, the spotlight effect is stronger in 
newspapers than in broadcast media.   
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Celebrities may be able to cast a spotlight on a political cause, but do their endorsements 
on that issue affect the way people feel?  Do people agree with their endorsements?  To discover 
whether celebrities had the power of persuasion on political issues, chapter 5 introduces an 
experimental design study.  Participants were provided information about an issue and exposed 
to a frame where a celebrity endorsed a position or policy.  Thus, celebrities’ ability to persuade 
respondents in experimental groups to accept their proposed position was compared to the 
control groups that received no celebrity endorsement.  Respondents were also asked about how 
they felt about the celebrity, how much credibility particular celebrities and politicians had on a 
particular issue area, what positions they expected elebrities to take on a given issue, and 
whether the selected celebrities’ “talents, abilities, and professional projects” uniquely make 
him/her an “authentic spokesperson.”  Additional metrics were established to measure how 
deeply embedded a celebrity is in an advocacy network, the perceived importance of the issue at 
the time of the study, and the degree of polarization.  Demographic data such as age, gender, and 
party affiliation were also gathered and included as control variables.   
Chapter 5 finds that politicians, across the board, e generally more credible and expert 
than celebrities on most of the eight political issue  included in this study.  Some celebrities did 
rank higher than some politicians, but for the most par , high profile politicians such as Barack 
Obama, John Boehner, and Hillary Clinton topped the lists.  Celebrities did top the lists in two 
issue areas:  same-sex marriage and increased funding for international AIDS prevention.  
However, when focusing on two distinct issues—US intervention in the Syrian conflict and 
legalization of same-sex marriage—some celebrities w re found to be uniquely persuasive 
versus the control group, a finding that was statistically significant while controlling for age, 
gender, or party affiliation.  Some celebrities were persuasive whether they advocated for or 
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against a particular policy position.  In these twoissue areas, celebrities could persuade 
respondents independently of the feelings they had about the celebrity.   
While some celebrities were quite persuasive, most, across the multiple issue areas, were 
not.  Therefore, chapter 6 introduces an aggregate analysis to ascertain correlates of successful 
persuasion.  Credibility of the celebrity had no effect on persuasion, although authenticity did, 
suggesting that a source of celebrity persuasion lies in his/her unique qualities and talents as an 
entertainer.  Moreover, those celebrities that were more embedded in advocacy networks proved 
to be more persuasive.  Thus, celebrities’ connections to a larger movement may successfully 
compensate for a perceived lack of expertise.  A celebrity advocating a policy that was 
inconsistent with respondent expectations did not seem to increase or diminish his/her likelihood 
to persuade.  However, celebrities were more likely to persuade on issues that were considered to 
be of greater public importance and on issues that were less polemic.  Indeed, celebrities seemed 
to be least persuasive when partisan respondents from one side or the other had very strong 
views on the issue, limiting the range of respondents who could be more easily persuaded. 
Chapter 7 ultimately concludes that celebrities are c pable of both spotlighting and 
persuading target audiences on political issues, making them potentially powerful and capable of 
affecting the public agenda.  Clearly, not all celebrities have these abilities.  However, many 
celebrities who engage in policy advocacy can be pivotal in achieving strategic goals.  Moreover, 
the potential of celebrity power is substantial enough that politicians might well benefit or suffer 
because of their interventions. 
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Celebrity Power and the Study of Politics 
The findings of this dissertation potentially go a long way toward understanding why a 
public official would pay attention to a celebrity.  To return to the example, if Bono can attract 
attention and is effective at persuasion, why would George Bush not want him on the team?  
Moreover, if Bono is actually better than Bush in at le st one of these skills, Bush might perceive 
that he is less likely to “win” without Bono.  Bono facilitates Bush’s ability to push debt relief on 
the public agenda.  On the other hand, if Bono is effective at this agenda setting game and 
disagrees with Bush’s policy, perhaps Bono is more th atening outside of the White House than 
inside it.  If Bono is willing to play on Bush’s team, why not let him?  Answers to these 
questions illuminate why Bush might tolerate or even appreciate Bono.  In addition, if the 
answers are conditional—that is, if a celebrity is skeptical of his/her ability to command media 
attention in a particular situation—it might explain why s/he might play the role of policy 
lobbyist and confidante instead of pursuing an outside trategy. 
If celebrities are more powerful than the literature currently assumes, the implications for 
the public agenda literature in particular, and for p litical science in general, are profound.  First, 
it adds a dimension to the policy entrepreneur liteature by explaining how activists with unique 
skills of spotlighting and persuasion may be able to affect the policy process.  Moreover, it 
specifies conditions under which celebrities can or cannot gain attention and/or persuade target 
audiences.  Second, it may reveal something about the relative power of celebrities as political 
actors.  The growth of mass media has made politics more like entertainment and entertainment 
more political (Marshall 1997; Shea 1998).  If celebrities really compete with politicians for 
power, this challenges basic assumptions about how scholars study power in domestic and 
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international politics.  In short, the introductory scenario of Bush jokingly standing to attention 
as Bono walks by may be less ridiculous than previously assumed. 
Chapter 2 - I’m Just a Singer in a Rock and Roll Band:  Is Bono Wasting His 
Breath? 
 
Photographs of the conservative president and the agitating rock star at Gleneagles made 
good entertainment on the evening news and fodder for talk show hosts in 2005.  Similar images 
still do.  As implied in chapter 1, Bono seemed to think his lobbying efforts made a difference, as 
do dozens of celebrities touting similar causes.  However, are these celebrities simply offering up 
more entertainment?  Does it really make any difference when celebrities intervene in politics?  
Or is Bono wasting his breath? 
Larry Sabato, Robert Kent Gooch Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and 
director of its Center for Politics, cynically suggests that celebrities have little impact on the 
political process: 
My take on celebrity endorsements is that the only weak minds they can sway are 
fortunately not registered voters, or they don’t show up at the polls.  Very few Americans 
are empty vessels into which celebrities or the media can pour opinions…Celebrities 
don’t sway any voters with substantial gray matter. I mean, who would vote for someone 
because Ben Affleck is for them?  They’d have to be a blithering idiot.  Generally, the 
blithering idiots are in the movie theaters on Election Day….Celebrities?  Most of them 
couldn’t get their spouses to endorse their choice.  This is of great fascination to readers 
of Variety, and not to any real people — thank goodness (Ross 2004). 
 
Until recently, most academics would likely agree.  The idea of celebrity political power 
was so laughable, that the subject had hardly been pondered.  The celebrities in politics literature 
has a few modern precursors to Shea’s edited volume on politics and popular culture (Dyer and 
McDonald 1998; Gamson 1994; Marshall 1997; Meyer and Gamson 1995; Shea 1998; Street 
1986, 1997) and a body of research has been slowly growing since then.3  Still, the collection of 
                                                
3 With few exceptions, the study of politics and popular culture was a marginalized and underdeveloped ar a of 
study among American politics scholars until the 1990s.  Shea’s (1998) edited volume on the subject lamented the 
lack of scholarship and the lack of seriousness given to the study of popular culture, but says little about celebrity.   
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articles and books on the subject could hardly be considered a subfield and the answers to 
research questions often offer ambiguous answers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize and organize much of the disparate research 
pertaining to the study of celebrity and politics to highlight the central problem that this 
dissertation purports to address:  are celebrities capable of agenda setting and if so, how effective 
are they?  The first section of this chapter will differentiate celebrities from other types of 
political actors and detail the ways that celebrities have emerged as competitors with traditional 
politicians.  Drawing from theory and empirical research, the second section will conceptualize 
and compare politician and celebrity power.  The third section will focus on agenda setting, 
explaining how celebrities act as policy entrepreneurs in order to advance their causes.  The final 
section will explain how this dissertation intends to evaluate celebrities’ potential for agenda 
setting. 
 
The Concerned Celebrity 
Reporting of celebrity activists on websites, newscasts, and the pages of newspapers has 
increased substantially since the 1940s when celebrities such as Frank Sinatra endorsed Franklin 
D. Roosevelt for president.  Observers at the Democratic Action Committee luncheon in New 
York and the Republican opponents who criticized the president’s affiliation with a “mere 
crooner” would not have been able to imagine a world where reality television star Kim 
Kardashian announces, “Let’s get this trending!”  With a few taps on the buttons of her cell 
phone, she tweets a hashtag to over 14 million followers, causing “#Armenian Genocide” to 
become one of the most searched for terms on Google in hours (Kendzior 2012; Wheeler 2013, 
44–45).  While multiple factors have led to the increased prominence and perceived importance 
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of celebrity in modern society, for simplicity, these factors can be categorized into two trends 
(Marshall 1997, 25–26; Stohl, Stohl, and Stohl 2011; West and Orman 2003, 2–8; Wheeler 2013, 
44).  First, technology has both empowered and exploited audiences.  Media organizations, 
mindful of competition and profits, have utilized celebrities to meet a market demand.  Second, 
some celebrities have become autonomous from their bus ness benefactors, allowing them a 
greater opportunity to express themselves politically.  The following sections will address each 
of these trends.4   
 
Technology, Media, and the Audience 
Most would argue that the accuracy and quality of media reporting has improved over the 
past 100 years.  Many would argue that the “press” is “enabling” to democracy as it presents 
“diverse views and critical scrutiny of those in power,” media and entertainment organizations 
remain, first and foremost, businesses (Corner and Pels 2003, 3–4).5  The business part of the 
press also makes it potentially “disabling” to democracy  when the pursuit of “the bottom line” 
puts media organizations at odds with honest, in depth reporting for the purpose of serving the 
populace (Bennett 2012; W. J. Campbell 2003; Kuypers 2013).   
Over time, however, technology has increased the importance of the “business side” of 
the media business.  It has accelerated speed of delivery and enhanced the entertainment value of 
media so that people can consume entertainment or news on demand at any time of day or night 
through multiple delivery mechanisms, observing some of the highest quality writing, photos, 
                                                
4 There is an associated literature on whether celebrity politics is enabling or disabling to democracy (Corner and 
Pels 2003; Couldry and Markham 2007; Giroux 2002; Gitlin 1998; Rojek 2010; Rosamond 2011; Tsaliki, 
Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011; G. Turner 2004; Wheeler 2011, 2013; Zoonen 2004).  While that literature 
is complementary to the work of this dissertation, its normative nature is somewhat beyond the scope of this study. 
5 Kuypers (2013) argues that the modern media has returned to its partisan roots after a brief historical period where 
“objectivity” was attempted. 
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video, and audio that cater to an audience’s personal preferences.  These “audiences” have grown 
in power since the emergence of consumer capitalism.  An audience in a capitalist economy and 
democratic society has purchasing power, makes political decisions, includes people of varying 
power capacities, and involves both observer and participant in an interactive process (Marshall 
1997, 63).  An audience’s social power is evident in the way that media companies and political 
organizations alike attempt to learn more about their audiences.  They target messages, 
programs, and advertising to the appropriate consumer, ironically persuading members of 
demographic groups of their unique individuality in order to sell massive quantities of identical 
products (Adorno 2002; Fenster and Swiss 1999, 226; Marshall 1997, 63–64). 
 The entertainment industry responds to consumer and media demand by manufacturing 
and marketing art and entertainment as if they were automobiles or bars of soap (Adorno 2002; 
Balliger 1999, 58; Boorstin 1992; Fenster and Swiss 1999, 225; Gramsci 2011; Marshall 1997; 
Martiniello and Lafleur 2008).  Celebrities are part of a larger business machine that serves to 
publicize and promote them and their projects (Marsh ll 1997, 25–26).  Politicians have 
followed the same trend.  By 1960, the image of John F. Kennedy mattered, particularly in his 
presidential debate versus Richard Nixon.  The accompanying fame associated with this 
“commodification of the individual” means that celebrities and politicians alike become highly 
visible and immediately recognizable products.  Daniel Boorstin referred to this as the “age of 
contrivance” where public officials and celebrities (who are “pseudo-people”) participate in 
scripted, counterfeit versions of real events (“pseudo-events”) to depict and construct public 
images that may be alternative, phony, or false representations of reality (Boorstin 1992).   
The news media willingly convert these events and people into easily digestible tabloid 
“infotainment,” presenting “complex issues…in terms of human experience” and utilizing 
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“images, especially emotional ones…to illustrate news vents.”  News organizations have 
discovered that audiences respond well when stories a e modeled after fiction with clear 
beginnings, middles, and ends, and are selected based on their potential for displaying high 
levels of action, conflict, or novelty (Bennett 201; Cook 2005, 2–3, 104; E. J. Epstein 1973, 
262–263).  The mantra, “if it bleeds, it leads,” does not only pertain to television news coverage, 
but also to newspapers (Jowell et al. 2007, 109).  As a result, news organizations present 
politicians in constant, extreme conflict with each ot er, presenting simplified soundbytes of 
complex issues.  Celebrity interviews on their latest project offer a break from serious news, and 
those celebrities that advocate political issues ar both entertaining and novel.  In this way, 
politicians and celebrities alike enter into a symbiotic relationship with the media where public 
figures build consumer loyalty and peddle their goods (public policies, music, film, 
personalities), while media outlets benefit from the attention that these figures attract, which 
translates to advertisement revenue (G. Turner 2004). 
Because market share is important, media organizations compete for consumers by 
adopting similar business models and presentation syles.  Taking into account budget, time, 
advertising revenue, and other business considerations, newsrooms establish standard operating 
procedures to avoid “crises or intervention from network executives” (E. J. Epstein 1973, 259).  
In addition, there is an incredible competition in the industry to be the first to break a story.  At 
the individual level, reporters monitor what others in rival organizations are doing to avoid being 
“scooped.”  At the organizational level, news corporati ns constantly evaluate other media 
sources, even different types of global media outlets,  including newspapers, television and radio 
news, and websites (Boczkowski 2009; Bourdieu 1996; Lim 2012; Reinemann 2004; Weaver et 
al. 2007).  An increased reliance on electronic information has intensified imitation (Boczkowski 
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2009) and reporters and editors often choose storie because they expect that a rival might do it 
(Lim 2012).   
Finally, the demand for more content has led journalists to become more reliant upon 
public officials to give them information that they can deliver to the public without much effort 
or critique (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2008, 3; Cook 2005, 102–103).  It has also forced 
journalists to “figure out how to make journalistic silk purses out of the sow’s ears that officials 
occasionally give them” (Cook 2005, 102).  Journalists have increasingly turned to “reality” and 
celebrity stories, presenting these stories as if they were as significant as political news (Bennett, 
Lawrence, and Livingston 2008; Bennett 2012).  This kind of coverage can lead to 
sensationalism, not unlike “yellow journalism,” where stories are “over-hyped” to increase 
attention and circulation by either heightening the importance of trivial issues that are not of 
public importance or trivializing issues of public importance by oversimplification in a tabloid 
format (Bennett 2012; Stephens 2007; Thompson 1999).  The ultimate result of the demand for 
more content and for the best “scoop” has driven report rs to source non-experts and non-
celebrities through citizen-generated content.  “Facts” derived from Twitter and other social 
media have often been treated uncritically, which has led to poor reporting from otherwise 
reputable newspaper, radio, television, and online news outlets (Folkenflik 2012; Guthrie 2013; 
Lutz and Rogers 2012; O’Neal 2013; Rieder 2013; Wigley and Fontenot 2011). 
 
Celebrity autonomy 
The process of turning people into celebrity commodities makes them famous, but it does 
not necessarily make them political.  The news media does not need entertainers to have opinions 
on political issues.  Reporters can manufacture news with entertainers just being entertainers.  
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Celebrity advocacy requires a conscious decision, which consists of the individual desire and 
freedom to “get involved.”  Desire and freedom do not emerge easily or naturally.   
Just like other citizens, many celebrities who have the freedom to get involved in political 
advocacy do not have the desire to do so, or have mix d motives.  Some seek out causes in the 
same way they seek product endorsements.  They look for causes that match their image and 
avoid controversy and believe that certain types of political involvement will enhance their 
images as “all-around” individuals who do more than feed mundane promotions of their latest 
projects to a hungry media (Becker 2010, 95–96; Duvall 2010; Meyer and Gamson 1995; 
Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011, 9). 
On the other hand, many celebrities who have the desire to express themselves may not 
have the freedom to do so, since they are limited by contractual obligations.  Prior to the 1960s, 
celebrities were largely dependent upon their employers.  Actors and musicians were often 
exclusively signed to a single studio and athletes w re not free agents.  Movie studios, record 
companies, or sponsors of athletes and sports teams were concerned about controlling the image 
of celebrities for fear that the tarnishing of a celebrity’s image would adversely affect movie or 
album sales or attendance at sporting events.  Contracts sometimes stipulated that the artist or 
athlete could not speak against the interests of the employer.  Those celebrities who had 
commercial corporate sponsorship had even less freedom of expression for fear that speaking out 
could tarnish their image and risk loss of a product endorsement contract.  Even today, “morals 
clauses” in entertainment contracts are commonly used a  an excuse to release actors whose 
behavior undermines the success of a project.  For example, Charlie Sheen’s erratic behavior led 
to his release from the popular sitcom, Two and a Half Men (A. W. Campbell 1994, 394; 
Huliaras and Tzifakis 2011; “Morals Clause at Issue in Charlie Sheen Legal Fight” 2011; 
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Williamson 2011; Zirin 2009).  However, changes in the entertainment industry have given some 
celebrities a greater degree of autonomy, which has led to an increase in celebrity advocacy.  
Two factors are believed to drive autonomy:  money and an emergent authenticity norm. 
First, celebrities that are more financially successful are likely to have greater autonomy.  
The Beatles in the 1960s, for example, had latitude o express themselves more flexibly because 
they were an industry “cash cow.”  From the Beatles’ earliest American tours they put out a press 
statement as part of their performance policy directed at segregationists, “We will not appear 
unless Negroes are allowed to sit anywhere” (Miles 2009).  John Lennon said, “We never play to 
segregated audiences and we aren't going to start now. I'd sooner lose our appearance money” 
(Cornish 2011).  Subsequent statements about civil rights and religion led to Beatles boycotts 
and record burnings in southern American states.  Ultimately, the Beatles were able to direct 
attention to this issue and demand changes to policies based on their popularity and commercial 
influence.  Political involvement is potentially a commercial risk for entertainers, but wealth may 
reduce that risk. 
Second, changes in the music industry in the 1960s tran formed the marketable image of 
the modern musician, emancipating many artists from such “moral” issues and increasing their 
level of autonomy.  Unlike actors, whose business is to play someone other than themselves, 
rock and folk musicians such as the Beatles and Bob Dylan were increasingly marketed as 
genuine artists who wrote and produced their own music.  These changes pressured many 
musicians to meet an “authenticity norm,” which pigeonholed some musicians as superficial and 
others as deep and artistic.  Those who fell into the latter category were less likely to be 
commercially “punished” for sharing their opinion, because political expression fit into their 
constructed image of authenticity  (Ballantine 1984; Balliger 1999, 60–63; Brackett 1999; 
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Fischlin 2003, 11; Grossberg 1987; Kruse 1999, 87–89; Marshall 1997, 150, 75; Mattern 1998, 
16–17; T. Rose 1994, 18; Schoonmaker 2003b, 2003a; Sm ll 1987; Veal 2000; Winstock 1970, 
70–71).  Indeed, audiences may be more likely to punish an “inauthentic” celebrity than one 
whose image depends upon the perception of authenticity.   
While many celebrities who serve advertisers still fee pressure not to make political 
statements, the emergence of free agency has led some actors and sports figures to become more 
outspoken (Wertheim 2008; Williamson 2011; Zirin 2009).  Still, it may still be less normatively 
acceptable for athletes and actors to get politically involved.  Some, like Olympic runner Nick 
Symmonds, describe the public pressure not to speak out, as documented in chapter 1 (Ashlock 
2013; Symmonds 2013).  Likewise, when Tim Robbins, a principal actor in the popular baseball 
movie Bull Durham, spoke out against the Iraq war in 2003, the Major League Baseball Hall of 
Fame cancelled a the celebration of that film’s 15 year anniversary (Hernández 2003; 
Rosenbaum 2003; Sports Illustrated 2003).6  Moreover, modern audiences may be less tolerant 
of country music artists taking on political positions that are not apolitical or conservative, as 
evidenced by the Dixie Chicks’ unintentional political firestorm with their fifteen famous words 
on a British stage, “Just so you know, we’re ashamed th  President of the United States is from 
Texas.”  The comment seriously undermined their commercial viability as radio stations pulled 
their songs from playlists and fans staged CD smashing parties (Brost 2013; Firestein 2005; 
Rudder 2005, 208; Scholten 2007; Van Sickel 2005; Willman 2007).  The authenticity norm 
clearly does not extend to all celebrities or even all genres of music. 
 
                                                
6 Hall president Dale Petroskey said that Robbins’ public criticism undermined the country and “ultimately could 
put our troops in even more danger.”  Subsequently, an interview with Robbins by Matt Lauer on the Today Show 
was cut short when Robbins stepped up his criticism. 
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Qualifying Celebrity Power 
The previous section illustrated how traditional celebrities have become potentially 
politicized while political figures increasingly behave as Hollywood actors, engaging in the 
image-building common in the entertainment industry (Corner and Pels 2003, 2; West and 
Orman 2003, x).  The public sanctions these individuals with power “based on similar emotive 
and irrational, yet culturally deeply embedded, sentiments” causing “a convergence in the source 
of power between the political leader and other forms of celebrity” (Marshall 1997, 19).  If the 
media has provided a cultural power to celebrities, how does that power compare to politicians’ 
power?  Given that the political science literature on celebrity is sparse, the following section 
draws from a diversity of sources in order to summarize theories and empirical findings on the 
potential power of celebrity.     
 Celebrities have much in common with politicians i that they have similar relationships 
with the media and have public personas that are akin to brand recognition for a product.  
However, one key difference between them is that poli icians hold public office and formal reins 
of power while celebrities do not.  Thus, celebrities are more like activists than like politicians.  
They are outsiders trying to pressure the system to attain specific ends.  To understand not only 
the power potential for celebrities but also their differences from politicians, Table 2.1 
summarizes a “bases of power” typology, which provides a means to compare types of power 
across those who hold formal institutional power and those who do not (Costa and Martins 2011; 
French and Raven 1959; Raven 1993).   
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Types of power Characteristics 
Legitimate Based on the subject’s perception that the influencing agent has the legitimate right 
to indicate his behavior and that this indication should be complied with. 
Expert Based on the subject’s perception that the influencing agent has knowledge and 
expertise in a certain area. 
Reward Based on the subject’s perception of the influencing agent’s ability to reward him for 
the desired behavior 
Coercive Based on the subject’s perception of the influencing agent’s ability to apply 
punishments. 
Informational Based on the influencing agent’s presentation of information and logical arguments. 
Referent Based on the subject’s identification with the influencing agent, seeking to behave 
like him. 
Source:  French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993; Costa & Martins, 2011 
Table 2.1 - French and Raven's Power Typology 
 
Politicians possess all of these powers.  They holdlegitimate power as publicly elected or 
appointed officials, coercive and reward power in the form of creation of laws, execution and 
enforcement of laws, and access to the resources nec ssary to attain public office and to facilitate 
others’ entry into public office.  They also hold exp rt power based on their specialized 
knowledge and connections within a particular policy area.  They likely would not have been 
elected to public office without the informational means to persuade.  Likewise, they have 
varying amounts of referent power.  Not all politicians are particularly charismatic, but based on 
party identification, which is a significant source of social identity for many when political issues 
are salient, citizens do identify with them.  They also have to at least be likable enough to get 
elected.   
Celebrities possess most of these powers in degrees.  To what extent can we describe 
these powers of celebrity and how do they compare with politicians’ powers?  The following 
sections organize the scholarship on celebrity power using French and Raven’s typology. 
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Legitimacy 
Elections and appointments to public office provide political legitimacy.  Of course, some 
celebrities become public officials such as Ronald Reagan, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Jesse 
Ventura, Bill Bradley, John Glenn, Sonny Bono, and Jack Kemp.  Once a celebrity is elected, 
their position in public office becomes their primary vocation, at least for a time.  Unless 
celebrities attain legitimate power, their powers are more akin to those of activists. 
There are two primary differences between celebrity ac ivists and ordinary activists.  The 
first and most obvious is that their fame sets them apart from typical activists.  According to 
Jamie Drummond, global strategist for the Jubilee 2000 “Drop the Debt” campaign and the man 
who recruited Bono to the cause, “Bono got meetings with people that we couldn’t meet with.  If 
you’re looking for the X factor, it is that we managed to win over the attention of the media, 
which usually ignore a cause like this.  And that ws through Bono” (Stockman 2005, 152). 
Huddard (2005) calls celebrities “symbolic heroes” in activism: people who have the status and 
utilize most of the same tactics as other activists, but by nature of their stature can amplify a 
social cause. 
Second, celebrities are, in the words of Francesco Alberoni (2007), “politically 
irresponsible.”  Their independent fame makes them fr e agents, so their actions can be 
unaccountable and less coordinated with broader social movements.  Media organizations report 
on celebrities’ random statements or uncoordinated events, causing traditional activists to “jump 
on the bandwagon” if the publicity brings positive b nefits or to distance themselves if the 
movement suffers from the fallout.  Alternatively, if an organization recruits a celebrity to 
advance their cause, the effort may backfire.  Celebriti s sometimes lose interest, experience 
personal problems on the front pages of tabloids, or fail to stay on message.  Thus, when 
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celebrity activists fail, their failures are more public and consequential than those of ordinary 
activists (Rosamond 2011; Stohl, Stohl, and Stohl 2011; de Waal 2008; Wheeler 2011).  For 
example, Bob Dylan had been performing at rallies organized by Martin Luther King in the early 
1960s, even performing “Blowin’ in the Wind” at the March on Washington in 1963.  In 
December of that year, one month after the assassination of President Kennedy, the National 
Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (NECLC) honored Dylan with a civil rights award for his 
songs that raised the profile of the plight of African Americans.  During his acceptance speech at 
their annual banquet, a drunken Dylan talked about h w he “saw a lot of himself” in Lee Harvey 
Oswald (Crosby and Bender 2000, 12; Dylan 1963).  The crowd booed him out of the room.   
Because celebrities are not legitimately powerful and re technically more like activists, 
the following sections focus upon the forms of power that are available to celebrities and define 
those powers primarily utilizing terminology from the transnational advocacy network and social 
movement literature. 
 
Expertise and Credibility 
Celebrities are credible and expert at their professions.  People may think that Mariah 
Carey is a good singer who does good things for the Fresh Air Fund, but few would assume that 
she is an expert on environmental issues or equipped to be a policy maker.  Angelina Jolie, 
George Clooney, and Bono are not professors, professi nal lobbyists, or policy makers.  
Celebrities will generally be perceived first and foremost based on their abilities—as a musician, 
actor, or athlete. 
Must celebrities gain expertise in order to become credible?  The advertising literature 
suggests that it is not essential, but it is highly desirable.  Perceived expertise of celebrities is the 
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only source factor that has a significant impact on intent to purchase.  Those who have perceived 
expertise are thought of as more attractive and more liked than those who do not, and credible 
sources tend to be more persuasive (Buhr, Simpson, and Pryor 1987; Horai, Naccari, and 
Fatoullah 1974; Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953; Lammie 2007; Maddux and Rogers 1980; 
Ohanian 1991; Speck, Schumann, and Thompson 1988).  However, celebrities are often not seen 
as expert, credible, believable, or effective (Atkin and Block 1983; Freiden 1984), although some 
scholars have suggested that celebrities are more persuasive than “experts” (Becker 2010, 116).   
In fact, few celebrities claim to be experts or actively pursue expertise, although some 
attempt to compensate for their lack of expertise.  B n Affleck, who testified twice in the House 
of Representatives and once in the Senate on the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, argues: 
I knew I wouldn't be a credible advocate if I wasn't taken seriously, if I hadn't done my 
homework.  And so, you know, in order to do it, you had to do it properly….  there 
definitely [is] a sense of resentment towards actors, and the idea is, well, you're not an 
expert, and that's true….  I never pretended to be a technocrat or a wonk or certainly, you 
know, an expert, a special envoy (Greene 2014). 
   
To compensate “properly” for a lack of expertise, clebrities do two kinds of 
“homework.”  The first is the establishment of experiential credibility.  George Clooney, for 
example, sneaked into some of the worst, war-torn areas of Sudan to witness the plight of 
refugees living in caves (Straziuso 2012).  Days later, he testified before Congress about his 
experience.  Because of his resources, he was able to fund and execute the trip.  Because of his 
high profile, he was able to draw attention from national leaders.  Nevertheless, it was his 
expertise on this focused event—the fact that he was able to see things on the ground that no 
other expert could have recently seen—that made his content worth hearing.  Whether it is Bono 
touring Africa or El Salvador or Angelina Jolie visiting a refugee camp, many celebrities put 
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themselves on the ground, often among victims, in an effort to communicate to observers that 
they know and understand something that the regular citizen or legislator does not. 
A second kind of homework is establishing a connection with a network of activists.  
Transnational advocacy networks provide an enabling means for individuals to produce 
meaningful change by operating transnationally within larger organizations (Antrobus and Sen 
2006; Batliwala and Brown 2006; Garwood 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and 
Sikkink 2002; Mekata 2006; M. Rodrigues 2004; Shaw 2005).  They undertake voluntary 
collective action across state borders and are distinguishable by the centrality of principled ideas 
or values in motivating their formation, the belief that individuals can make a difference, the 
mobilization of information, and the employment of s phisticated political strategies.  They are 
comprised of activists, local social movements, professionals, scientists, foundations, the media, 
churches, economic actors such as trade unions and firms, consumer organizations, research and 
advocacy NGOs, and intellectuals (Clark 2006, 133; Keck and Sikkink 1998, xi, 1; Naidoo 2006, 
54).   
A celebrity that allies with a network or affiliated organization or institution gains access 
to dozens of organizations, thousands of activists, a multitude of experts, and additional 
resources.  For example, when Bono first became involved in debt relief with the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, he contacted Kennedy family activist Bobby Shriver who suggested that Bono “go 
back to school” before lobbying Congress.  Shriver connected him to World Bank head James 
Wolfensohn, ex-Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker, and David Rockefeller to discuss the 
issue.  He then studied under Jeffrey Sachs at Harvard (N. D. Jackson 2008, 70).  When he 
lobbied Congress, Bono’s arguments might have independently persuaded legislators to forgive 
the debt of developing countries (Busby 2007).  However, Bono gained credibility as he was 
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flanked by experts and connected politicos such as Jeffrey Sachs and Bobby Shriver and backed 
by an advocacy network.  Bono became the articulate mouthpiece of a coordinated lobby. 
 
Reward/Coercion 
Celebrities may possess reward and coercive power at some level.  Two categories of 
tactics used by activists directly refer to reward n  coercive power:  leverage politics and 
accountability politics.  “Leverage politics” refers to activists’ attempts to secure commitments 
from leaders and institutions on policies by linking an issue to use of money, goods, votes in 
international organizations, powerful allies, prestigious offices, or other benefits (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 16, 24–29, 35, 206; M. Rodrigues 2004; Shaw 2005).  Here, the goal is to get 
public officials to change their position.  “Accountability politics” is where activists attempt to 
get officials to take public positions on issues and “hold powerful actors to their words, policies 
or principles” (Batliwala and Brown 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19–27).  Perhaps “talk is 
cheap,” but it may not be if networks can pressure ta get actors to act according to their stated 
intentions.  In this case, they pressure a target politician into doing what they promised to do.  To 
achieve these goals, activists may get financial institutions to link money to salient issues as a 
source of pressure.  By mobilizing the masses, they ma  affect public opinion through the media 
and then pressure policy makers.  If target actors are vulnerable or sensitive to their organization 
or state’s reputation among the “good opinion” of others as described in the previous section, 
activists may exert “moral leverage” against them as well by “shaming” them for bad policies 
and practices (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23–24).   
Celebrities have greater potential for power in these tactics than regular non-celebrity 
activists.  As entertainment celebrities have gained i  wealth, they have not only increased their 
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ability to manipulate their media image more effectively, but also to exert leverage by 
contributing money to organizations and campaigns and demanding a greater role in their 
promotion.  One could argue that the ability to give money or threaten to deny it would make 
celebrities as potentially powerful as individuals of similar wealth (Marshall 1997; West and 
Orman 2003, 19).  While this coercive and reward power may not rival the legitimate power of 
public officials in wealthy democratic states, or even the concentrated wealth of multinational 
corporations, it may buy influence in places. 
Another factor is fame.  High profile celebrities, because of their ability to command 
attention, may be more effective at pressuring public officials or holding them accountable to 
their promises.  While the literature offers little hard research on this hypothesis, there are 
anecdotal examples that support this possibility.  For example, Bono, while lobbying for debt 
relief and AIDS funding with the Jubilee 2000 campaign, played a role in shaming US senators 
and representatives in their own districts during campaigns and subsequently received both 
attention and commitment from these players (N. D. Jackson 2008, 151–152).  Likewise, “Little” 
Steven Van Zandt of Bruce Springsteen’s E Street Band formed Artists United Against 
Apartheid to shame governments who did not go through with promises to sanction South 
Africa.  The primary vehicle was a song and music video in which dozens of popular musicians 
appeared.  Van Zandt not only shamed the world’s major governments for failing to sanction 
South Africa, but also shamed many of his fellow musicians who evaded a United Nations 
sanctioned cultural boycott by playing at the Sun City asino and Resort (Hawkins 2011; Young 
2013).   
How effective were these shaming efforts?  Both Bono a d Van Zant got what they 
wanted.  However, both also worked through transnatio l advocacy networks to attain their 
32 
 
ends, so it is difficult to assign credit to the celebrity intervention alone.  To prove that celebrities 
have the power to shame or praise political actors effectively, one has to first prove that 
celebrities are capable of attracting sufficient media attention on a political issue and that they 
are sufficiently persuasive enough to be threatening.  Otherwise, both efforts may have been acts 
of conscience that ended well enough.  If it can be demonstrated that celebrities are indeed 
capable of these skills, it is quite possible that celebrities’ coercive and reward powers go beyond 
distributing or denying money.  They may include thability to make life difficult for public 
officials by inspiring audiences to validate or question their credibility.   
 
Informational Power 
Informational power is based on the influencing agent’s presentation of information and 
logical arguments (French and Raven 1959; Raven 1993).  “Information politics” is the “ability 
to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have 
the most impact” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16).  On a most basic level, information politics refers 
to the mechanisms used to distribute information.  Activists make use of social media, websites, 
and email in order to organize and communicate their m ssages.  They stage events, give 
speeches, write editorials, make endorsements, and perform interviews.  On another level, 
information politics also refers to the construction of the message.  Activists frame stories and 
testimonies that appeal to shared principles, utilize language for maximum persuasive impact, 
explain problems, blame responsible parties, and attempt to set agendas (Antrobus and Sen 2006, 
149; Appaduri 2006, xi; Clark 2006; Grove and Carter 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16, 24–29, 
202; Mekata 2006, 186; Nelson 2004; Overdevest 2005; Riker 1996; Tarrow 1996).  These 
strategies not only inform target audiences, but also set public discourse with the intention of 
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changing language, changing minds, and even uniting diverse actors behind a common cause.  
This section on informational power will focus on three aspects of informational politics:  
spotlighting, persuasion, and symbolic politics. 
Spotlighting.  One manifestation of information politics is celebrities’ use of fame to 
direct attention toward particular causes.  For example, during the civil rights movement, Harry 
Belafonte explains that Martin Luther King was inspirational and a good organizer.  “All they 
needed was somebody to say, ‘Where do we go?’  Theyjust needed someone to point and since 
I’m always pointing anyway, Dr. King made me the pointer” (Crosby and Bender 2000, 14).  
Bono echoes Belafonte’s analogy:  “We have a spotlight on us.  I'm just doing what everyone 
else would do if they had the time and the money.  U2 fans have given me a great life, and I'm a 
spoiled-rotten rock star…In return, there’s a deal.  One, don't bend over, and two, use this 
spotlight to shine on bigger problems” (Richardson 2002).  If a celebrity can attract attention, the 
celebrity not only becomes the message, but also the medium.   
However, some celebrities employ alternative methods and focus primarily upon the 
medium itself.  For example, Serj Tankian of System of a Down and Tom Morello of Rage 
Against the Machine founded Axis of Justice to “bring together musicians, fans of music, and 
grassroots political organizations to fight for social justice” and to “build a bridge between fans 
of music around the world and local political organiz tions to effectively organize around issues 
of peace, human rights, and economic justice” (“Fighting for Social Justice” n.d., “Serj Tankian” 
n.d.).  They use their celebrity names to host a websit  that acts as a communication link to 
connect organizations with common causes.  Rather than seeking out interviews on network 
news, they pursue a grassroots model focused on organizing and lobbying. 
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What does the literature conclude about the ability of celebrities to attract media attention 
toward political issues?  Very little.  Some scholars rgue that celebrities can be powerful 
political communicative agents that raise awareness, rai e the profile of some issues, and 
legitimize some actions (Njoroge 2011; Rosamond 2011).  They may provide focus for causes, 
which make them a successful in political communication (Wheeler 2011).  They may also 
create a sense of ethical obligation and sympathy for causes that seem distant (Rosamond 2011; 
Wheeler 2011).  Having said that, some scholars argue that celebrities do not increase focus on 
an issue, but rather contribute to a larger media bandwagon effect (Hawkins 2011; Tait 2011).  
Using the New York Times as a source, Strine found no significant difference in the amount of 
media attention given to committees hosting celebrity w tnesses versus committees which do not 
invite celebrity witnesses (Strine 2004). 
Persuasion.  Many celebrities are also known to be quite persuasive, perhaps based on 
the nature of their art and skills.  Musicians authentically deliver their music; actors exploit 
emotion.  Anecdotally, some empirical examples support this assertion.  Joan Baez successfully 
appealed to President Jimmy Carter to send the Navy’s Sixth Fleet to rescue refugees from 
Southeast Asia (Ali 2013; Berman 2005, 242).  Bono famously made conservative Senator Jesse 
Helms cry by connecting with him on their shared Christian faith, which broke his resistance to 
release aid to Africa (Busby 2007).  Drummond summarizes how these sorts of events run 
counter to expectations, yet the potential for successful persuasion and personal appeals is there:  
“We expected that [Bono’s involvement] might be conerts and records, but it turned out that 
Bono’s a very brilliant political lobbyist” (Stockman 2005, 154). 
Are stories such as these supported in the academic literature?  Most of the literature on 
celebrity persuasion focuses on endorsements, particul rly product endorsements.  While 
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celebrities are highly desired for advertisement, in practice, placing an attractive celebrity next to 
a car to sell it is not as simple of a prospect as i seems.  Celebrities do attract attention to ads 
(Atkin and Block 1983; Miciah and Shanklin 1994) and make ads more believable and 
memorable (Friedman and Friedman 1979; Kamins 1970; Lammie 2007).  Celebrities also 
improve brand recognition (Gamson 1994, 62; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).  
Attractiveness also is potentially persuasive, serving as a cue to make inferences about one’s 
characteristics, abilities, and motivations (Berscheid and Walster 1974).  Sources that are 
familiar, physically attractive, or similar to the target audience are more persuasive (McGuire 
1985).  Celebrities are often attractive and usually f miliar, which makes them more persuasive.   
However, the attractiveness of the actor does not necessarily transfer to the product.  If 
anything, the “cultural meaning” attached to a celebrity can be transferred to “the symbolic 
properties of the product” (McCracken 1989).  If cultural meaning can be transferred to a 
product, then advertisers must be extremely careful about their choices of celebrity because of 
the potential for both positive and negatively transferred meanings. Celebrities are most effective 
when the image of the product matches the image of the celebrity (Friedman and Friedman 1979; 
Kahle and Homer 1985; Kamins 1970; McCracken 1989), although these findings have not been 
consistently demonstrated when matching a celebrity to a candidate or cause (Lammie 2007).   
Surprisingly, celebrity product endorsement rarely increases purchasing behavior or 
intentions.  Advertisers’ expectations have only been satisfactorily met in one out of five 
campaigns (Lammie 2007; Miciah and Shanklin 1994). An overexposed celebrity generates 
lower consumer purchase intention than an underexposed celebrity (Roy 2012).  A celebrity will 
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be an ineffective endorser if a product cannot enhance a person’s attractiveness or if it detracts 
from the person’s attractiveness (Kahle and Homer 1985; Kamins 1970).7   
This mixed record for advertising, an activity in which celebrities regularly engage, 
complicates celebrities’ endorsement of politicians or issues.  Celebrities’ skills at persuasion in 
politics have not been extensively studied, althoug there is a growing body of research on 
celebrity endorsements of political candidates.  Celebrity endorsements may be helpful in getting 
attention, raising money, and appealing to youth (Atkin and Block 1983; Becker 2010, 116; 
Meyer and Gamson 1995; Pease and Brewer 2008; Torrey 2008), although the relationship 
between youth and celebrity persuasion has been disputed (Duvall 2010; Lammie 2007, 4; Wood 
and Herbst 2007).  Scholars identified a positive eff ct on Barack Obama’s candidacy when 
Oprah Winfrey endorsed him, but whether that effect is unique to Obama and Winfrey is not 
established (Garthwaite and Moore 2008; Pease and Brewer 2008).  Nownes (2012) argues that 
celebrity endorsements are more likely to influence citizens’ views of political parties than vote 
choices or views of political candidates.  Moreover, third-person effects are also strong.  
Individuals tend to believe that celebrity endorsements are more likely to affect other people, 
particularly those in out-groups.  Celebrity endorsements may not change the attitudes of voters, 
but may instead have a have a polarizing effect on voters who are already decided on candidates 
(Brubaker 2011).   
Much less research has focused on celebrity endorsements on political issues.  If 
endorsements of candidates are like endorsements of is ues, one could infer that celebrities are 
more likely to be persuasive with young people and less likely to be persuasive on polarizing 
issues.  Political science research on persuasion i consistent with these inferences.  When one’s 
                                                
7 This finding has interesting implications for political research if the analogy between products and political 
candidates or causes holds.  In order to be effective, the celebrity would have to make the target audience feel more 
attractive or better about themselves in order to be effective.   
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views are closely tied to moral values, people are resistant to change and perceive their opinions 
as facts (Johnson and Eagly 1989; Morgan, Skitka, and Wisneski 2010; Turiel 2002).  Becker’s 
research concludes that celebrities were more likely to be persuasive with young people, young 
women, and Democrats, particularly where the issue had low importance or were “soft” social 
issues like same-sex marriage.  Celebrities were less p rsuasive on “hard” issues such as the 
economy.  Moreover, video appeals by celebrities were more effective than text appeals, which 
implies that audiences may respond to broadcast media differently than newspaper or other 
written media (Becker 2010, 112, 116). 
Lammie (2007) argues that persuasion is affected by a “three-way interactive process” 
involving the celebrity, party identification, and the perceived affiliation of the celebrity so that 
one’s party identity is central to evaluation of the celebrity’s message.  Democrats respond to 
certain celebrities differently than Republicans, a finding consistent with the larger political 
science literature on party identification and persuasion (Bartels 2002; Brady and Sniderman 
1985; A. Campbell et al. 1980; Dancey and Goren 2010; Gaines et al. 2007).  Moreover, party 
match improves persuasion, suggesting that someone deliv ring a message who shares beliefs 
with a target audience is more likely to be persuasive (Nelson and Garst 2005). 
Symbolic politics.  “Symbolic politics” can also be considered as a form of information 
politics.8  It is the “ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation 
for an audience that is frequently far away” physically or emotionally (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
23–24).  A public speaker who is skilled at the useof symbolic politics can refer to such symbols 
in order to not only inspire and unite those who may associate with them, but may also use them 
                                                
8 The transnational advocacy network literature treats symbolic politics as a separate category of activity from 
information politics.  Because French and Raven’s typology groups together forms of information distribution and 
persuasion, it makes sense to place symbolic politics in this category.  Despite its treatment of symbolic politics as a 
separate category, the transnational advocacy network literature has done little to specify or test it impact or 
acknowledge its potential power.   
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as a dividing line between identity groups: those who support from those who oppose the 
symbol, potentially polarizing the divide.  In this way, symbols bring people together and tear 
them apart, depending upon the rhetoric of the speaker.  Objects such as flags are perceived as a 
threat to some and reassurance to others.  Images of l aders and statements attributed to them are 
subjectively interpreted based upon the individual’s beliefs.  Rhetorical references to particular 
public officials can unite or divide people (Edelman 1985; Perloff 2013). 
Symbols are universally used by politicians and activists alike to frame arguments and 
ultimately to persuade a target audience (Barnett 1998, 4, 10; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 22–23; 
Grove and Carter 1999).  Activists attempt to connect target actors with causes and people 
outside of their normal experience, negatively associate “bad” actors with despised groups or 
individuals, or unify disparate groups around common ideas.  Celebrities are as capable as 
anyone of utilizing these rhetorical arguments (Marsh ll 1997, 54–55; Weber 1978, 1112). 
What makes celebrities different is that, like a flag or a president, they are symbols, too.  
Media attention provides cultural meaning for celebrities—first, based on their role as 
entertainers and the symbolic information associated with the image they have constructed and 
the entertainment they produce; second, based on the personal information they share about their 
supposedly “real” life that deepens public knowledg about them.  The public then forms 
subjective impressions of them based upon this information (Dyer and McDonald 1998; Marshall 
1997, 19). 
Sometimes the political symbolism works as intended where artist, organizers, and “art” 
coincide to deliver the framed message.  Consider the case of David Hasselhoff’s appearance in 
Berlin in 1989.  Hasselhoff is often apologetically described as “big in Germany.”  During that 
time, one German newspaper displayed the headline, “Hasselhoff: Not since Elvis” and another 
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displayed, “Hasselhoff: Not since the Beatles” (Barr 2001; “Did David Hasselhoff Really Help 
End the Cold War?” 2004).  One month after the official fall of the Berlin Wall, Hasselhoff was 
invited to headline a New Year’s Eve concert there.  H  apparently insisted that he would do it if 
he could sing his number one hit, “Looking for Freedom” from atop the Berlin Wall itself.  This 
request was supported and arranged by West German Ch cellor Helmut Kohl and East German 
communist leader Erich Honecker.  German reunificaton was on the mind of many, but not a 
“done deal” at that point.  Hasselhoff’s role in this istorical event is clearly not quantifiable, 
although organizers of this event likely had symbolic politics in mind when they put “The Hoff” 
on “The Wall” (Bainbridge 2006; Orth 2006; Patel 2013; Witchel 2010, 4–5). 
In many cases, celebrities’ political messages are more subjectively interpreted than the 
message advanced by Hasselhoff.  The Beatles’ 1967 performance of “All You Need is Love” on 
the first global television program, transmitted by Telstar to 350 million viewers worldwide was 
“intended to serve as an emblem of the benevolence of expanding Western influence”, but “it 
also became an anthem of countercultures that were resisting the power of authoritarian states 
throughout the world” (Hall 2006, 18).  Likewise, “Born in the USA” by Bruce Springsteen was 
critical of the US for its treatment of returning Vietnam veterans and implicitly critical of the 
Reagan administration for shutting down factories and closing off opportunities for veterans to 
return to work.  However, in the 1984 presidential campaign, both Reagan and Mondale 
campaigns adopted the song as their own.  The anthemic riff and repeating chorus of “I Was 
Born in the USA” in front of a backdrop of American flags and festive cheering destroyed any 
irony the song intended.  Listeners, politicians, and udiences in general separated the literal 
message of the song from the feeling evoked by the music and its contextual use (Grossberg 
1987; Kruse 1999; Marshall 1997, 75; Mattern 1998, 17; T. Rose 1994, 18). 
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Moreover, celebrities and their entertainment products are often subjectively interpreted 
when celebrities do not deliberately make a political statement at all.  Something that was not 
intentionally political may be interpreted politically whether the celebrity intended it or not.  
Elvis Presley, for example, both blurred the lines b tween acceptable behaviors for black and 
white youth, making a rock and roll art form accessible to a young white audience, but 
simultaneously drew strong symbolic lines separating youth and adult  (Altschuler 2003; Iton 
2000, 216).  The Monkees’ television program, on the other hand, made rock and roll and the 
counterculture symbolically more palatable to adults during a time when the “generation gap” 
was pronounced (Perone 2004).   
The informational “power of persona.”  Celebrities bring together many diverse qualities 
in one symbolic person—a series of traits that are oth rwise attainable when distributed across an 
entire organization or movement—the promise of communicating information, identity, and 
symbolic meaning clearly, effectively and efficiently.  DeMars (2005, 9) refers to this as the 
“power of a persona—projected onto the world stage by an NGO, conveying a contagious moral 
conviction, and offering a simple and readily imitated technique for action.”  All of these 
qualities make celebrities potentially powerful practitioners of symbolic politics.  It also means 
that some people may be more receptive to celebritis’ messages than others, and that efforts to 
get involved in politics may potentially fail. 
 
Referent Power 
A combination of promotional ability and personal artistic or physical talents and traits 
translates to “referent power,” the ability to be likable and relatable (French and Raven 1959).  In 
an information-soaked, media-connected political enviro ment, referent power is available to 
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non-traditional political actors such as entertainers.  Referent power is profoundly useful because 
it translates to love, adoration, emulation, and support from an audience (Jauss 2008; Marshall 
1997, 56).  Therefore, it is possible that celebrities may be more skilled at attaining and 
exercising referent power than many public officials.   
Celebrities “attract unconditional admiration and iterest and are usually credited with 
capacities superior to those of other people,” which gives them a unique charismatic power 
(Marshall 1997, 20; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011, 9; Weber 1978, 241).  
Across age groups, individuals affectively “personalize” these distant celebrities, connect 
emotionally to them, and speak as if they know them and have a relationship with them.  People 
may not share an unconditional admiration and interest in all celebrities, but they tend to have 
powerful feelings for the ones they do like and a fairly universal understanding of a celebrity’s 
image within the culture (Caughey 1984; Lammie 2007, 1; Marshall 1997, 56–61).  Celebrities 
play a role in individuals’ construction of their own personal identity and meaning (Dyer and 
McDonald 1998; Marshall 1997, 19).  People live vicariously through celebrities, imagining 
themselves as athletes, rock stars, or in a role played by a favorite actor.  Moreover, the public 
has a desire to buy into a discourse where individuals can make a positive difference where, 
perhaps, they cannot do so themselves.  Celebrities, thu , compensate for qualities absent in 
“normal” people’s lives (Dyer and McDonald 1998).  As a result, citizens may become more 
aware of social problems because of their identification with celebrities.  Thus, celebrities may 
be able to influence audiences to get involved or to support causes as another means to consume 
politics and activism in the same way they consume ent rtainment (Dyer and McDonald 1998; 
Gitlin 1998).   
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One foundation of their referent power with an audience may lie in their perceived 
“authenticity,” which gives them a level of inflated moral standing based upon their status as an 
artist (Balliger 1999, 61; Fenster and Swiss 1999, 228).  Much has been written about this, 
particularly in regard to the aforementioned emergent authenticity norm in popular music 
(Marshall 1997, 150).  Authenticity includes the connection between a celebrity’s “art” to an 
expression of his/her inner emotions, feelings, and personality (Huddart 2005).   While the public 
has felt more jaded about public officials, the authenticity discourse may have created an 
opening for the public to feel less jaded about the int ntions of entertainers (West and Orman 
2003, x).  People recognize that celebrities are interested in making money.  However, they are 
also inclined to believe that they are trustworthy and invested in their art or entertainment (Atkin 
and Block 1983).  As Jimmy Buffett observes: 
I love to watch politicians come to my shows and be fascinated by how the crowd loves 
us, because they don’t get that.  And they want that more than anything.  So many times 
people have asked me, ‘How do you do that?’  I go, ‘Because I tell them the truth.  I’m 
not there to make it up.  I’m not asking for their money.  I’m just doing it.’  It’s an 
amazing thing that what they so desperately want e have.  And we have it because 
we’re able to do it from the heart (Crosby and Bender 2000, 99). 
 
On the other hand, some scholars argue that modern audiences are savvier than they were 
years ago.  With the increased glut of reality television stars, the increased exposure to fame via 
a diversity of media delivery systems, the public does not view celebrities in the glorified 
patterns of the past.  Awareness of celebrities’ need for self-aggrandizement may lead to greater 
skepticism on the part of the audience (Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011, 10).  
Moreover, those citizens who are most connected to celebrity culture are the least engaged in 
politics and least likely to get involved (Couldry and Markham 2007). 
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Summary and synthesis 
 
 The discussion on celebrity power not only illustrates the distinction between politicians 
and celebrities.  It also theoretically illustrates he ways in which celebrities exercise power.  The
academic literature provides some limited and nuanced support for celebrity power, although 
inconsistent conclusions demand much more research.  Despite ambiguous results from 
academic sources, some conclusions or hypotheses can be drawn from the previous analysis, 
according to the bases of power. 
Legitimate power.  Celebrities do not have legitimate power.  They are activists with a 
difference.  Since they are far more recognizable than the average activist is, and since they 
receive media coverage, they have potentially more p wer and may be able to act independently 
of advocacy network.  However, some opportunistic celebrities may bring less commitment and 
more baggage to an advocacy campaign.   
Expert power.  Celebrities lack academic expertise and credibility on political issues.  
They compensate for these losses by generating experi ntial expertise and by affiliating with 
transnational advocacy networks. 
Reward and coercive power.  There are cases of celebrities engaging in accountability 
and leverage politics in order to reward or coerce public officials into holding to pledged 
positions or changing their positions.  Money and resources may be important to their ability to 
advance a campaign and to reduce their personal risk.   
Informational power.  Celebrities may have the ability to draw attentio  to issues and to 
persuade target audiences.  Results in the literatur  th s far offer ambiguous answers to these 
hypotheses. 
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Referent power.  People identify positively with celebrities because they socially identify 
with them and because they are perceived as authentic.  Their likability fuels media interest in 
them and enhances their ability to attract attention and to persuade others, which makes referent 
power an amplifier for informational power, the real potential power base for celebrities. 
 
Agenda Setting 
Thus far, this chapter has summarized the rise of clebrities in politics and detailed the 
ways in which celebrities are potentially powerful.  As suggested above, when celebrities get 
involved in issue advocacy they ideally hope to get people to pay attention to an issue and to 
persuade people to support policies.  One way of visual zing how celebrities, as well as activists 
and politicians, attempt to gain attention for their issue and persuade the powerful is through the 
concept of agenda setting.   
The agenda is “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and 
people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious 
attention at any given time” (Kingdon 2010, 3).  Given the incredible demands placed upon those 
who hold legitimate power to meet a diversity of needs, not all ideas and policies receive the 
same amount of attention.  Agenda setting is the process of making issues important to 
controllers of information and decision makers.  Thus, it involves identifying a problem, raising 
it in the public consciousness, getting target actors t  acknowledge the problem, and ideally, 
persuading them to make it a priority (Keck and Sikkin  1998; Batliwala and Brown 2006, 5). 
Those who hope to affect the agenda are often called policy entrepreneurs (Crowley 
2003, 13–14).  Much of the research on policy entrepreneurs focuses on key legislators’ abilities 
to make an issue prominent that would not otherwise rise on the public agenda (Loomis and 
Nownes 1993).  John Kingdon, in his early use of the term, (2010, 122) argues that policy 
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entrepreneurs “could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest 
groups or research organizations. But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a 
business entrepreneur is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and 
sometimes money—in the hope of a future return.”  I a way, celebrities are policy entrepreneurs 
in a media saturated age.  As summarized in the discussion on celebrity power, celebrities have 
more of most of these entrepreneurial resources than average, which offers them potential access 
and power beyond the reach of the typical citizen entrepreneur.   
Table 2.2 illustrates how policy entrepreneurs engage in two basic strategies in order to 
achieve their ends (Crowley 2003, 14–27).  The first is a risk reduction strategy.  If policy 
entrepreneurs necessarily accept a level of risk by simply entering the political game, it is in their 
best interest to minimize or diffuse cost and uncertainty, which usually plays out in terms of 
“strong” or “weak” approaches.  A weak approach is “individualized.”  The policy entrepreneur 
attempts to achieve his/her goals through force of will, based on the strength of personality, with 
many of the efforts and resources deployed by the individual, only networking if absolutely 
necessary.  While approach may be effective, it means that the individual shoulders much of the 
risk and gains may be slowed without support from a larger organization.  A strong approach 
places the policy entrepreneur in a larger organization, networking with others to achieve goals 
to offer a diversity of skills and resources as well as a more enduring institution for future 
lobbying efforts (Crowley 2003, 11–14).  These risk reduction strategies are consistent with what 
has already been discussed about celebrity behavior when engaging in advocacy.  Celebrities 
with more money and resources, and those that are institutionalized are theoretically less likely 
to be exposed to risk. 
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Strategies Legitimate (Strong) Illegitimate (Weak) 
Risk Reduction 
Strategies 
Cooperative (Highly organized, 
system-based, thick) 
Individualized (Personality-based, 
atomized, thin) 
Shakeout 
Strategies 
Lobbying, media exposure, 
institutional changes 
Force, coercion, illegal activities, 
undemocratic tactics 
[From Crowley (2003, 13, 18–19)] 
Table 2.2 - Strategies of Policy Entrepreneurs 
A second strategy is called “shakeout.”  As a policy window opens, policy entrepreneurs 
perceive opportunities to disrupt the status quo equilibrium or to capitalize on a disruption.  
Shakeout refers to the competition between status quo forces (incumbent entrepreneurs) and 
reform forces (challenger entrepreneurs) that results in some ideas, players, and organizations 
rising to prominence and others falling by the wayside.  Shakeout strategies, therefore, include 
those activities policy entrepreneurs employ in order to survive the shakeout and achieve the 
policy goal.  Illegitimate or weak shakeout approaches include the use of force, coercion, illegal 
activities and undemocratic tactics.  Legitimate or strong shakeout approaches include lobbying, 
media exposure, and institutional changes, all approaches utilized by celebrity activists (Crowley 
2003, 14–18, 20). 
In the “shakeout” process, entrepreneurs seek to open a “window of opportunity” or 
“policy window” where the conditions are ripe for policy change (Galligan and Burgess 2005; 
Jaiani and Whitford 2011; Kingdon 2010, 87).  Kingdon describes three convergent “streams” 
that have the capacity to open a policy window.  The first is the problem stream, the salience of a 
set of issues or problems that the public perceives at a given time.  The second is the policy 
stream, which includes various solutions to these problems formulated by public officials, 
legislative staffers, bureaucrats, academics, and interest group participants (Kingdon 2010, 116).  
The third is the political stream, which includes shift  in public opinion, results of elections, 
turnover of public officials, changes in ideological and partisan distributions in a decision 
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making body, and interest groups’ pressure campaigns (Crowley 2003, 14–27; Henig 2009; 
Knott and McCarthy 2007; Levin and Sanger 1994; Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652; Mintrom 
and Vergari 1996; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Quinn 2000; N. C. Roberts and King 1991; 
Schattschneider 1975; Stone 2001; Teske 2004).  
Another way to categorize these streams is according to the “insider” and “outsider” 
strategies they deploy.  The second stream largely focuses on insider strategies where policy 
entrepreneurs act as “hidden participants” by connecti g themselves to policy makers or 
injecting themselves into the policy making process where possible (Florini, Nihon Kokusai 
Koryu Senta, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2000, 105; Khagram, 
Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 67; Naidoo 2006, 56–57; della Porta and Tarrow 2004; M. Rodrigues 
2004).  Insiders are less likely to affect the public agenda, but are more likely to narrow 
alternatives once the agenda has already been set (Kingdon 2010, 72–74).  Ultimately, the 
intervention of entrepreneurs directly in the policy process has been shown to affect agenda 
setting and ultimately policy innovation (Mintrom and Norman 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 
1996; Mintrom 1997, 2000).   
Celebrities have, on many occasions, undertaken insider trategies.  To name only a few, 
actor Michael J. Fox lobbied Congress to pass stem cell legislation, hoping for a potential cure 
for Parkinson’s Disease (Stanley 2006).  Actor Fran Drescher lobbied successfully to pass 
Johanna’s Law, also known as the Gynecologic Cancer Education and Awareness Act, which 
allocated $6.5 million for a national gynecologic can er education campaign (“Gynecologic 
Cancer Education and Awareness Act of 2005” 2006).  In perhaps the first example of a celebrity 
becoming intimately involved in a Congressional policy making process, Harry Chapin worked 
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on the Presidential Commission on Domestic and Interna ional Hunger and lobbied Congress in 
an attempt to pass legislation to change food policy toward Africa (Coan 2001, 373).   
The first and third streams of agenda setting, for the most part, comprise “outsider” 
strategies (Clark 2006; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Price 
1998; Torrance and Torrance 2006).  When the focus is on the public’s perceived salience of an 
issue, public opinion, elections, and campaigns by advocacy groups, outsider strategies are more 
likely to be utilized (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2008; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Birkland 1997; R. W. Cobb and Elder 1975; R. W. Cobb and Ross 1997, 26; Soroka 
2003).  Public officials and activists alike engage in public information politics strategies to draw 
attention to issues and to persuade the public and key players, often through framing (Grove and 
Carter 1999; Jerit 2008; Maoz 1990; Matthes 2012).  
Celebrity outsider strategies are obvious because of their broad public appeal.  When 
Angelina Jolie makes an appeal for funding education in Africa on Dateline NBC or George 
Clooney protests alongside public officials in front f the Sudanese Embassy, they are attempting 
to gain media attention for their cause and framing their arguments to persuade their target 
audiences:  the mass public and policy makers.  A trip to Congress is not necessary to execute 
these strategies.  However, the media are essential.  According to Shanto Iyengar, “The well-
known ‘agenda-setting’ effect refers to the tendency of people to cite issues ‘in the news’ when 
asked to identify the significant problems facing the nation” (B. C. Cohen 1963; Cook 2005; 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1994, 132; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Zaller 1992).  Timothy 
Cook describes the interaction between politicians d media:  “Politicians dictate conditions and 
rules of access and designate certain events and issues as important by providing an arena for 
them.  Journalists, in turn, decide whether something is interesting enough to cover, the context 
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in which to place it, and the prominence the story receives.”  Non-traditional political actors can 
make news on their own terms if “the material they provide is high in the production values that 
would make the news interesting” (Cook 2005, 102).  Social movements may produce sporadic 
information, usually on the reporter’s terms, but the escalation of this information can “set the 
agenda and shift the terms of the debate” (Cook 2005, 1 2).  Indeed, the visibility of an issue is a 
key factor in swaying public opinion and even voting behavior (Hopmann et al. 2010).  In 
addition, Mortenson (2010) establishes a positive correlation between the amount of time the 
public spent focused on an issue and the amount of money a legislature spent on that issue, 
suggesting that successful outsider agenda setting strategies may affect policy outcomes. 
Insider and outsider strategies are not mutually exclusive.  One can make public 
statements and privately lobby.  A celebrity’s insider lobbying efforts can become public news, 
and thus, an outsider strategy as well.  People pay attention when Bono meets Bush or Clooney 
meets Obama.  The insider is simultaneously a “visible participant” (Kingdon 2010, 72–74).  
However, it is methodologically helpful to separate th  strategies.  Proving that a celebrity can 
set a public agenda by making issues seem more salient or by framing arguments in the media is 
different from proving that a celebrity can successfully lobby or insert him/herself into the policy 
making process and produce changes there.   
  
Can Celebrities Set Agendas? 
 The previous literature review offers many anecdotal cases of celebrity successes, but 
much of the academic literature surveyed offer a mixed to pessimistic view when it comes to 
generalizable findings.  As Nick Symmonds or Ben Affleck or even Larry Sabato might expect, 
original survey research produced for this dissertation received its share of cynical comments 
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about celebrities from “I don’t really care” to “Who cares anything about her, seriously….??” to 
“Don’t give a flying f***.” 
 Perhaps the cynics are correct.  Perhaps few care about the statements or actions of 
celebrities.  Still, the anecdotal stories of persistent celebrities advocating for unlikely causes beg 
for an answer.  Are their efforts are in vain?  Theoretically, celebrities have power that compares 
or perhaps even exceeds that of public officials.  Can any of these powers be quantified in an 
effort to demonstrate celebrities’ potential for agenda setting?  In order to answer this question, 
the first step is to establish a threshold for proving an agenda setting capacity and to be able to 
attribute that capacity specifically to celebrities.   
There are many ways to operationalize agenda setting.  Kingdon specifies three policy 
streams, and one could focus on several strategies in the agenda setting process to come up with 
potential answers.  To narrow the scope of the question, this dissertation focuses primarily on 
outsider strategies and more precisely, upon the effects of celebrity policy entrepreneurs’ 
information politics strategies.  The following chapters will provide evidence on two criteria that 
support prospects for successful agenda setting.  The first criterion is issue visibility.  Does the 
celebrity have the “spotlighting” power described by Belafonte and Bono?  When a celebrity 
publicly involves him/herself in an issue, is there a heightened level of media coverage?  If so, 
celebrity involvement may affect issue salience, which as been associated with agenda setting 
(B. C. Cohen 1963; Cook 2005; Hopmann et al. 2010; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1994; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972; Mortensen 2010; Zaller 1992).  The second criterion is persuasion.  It 
is important to gain media attention.  Once a celebrity has the attention of a mass audience, is 
s/he persuasive?  If it can be proven that a celebrity is also persuasive, the dissertation can make 
an even stronger case for celebrity agenda setting. 
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The following chapters will address these questions.  Chapters 3 and 4 will examine 
evidence on the effect of celebrity interventions o media coverage.  Using time series analysis, 
chapter 3 will focus on specific instances of interventions in the media to determine whether 
these interventions cause coverage “spikes” on the relevant political issue.  Chapter 4 will 
analyze the data from chapter 3 to determine whether cel brity successes are significant across 
all cases taken as a whole.  Chapter 5 will present th  results of an experimental study on 
celebrity persuasion.  In that chapter, experimental group participants were given information 
about a political issue, along with a celebrity endorsement frame taking sides on that issue.  The 
purpose is to determine whether celebrities are ablto persuade experimental groups to accept 
their proposed position on an issue when compared to the control groups that receive no celebrity 
frame.  Chapter 6 will use the data from chapter 5 to isolate the characteristics and conditions 
that optimize celebrities’ potential for persuasion.  Each chapter will specify the methodology 
taken to produce and analyze the data. 
How can these attributes be uniquely connected to a celebrity intervention?  This 
dissertation will isolate key attributes and environmental factors as control variables, based on 
some of the major questions in the literature.  Oneset of questions revolves around whether 
celebrities can compete with politicians for media attention.  Chapter 3 will compare celebrities’ 
and politicians’ abilities to generate attention on a political issue by constructing timelines that 
include media interventions from celebrities, politicians, and other public figures.  In order to 
determine whether celebrities are independently powerful or “piggyback” by association with 
politicians, Chapter 4 will compare the level of media coverage of celebrities or politicians 
acting alone versus celebrities intervening with politicians.  It will also examine whether an 
increased number of politicians and/or celebrities increases the likelihood of media coverage.   
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Chapters 3 and 4 also compare results across newspaper and broadcast news, treated as 
separate media types.  At least one finding suggested that people are more responsive to 
celebrities in video messages rather than in print.  Does this relationship apply to media attention 
as well?  If celebrities are capable of attracting media attention, are they more effective in the 
traditional print media or in broadcast media?  If politicians and celebrities thrive on the pseudo-
event as implied in the literature review, are they tr ated better in the broadcast media than in 
print?  Is there a contagion surrounding a story?  If a celebrity intervention appears in one media 
type (such as broadcast news) will it also correspond with a bump in another media type (such as 
newspapers?)  These questions are also addressed in the time series and aggregate analyses. 
While the real crux of this dissertation focuses upon information politics media strategies, 
another set of questions focuses on different kinds of power.  The first questions pertain to expert 
power.  How do politicians and celebrities compare on credibility and expertise?  Must a 
celebrity be credible in order to be effective?  Does affiliation with an institution improve the 
celebrity’s chances for persuasion?  Is it possible for a celebrity to be effective outside of an 
advocacy organization?  The second questions revolv around referent power.  Do the feelings or 
perceptions respondents have about celebrities makethem more likely to agree with them?  To 
get at expert power, the mean credibility of politicians and celebrities were compared across 
eight issue areas.  Institutionalization scores were also computed to compare celebrities’ level of 
connection to advocacy networks.  For referent power, respondents were asked about the 
authenticity of celebrities and how they felt about certain celebrities.   
A fourth question area deals with the characteristics of the issue advocated by the 
celebrity.  Several questions in the literature review have ambiguous answers in the literature.  
Must celebrities only advocate “safe,” non-controversial issues?  Are they only persuasive on 
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issues that are perceived as less important?  Must the position advocated by the celebrity match a 
target audience’s expectations?  Metrics were constructed to take into account how polarizing the 
issue is, how important it seemed at the time of the study, and whether the celebrity was 
advocating a position that matched the expectations of the respondents.  
Chapters 5 and 6 take all of these questions into acc unt when trying to first, determine 
the persuasive success of celebrities and second, isolate the potential sources of that ability.  
Additional characteristics of the target audience were also considered as control variables, based 
upon some of the findings in the academic literature.  Does age, gender, or party affiliation affect 
the attitudes of participants?  If so, it may be possible to replicate or reinforce some findings 
from previous studies. 
This chapter’s review of the academic literature has not only illustrated how the changing 
business and media environments have made the news more receptive to celebrity activists.  It 
has also specified ways in which celebrities may possess different types of power.  The next task 
of this dissertation is to evaluate whether any of the theoretical powers of spotlighting or 
persuasion can be empirically documented.  If so, it may be possible to conclude that celebrities 
can set public agendas.  
Chapter 3 - The Power of Spotlighting: Celebrities and Issue Advocacy in the 
Media 
 
In 2003, activist John Prendergast was working with the International Crisis Group, an 
NGO seeking to resolve international conflicts.  After meeting Angelina Jolie, he invited her to 
travel to the conflict zone in the Congo instead of exclusively to refugee camps in an effort to 
raise awareness of the civil war in that country, the human rights violations, and the 
humanitarian crisis.  She took photographs that were f atured on Washington D.C.’s Holocaust 
Memorial Museum website.  The traffic from the photos crashed the website.  “If I had made that 
trip alone,” Prendergast said, “maybe a few hundred people would have paid attention” (Bergner 
2010).  Despite the rhetorical power of statements such as Prendergast’s, they remain informal 
stories illustrating the positive effect of celebrities in politics.  They say little about the general 
impact of celebrity interventions in the media.   
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate whether the public activities of celebrities result 
in increased visibility on an issue.  Policy makers may start to consider policy changes as the 
public becomes more aware of an issue.  Making an issue salient is a necessary but not sufficient 
means to change policy.  Still, the ability to make n issue “known” is an important step.   
The question is, how effective are celebrities at dr wing attention toward issues?  How do 
they compete with politicians at agenda setting?  More importantly, is there a way to 
operationalize and quantify this phenomenon?  This c apter will focus on answers to these 
questions.  The first section will describe the methodology.  Next, key case studies will suggest 
that in many instances, celebrities can be quite effective at agenda setting.  
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Methodology 
The following section presents the methodology utilized in this chapter.  It describes the 
rationale of case selection, how the content analysis was conducted, the logic behind the time 
series analysis, and the development of the regression models. 
 
Case Selection 
This study focuses on high profile celebrities.  Celebrities are, by definition, known.  
Thus, it is assumed that at some level, a celebrity can garner attention.  How much attention can 
they command?  Do they command attention only over thei latest project or does this attention 
extend to political issues as well?  Are they drowned out by the political players and events 
competing for time on that issue?  The literature do s not make clear predictions about the 
performance of celebrities on such issues (Hawkins 2011; Njoroge 2011; Rosamond 2011; Tait 
2011; Wheeler 2011).  Since the purpose of this analysis is to examine whether a celebrity can 
cut through the media noise on political issues, those celebrities selected for analysis were 
assumed capable of garnering attention in the non-etertainment media, at least for their 
professional work.  In addition, choosing high profile, “attention-getting” celebrities was 
important not only in terms of research design, but also in terms of methodology.  If celebrities 
made no impact outside of the entertainment press, there would be nothing to measure, or the 
number of cases would be too small to make any conclusions. 
Celebrities were also chosen based on their long-term affiliation with political causes and 
connections to high profile international institutions and transnational advocacy networks.  
Granted, it may have been more of an exciting “crucial” or “least likely case” to have focused on 
random, renegade, disconnected celebrities who happened to make an impact at a particular 
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moment in time.  This study assumes that those celebrity activists are not common.  Indeed, the 
literature on transnational advocacy networks and political entrepreneurship supports the notion 
that successful activists are more likely to be embdded in institutions and advocacy groups 
while renegades have little traction (Keck and Sikkin  1998).  In addition, choosing celebrity 
activists that were densely connected with groups and c uses made it possible to track protracted 
campaigns.  Bono, for example, has been working on debt relief since at least 1998.  By looking 
at extended efforts such as these, it is possible to not only draw conclusions about the 
performance of multiple celebrities across cases but also about the conditions that may limit or 
enable the success of a single celebrity over a single related issue area.  Finally, those celebrities 
that are deeply embedded in institutions and advocacy groups are presumed to be more credible 
within their own networks, at least compared to those celebrities who make occasional and 
unpredictable appearances.  Credibility within one’s own cause may prove to be energizing when 
a celebrity addresses loyal followers.  Whether that credibility extends to media organizations, 
citizens, and public officials is an open question. 
International issues were selected as a “least likely” methodological strategy (Eckstein 
1998; Gerring 2007).9  It is safe to assume that people are more likely to care first about their 
own domestic concerns and that media would be responsive to that (Foyle 2011; Monroe 1979; 
Murray 2006; Shapiro 2011).  The ability of celebrities to move public attention toward 
international causes could prove to highlight their potential power.  Moreover, both political and 
entertainment media have become increasingly interna io alized.  High profile celebrities are 
known across countries and across markets.  Celebrities’ projects and activities are 
                                                
9 While choosing international issues does not precisely follow a crucial case approach where a single least likely 
case provides a reason to accept or reject a premise, it does follow this logic by choosing a series of cases where any 
political actor may have more difficulty raising the profile of the issue, thus increasing the rhetorical power of the 
argument. 
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simultaneously known in several media markets.  This expands the possibilities for data analysis.  
When a newspaper, for example, allows a celebrity to play editor for the day, does it have an 
impact on the local and national market?  Does the bump extend across borders?  In addition, 
activists have become internationalized.  Local activist organizations benefit from international 
affiliations and distant donors.  In many cases, low profile international issues would gain little 
attention and support from far away citizens and politicians seeking to satisfy the narrow 
interests of their constituents.  Does that equation change when celebrities enter the picture?  
Might the entrance of a high profile celebrity move th  media spotlight from parochial concerns 
to international ones?  Many people may not universally care about education in Africa, or feel 
moved to action, but without awareness, there is no choice.   
To satisfy these criteria, this study focuses on Angeli a Jolie, George Clooney, and Bono.  
All are high profile celebrities who have received mainstream media attention beyond the 
entertainment press.  All have long-term relationship  with international organizations and 
transnational advocacy networks.  All have achieved a level of legitimacy within their own 
activist circles as well as with policy makers.  All have met many times with various world 
leaders and policy makers.  And all have advocated on behalf of international issues.   
For simplicity, this study limits the number of issues supported by each of the three major 
celebrities.  The first issue included Angelina Jolie’s involvement in AIDS education and 
treatment, and education for children in Africa.  The second was an analysis of George 
Clooney’s attempts to find a resolution for the Darfur conflict.  The third was a focus on Bono’s 
debt relief efforts and attempts to prevent or end AIDS in Africa in association with the Jubilee 
2000 campaign and the NGO he co-founded, Debt AIDS Trade Africa (DATA), which in turn 
founded and merged with the ONE campaign.  In the process of researching these issues, 
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additional celebrities appeared in the timelines.  They included Brad Pitt, Don Cheadle, Matt 
Damon, Muhammad Ali, Bob Geldof, Wyclef Jean, Quincy Jones, Prince Harry, Alicia Keys, 
Peter Gabriel, Elton John, Dikembe Mutombo, Usher, John Mayer, Cynthia Nixon, and Jessica 
Alba.10  While these celebrities were not the initial focus of this study, and not all match the 
criteria described above, their involvement provided additional data in understanding how 
celebrities interact with the media.   
 
Content Analysis 
To determine the optimal time range of study, timelnes were constructed based on 
occasions when Jolie, Clooney, or Bono publicly intervened in the political discourse in the 
selected issue areas.  An intervention counted as a public event initiated by the celebrity or in 
which a celebrity made an appearance.  It could include writing an op ed to sway public opinion 
in a newspaper, a public speech in which the celebrity discusses the issue, interviews with major 
media organizations, situations where celebrities ar  given editorial control over publications, 
meetings with public officials, involvement in protes s, attendance at a fundraiser, and the like.  
If a celebrity wants to make their issue known, andhas gained some media attention in the effort, 
it counts as an intervention.  When celebrities intervene, is there a spike in the number of stories 
on that issue?  Do media organizations increase their coverage of related stories that day and the 
day after?  What portion of total stories on an issue in a given day is comprised by coverage of 
the celebrity’s statements or activities? 
A content analysis of two Lexis-Nexis databases provides the data.  US newspapers were 
searched utilizing Lexis-Nexis’ “advanced search” feature.  Searches were limited to five 
                                                
10 Details on the political involvement of these celebrities in the causes selected for this study can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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newspaper sources:  the N w York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles 
Times, and the McClatchy-Tribune News Service.  The latter includes a sampling of 30 daily 
newspapers from medium to large city markets across the United States and includes 
publications such as the Miami Herald, the Kansas City Star, the Charlotte Observer, and the 
Sacramento Bee.  In situations where the interventions seemed to be targeted outside the United 
States, the same feature was used to search newspaper  from the target country.  In some cases, 
the United Kingdom was the target country, so the four publications that had the highest 
circulation there were selected:  the Times of London, the Daily Telegraph, the Independent, and 
the Guardian.  When Canada was the target country, four of the newspapers with the highest 
circulation were the Toronto Star, Globe & Mail, the Gazette, and the Vancouver Sun.  
In all cases, broadcast news sources were also searched using Lexis-Nexis’ Broadcast 
Transcripts search engine.  All major US television news sources are included in this database as 
well as radio news sources such as NPR, and dozens f affiliates that pick up stories from 
national sources and broadcast them locally.  Even some entertainment sources appear in this 
database.  Broadcast transcripts of congressional and other institutional hearings frequently 
appear in the database.  The advantage of using a broad database is to get a better picture of the 
impact of a single story across multiple markets and broadcast media.  If Fox News carries a 
story that interests local affiliates, the story echoes across local markets, inflating its effect.  No
other available database could potentially capture this effect.  As a result, the exaggerated effect 
of broadcast media is better illustrated in this search engine than simply utilizing an advanced 
search limited to the major American news networks.  Big events seem even bigger when using 
this database, which reflects the reality of news consumption.  A media consumer may read a 
newspaper or see a story online.  But in broadcast media, they watch it on the evening news, see 
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it picked up again on a local broadcast, hear it onthe radio, catch it again on Entertainment 
Tonight if a celebrity is involved.  The media effect is cumulative and this search engine, while 
not perfect, captures that reality.  Moreover, a simple search of broadcast transcripts (minus any 
stories that are complete duplicates from the same source or affiliate) can be quantified and 
replicated. 
 Key words were selected pertaining to the aforementioned issue areas.  A search yielded 
a count indicating the total number of stories repoted on that issue during a specified period.  
One search featured only the key words.  A second search featured the search string, plus the 
name of the intervening celebrity, revealing only those stories where the media discussed the 
issue by referencing the relevant celebrity.  For example, the first search string for Sudan was 
“Sudan and not earnings or quarter.”  The second was “George Clooney and Sudan and not 
earnings or quarter.”  This method produced line graphs to compare the total number of stores on 
an issue with the number of stories that focused on a specific celebrity in reference to that issue. 
 
Time Series Analysis 
 The number of stories per day for each time span ws recorded in a database.  The 
celebrity intervention is the independent variable.  The design of the study was to observe a 
dependent variable, the number of stories occurring within a twenty-four hour news cycle 
following the intervention.  This was counted in four ways:  the number of stories appearing in 
selected US newspapers, the number of stories appearing in US newspapers that made reference 
to the issue in reference to a celebrity, the number of stories appearing in Broadcast Transcripts, 
and the number of stories appearing in Broadcast Transcripts that made reference to the issue in 
reference to a celebrity.  Line graphs were generated to observe (1) whether there was a visible 
spike that coincided with a celebrity intervention; a d (2) whether non-celebrity interventions or 
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other news stories seemed to be primarily driving coverage.  Clearly, celebrities are not the only 
drivers of news.  Were the spikes in news coverage driv n by political leaders making statements 
about the issue or by changing events on the ground?  Were interventions by non-celebrities 
producing spikes in the number of stories?  If a news organization reported on an issue with 
reference to a celebrity, would it create enough momentum behind that issue to generate interest 
in other stories on this issue where the celebrity is not mentioned?  The line graphs offered a way 
to answer these questions. 
 
Intervention Regression Models 
 For analyses of the data, I estimated ordinary least squares (OLS)/multiple regression 
models for the dependent variable, the number of stories occurring within a twenty-four hour 
news cycle following the intervention.  This was counted in four ways:  the number of stories 
appearing in selected US newspapers, the number of stories appearing in US newspapers that 
made reference to the issue in reference to a celebrity, the number of stories appearing in 
Broadcast Transcripts, and the number of stories appe ring in Broadcast Transcripts that made 
reference to the issue in reference to a celebrity.  Line graphs were generated to observe (1) 
whether there was a visible spike that coincided with a celebrity intervention; and (2) whether 
non-celebrity interventions or other news stories semed to be primarily driving coverage.   
The independent variables were interventions of public figures, including celebrities, politicians, 
or others.  Dummy variables were constructed to represent the intervention of a public figure into 
the news timeline.  Each day received a 1 or 0 where 1 = an intervention of public figure in the 
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time series and 0 = no intervention.11  In all cases, a one-day lag was assumed to account for a 
24-hour news cycle.  For example, if a political actor intervened on May 21, a “1” would be 
recorded for May 21 and 22.12 
 Each model represented a different dependent variable (number of newspaper stories; 
number of broadcast transcript stories) over a given period on a particular issue defined by the 
search terms.  Including interventions by public figures compared the spotlighting abilities of 
celebrities (such as Bono, Clooney, and Jolie) withpolitical leaders (such as Bush, Blair, and 
Obama) and others (such as evangelist Rick Warren, First Lady Laura Bush, or businessman and 
philanthropist Bill Gates).  Each OLS model included an intercept statistic, which indicates how 
many stories were reported per day on the issue area fo  the designated period, if the independent 
variable is not taken into account, offering a reason ble measure for the salience of an issue for 
that period.   
 
Results - Celebrity Victories 
 Can a celebrity’s intervention in a political cause raise the visibility of the issue in the 
media?  In general, the answer is yes.  The following cases illustrate some “victories” when 
celebrities intervene.   
 
                                                
11 The purpose of this data was to consider a connection between deliberate interventions and numbers of news 
stories on an issue on a given day.  In other words, George Clooney being referenced in a story was not ufficient to 
be counted as an intervention.  He had to be involved in some sort of event intended to advance his cau e.   
12 Upon closer examination of the news cycles, stories often had longer staying power than one day.  However, 
using a one day lag made it easier to isolate the effect of a single story.  Since celebrities and other political actors 
often engaged in a series of political events in short sequence for days in a row, a two day lag made it ifficult to 
discern which intervention caused a spike in coverag  on an issue.  Thus, for methodological reasons, the narrower 
operationalization of these variables was chosen.  The advantage of this approach was greater precision in isolating 
independent variables.  The disadvantage was that the results probably underestimate the potential impact of an 
intervention. 
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Sudan – 2012 Broadcast and US Newspaper Coverage 
 When heavy fighting broke out in Dafur in 2003, George Clooney became passionately 
concerned for the plight of the victims of the civil war in Sudan.  He increasingly felt a sense of 
obligation,--that his celebrity should be used as a platform.  “If there is any chance you can shine 
a light on it, and if you don't, it's irresponsible,” Clooney said in an interview (Curry 2009).  He 
soon aligned himself with John Prendergast, the aforementioned activist who brought Angelina 
Jolie to a war zone in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a movement that sought to 
provide aid to displaced refugees and end the genocide (E. Epstein 2013).  As a result of his 
alliance with Clooney—now leader and founder of the Enough Project—was able to attend a 
meeting with President Obama arranged and attended by Clooney in 2010.  While Prendergast 
worked under Susan Rice, the senior director for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration’s 
National Security Council for a time, he claimed, “I wouldn’t be getting a 45-minute meeting 
with the president if it weren’t for Clooney.”   
Meetings between Obama and Clooney soon revealed the value of a relationship with 
Prendergast.  Prendergast knew South Sudandese rebel leaders.  He had been working in Africa 
for years and understood both the reality on the ground and the demands of policy makers.  In 
exchange for information that Prendergast was able to provide about rebel leaders in South 
Sudan, Obama allowed him a key role in the policy making process.  Moreover, the rebel leaders 
knew that Prendergast was becoming a point player in Washington and came to rely upon him 
(Bergner 2010).   
In early 2012, George Clooney attempted to raise awareness about war crimes and 
victims of war in the Nuba Mountains.  Conflict betw en the Sudanese government and rebels 
forced thousands to seek shelter in caves, forcing a potential hunger crisis.  Clooney, along with 
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Prendergast, wanted solutions to assist the displaced nd to press the international community to 
hold President Omar al-Bashir accountable for human rights violations before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  Clooney and Prendergast quietly slipped across the Sudanese border in 
March 2012, “saw burned-out villages and met with residents forced to seek shelter in caves 
because of aerial attacks by Sudan's military” (Straziuso 2012).  This secret visit became public 
when Clooney returned to the US and testified before Congress on what he had witnessed.  The 
following day, he met with President Obama.  On the third day, he gave a speech and protested 
on the Sudanese embassy lawn along with United to End Genocide President Tom Andrews; 
Democratic Representatives Jim McGovern, Al Green, Jim Moran and John Olver; Martin 
Luther King III; and NAACP President Ben Jealous among others.  All were arrested for 
crossing a police line. 
Table 3.1 illustrates George Clooney’s interventions, and how they correlated with stories 
reported on Sudan in the broadcast media.  On March 6, 2012, Barack Obama talks about oil 
supplies from Sudan.  This story produces a moderate spike.  However, once the coverage of 
Clooney’s “secret” trip to Sudan begins and once he starts talking publicly about Sudan, massive, 
visible spikes in the number of stories covered appe r.  The blue line represents the total number 
of stories on Sudan reported per day.  The red line represents stories that discussed Sudan by 
referencing George Clooney in the story.  As the graph indicates, the broadcast media evidently 
cannot discuss Sudan without reference to George Clooney.  On the peak day of coverage, 
March 16, 94 out of 125 stories were about George Clooney’s arrest.   
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Table 3.1 - Broadcast Coverage of Sudan and Interventions by Clooney 
Does this coverage extend to US newspapers as well?  Table 3.2 illustrates the 
relationship between Clooney’s interventions and numbers of stories reported in US newspapers.  
While the overall number of stories is not as high as those reported in broadcast media, the 
relationship appears to be the same.  Spikes coincide with Clooney’s interventions and 
newspapers consistently report on Clooney’s activities as he intervenes.   
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Table 3.2 - US Newspaper Coverage of Sudan and Interv ntions by Clooney 
 
The spikes in the line graphs correlate with Clooney’s interventions, and with stories 
about Clooney and Sudan.  Visual representations of spikes associated with Clooney’s 
interventions look impressive, but are they statistically significant?   
According to the OLS regression estimates in Table 3.3, on a typical day during this 
period, the broadcast media reports almost six storie  n Sudan (intercept β = 5.73).  In contrast, 
a meeting between Clooney and Obama yielded almost 66 additional stories (β = 65.76, p ≤ 
.001).  Clooney himself is likely to increase the number of stories to almost 18 during the period 
(β = 17.76, p ≤ .05).  Interestingly, Obama does not generate the same amount of attention on his 
own (β = 3.26, n.s.).  Therefore, Clooney alone, and Clooney and Obama together, produce a 
spike; Obama alone does not.  In addition, it is difficult to say whether the meeting with Obama 
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generated an independent effect since Clooney testified before Congress the previous day and 
was arrested the following day and the majority of st ries focused on this event, not only on the 
day of the arrest, but for the following week.  Thus, Clooney alone may be producing this 
relationship. 
 
OLS Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers
β t Stat β t Stat
Intercept 5.74 2.82**** 2.68 8.55
(2.03) (0.31)
Clooney 17.76 2.57** 5.73 5.73****
(6.9) (1.00)
Obama 3.26 0.34 2.82 1.92*
(9.54) (1.47)
Clooney and Obama 65.76 6.89**** 3.96 2.59**
(9.54) (1.53)
Summary
N 50 50
R2 0.53 0.54
SEE 13.18 2.04
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 3.3 - Association between interventions of political actors and number of stories 
reported on Sudan: 2/20-4/9/2012 
During the same time, a similar relationship can be found in US newspaper coverage of 
Sudan.  George Clooney’s interventions produce almost six more stories in newspapers (β = 
5.73, p ≤ .001), when newspapers are producing approximately three stories per day (intercept β 
= 2.68).  Clooney also generates significant attention when he meets with Obama (β = 3.95, p ≤ 
.05). 
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In newspapers, Obama has a stronger effect than in broadcast media and this effect is 
statistically significant (β = 2.82, p ≤ .10).  Obama clearly creates a bump when he discusses oil 
in Sudan.  However, the rapid sequence of events makes it unclear whether the alliance of 
Clooney and Obama creates a spike in story or if it is Clooney alone.  Nonetheless, Clooney 
alone (β = 5.73, p ≤ .001) and Clooney with Obama (β = 3.96, p ≤ .05) have a stronger 
relationship and are more significant than when Obama speaks on the issue.   
 
Education in Africa – 2006 Broadcast news and US Newspaper Coverage 
In the spring of 2006, Angelina Jolie was pregnant with her first biological child, Shiloh.  
In the midst of the entertainment press’ manufactured media frenzy, Jolie and partner Brad Pitt 
decided to have their child in Namibia.  They claimed that they “wanted to find a place where 
they could spend some special time with their kids, Maddox, 4, and Zahara, 1.”  According to 
Reuters, Namibia “not only welcomed the movie stars, it handed over control of its international 
land borders and airspace to them.”  Namibian officials “bowed to pressure from Jolie and Pitt 
and granted them the right to ban foreign journalists from entering the country - a remarkable 
move for the Government of any sovereign state,” in part because “their presence would be a 
massive boost to tourist income in the desperately poor country, where the average wage is $46 a 
week.”  Jolie and Pitt told public officials that they would leave unless the “paparazzi were 
brought to heel.”  Human rights groups criticized the Namibian government for expelling four 
foreign journalists (Reuters, Independent 2006).  
To celebrate Shiloh’s birth, Jolie and Pitt engaged in the high profile activity of “donating 
$315,000 to state hospitals and a local school and community center” and promised to work with 
Namibia's first lady, Penexupifo Pohamba, to determine plans for future donations and 
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beneficiaries (Silverman and Fromm 2006).  Getty Images took the first photos and the rights to 
the photos were sold to People magazine in the US and Hello! magazine in the UK for $4.1 
million and $3.5 million dollars, respectively.  All money was donated to charities to benefit 
African children (L. Rose 2007).  Jolie capitalized on the run-up to the birth to draw attention to 
the beauty of Namibia, and particularly, the plight of many in Africa who suffer from inadequate 
education.  This effort was publicized when Ann Curry interviewed Angelina Jolie in Namibia in 
conjunction with “global education week” for interviews broadcast on April 27 and April 30.  
The interviews emphasized how “global education” has become Jolie’s “global mission” (Curry 
2006). 
Table 3.4 illustrates how the broadcast media and US newspapers reported on this series 
of events. 
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Table 3.4 – Broadcast News and US Newspaper Coverage of Education in Africa and 
Interventions by Jolie 
 
Jolie and Pitt’s arrival in Africa coincided with a burst of stories, climaxing with the first 
broadcast of Jolie’s interview on April 27.  The sub equent airing of the interview on April 30 
also produced a major spike.  The only other notable spike in the sequence is a Laura Bush 
speech about the issue on May 14.  The blue line repres nts total numbers of stories appearing in 
broadcast news on the subject of education in Africa.  The green line counts the stories in US 
newspapers on education in Africa.  The red line ref rences those stories in broadcast media 
where education in Africa was discussed with direct ference to Angelina Jolie.  There were no 
stories among the surveyed US newspapers that discussed education in Africa by referencing her.   
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It appears that Jolie’s appearances and interviews drove broadcast news coverage on 
those days.  The red spikes clearly coincide with the blue spikes.  This effect is less visible 
among US newspaper coverage where the number of stories reported is much smaller.  A 
regression model in Table 3.5 more clearly reveals the impact of Jolie’s interventions. 
OLS Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers
β t Stat β t Stat
Intercept 2.37 2.80**** 1.33 5.61****
(0.85) (0.24)
Jolie 11.63 3.51*** 1.67 1.81*
(3.32) (0.93)
Pitt and Jolie 54.00 10.65**** -0.50 -0.35
(5.07) (1.41)
Laura Bush 6.13 1.53 0.17 0.16
(4.02) (1.12)
Summary
N 50 50
R2 0.86 0.083
SEE 5.55 1.55
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 3.5 - Association between interventions of political actors and number of stories 
reported on Education in Africa: 4/2-5/21/2006 
 
In broadcast media, Jolie’s interventions produce approximately 12 additional stories (β = 
11.63, p ≤ .01) when one would ordinarily expect about two (intercept β = 2.37).  When Pitt and 
Jolie make news together, such as their move to Namibi  for the birth of their child, their efforts 
produce 54 additional stories (β = 54.00, p ≤ .001).  In newspapers, however, Pitt and Jolie have 
no discernible significant effect (β = -0.50, n.s.).  However, Jolie’s interventions produce a 
positive effect on coverage of stories about education in Africa which are otherwise scarce in 
newspapers (β = 1.67, p ≤ .10).  Using the intercept as a proxy for salience, ewspapers were 
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reporting just over one story a day on the issue (int rcept β = 1.33).  When Jolie intervenes, a 
second story is more likely to emerge.   
 
Debt and AIDS in Africa – 2010 Canadian Newspaper Coverage 
 In April and May 2010, Bono and Bob Geldof attempted o raise the profile of problems 
with development in Africa, particularly focusing on the indebtedness of governments and the 
spread of AIDS.  Both had been involved in African issues for years.  Geldof got his start as an 
organizer of the Band Aid effort, “Do They Know ItsChristmas?” followed by Live Aid, the 
1985 international concert to raise funds for famine victims in Ethiopia.  Bono, as lead singer of 
U2, played a visible role in both efforts.  He and the band had already been under fire for making 
controversial statements of neutrality and peace between Protestants and Catholics in Northern 
Ireland.  Since that time, he had been involved in various political statements and efforts, mostly 
on behalf of the poor in the developing world.  In the mid-1990s, activist Jaimie Diamond with 
Jubilee 2000 decided to recruit rock musicians to advance the cause of debt forgiveness in the 
year 2000, the Jubilee year, and contacted Bono to bec me a spokesperson for the campaign.  By 
early 1999, he wrote an op ed in The Guardian newspaper where he pressured world leaders to 
engage in debt forgiveness, a message that was publicized at the Brit Awards.  He was given the 
Freddie Mercury Award for outstanding charitable works and spontaneously ran to the audience, 
giving the award to Mohammad Ali, announcing that he and Ali were supporting the Jubilee 
2000 campaign.  This announcement on live television pr mpted a response by Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown and Prime Minister Tony Blair.  Ultimately, his involvement in this 
campaign led to years of events—dozens of meetings at G8 conferences, with presidents and 
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legislators—ultimately leading to pledges from leadrs around the world to forgive the debt of 
governments in the developing world (N. Jackson 2008, 66). 
 One of his awareness campaigns was initiated in 2010.  Bono published an editorial in the 
New York Times on April 8, which received some media attention beyond the newspaper itself.  
On April 30, Bono met with Barack Obama to discuss development issues in Africa.  The most 
striking result of Bono and Geldof’s intervention was in Canadian newspaper coverage.  On May 
10, Toronto’s Globe and Mail newspaper, one of the newspapers with the highest circulation in 
Canada, allowed Bono and Geldof to take over the editorial reins of their publication for the day.  
With these two rock musicians in charge of the paper for the day, they could write articles, 
choose content, and interview anyone they wanted.  Given control over a major Canadian 
newspaper, they were, to some extent, able to drivethe agenda of the Canadian media for the 
day.   
The red line in Table 3.6 illustrates stories about AIDS and debt in Africa that were 
written via direct reference to Bono.  The blue line llustrates a corresponding spike in overall 
stories on AIDS and debt in Africa occurring on thesame day in four Canadian newspapers.  
Compared to the intervention of other actors on this issue, Geldof and Bono’s editorship clearly 
produces the biggest spike.   
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Table 3.6 - Canadian Newspaper Coverage of Debt and AIDS by Bono and Geldof 
 Regression estimates reported in Table 3.7 reveal th  significance of these various events 
in Canadian newspapers.   
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OLS Regression Estimates
Canadian Newspapers
β t Stat
Intercept 2.00 4.70****
(0.43)
Bono & Geldof 13.50 6.54****
(2.06)
US Congress 1.50 0.73
(2.06)
Bono & Obama 4.00 1.94*
(2.06)
Summary
N 51
R2 0.49
SEE 2.85
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 3.7 - Association between interventions of political actors and number of stories 
reported on debt and AIDS in Africa in Canadian newspapers: 4/4-5/24/2010 
Bono and Geldof’s editorship yields 13.5 additional stories on that day (β = 13.50, p ≤ 
.001).  The direct intervention of a celebrity by controlling a form of media defacto increases the 
coverage of that issue.  The Bono and Obama meeting also receives attention and generates an 
additional four stories on the day of that event (β = 4.00, p ≤ .10). 
 
AIDS in Africa – 2006 Broadcast News, UK, and US Newspaper Coverage 
 During the spring and summer of 2006, a number of celebrities and politicians attempted 
to raise awareness about the problems associated with AIDS in Africa.  In Table 3.8, the blue 
line illustrates the total number of stories reported per day on AIDS in Africa.  The first major 
spike on this story involves the Pope saying the word “condom.”  Birth control had been a taboo 
subject at the Vatican and his announcement that they might even study the possibility of 
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encouraging condom use to prevent AIDS in Africa was exceptional.  The Pope is more of a 
political figure than a celebrity and is clearly capable of commanding attention.  Some of his 
“effect” is moderated by the other significant announcement driving the news on that day, that a 
gel to cure HIV passed some clinical trials.  So the spike is huge, but the Pope is not the o ly
factor driving the spike. 
The aforementioned case of Angelina Jolie publicizing the problems with education in 
Africa was only one facet of her campaign.  A secondary facet was the connection between 
poverty in Africa and AIDS.  While her interviews were focused on children and education, 
AIDS was also occasionally mentioned.  As a part of this effort, Angelina Jolie gives an NBC 
interview while in Namibia on April 26, expecting to give birth to her child with Brad Pitt in 
tow.   
Prince Harry announces an initiative to fight AIDS in Africa on April 28.  The red lin  
indicates the number of stories devoted to AIDS in Africa while referencing Angelina Jolie.  The 
green line shows the number of stories devoted to AIDS in Africa while referencing Prince 
Harry.  The table illustrates a confluence between spikes in the coverage of cel brities 
advocating this issue with overall broadcast coverage.  These spikes only appear in bro dcast 
news, not in US or UK newspaper coverage. 
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Table 3.8 - Broadcast Coverage of AIDS in Africa and interventions by Pope, Jolie, and 
Harry 
 
 Table 3.9 illustrates Bono’s attempts to increase global awareness of AIDS in Africa and 
how they are covered in the broadcast media.  In a roughly one month period, from April 29 
through May 29 of 2006, Bono makes a series of interventions.  One is a speech on AIDS and 
development before the World Affairs Council of Dallas/Fort Worth on May 5.  On May 15, he 
meets with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown to 
discuss the global AIDS pandemic, and to interview them.  The interview is included in a speci l
issue of the Independent, released on May 16 where the newspaper editors allow Bono to “guest 
edit” the publication and ultimately determine the content.  On the day of publication, he leaves 
for a tour of Africa, visiting several countries in the region.  Brian Williams of NBC travels to 
Africa to shadow Bono on the last days of his African tour (May 23-24), which results in the 
NBC evening news being reported from Africa with Bono involved.   
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Table 3.9 - Broadcast Coverage of AIDS in Africa and Bono Interventions 
 
The blue line illustrates broadcast media coverage of AIDS in Africa during this period 
by numbers of stories.  Large spikes in numbers of stories are associated with ach of Bono’s 
interventions.  The red line indicates how much of this spike is attributed to coverage of both 
Bono and AIDS in the same story.  In some cases, Bono’s spikes are modest compared to overall 
coverage of the issue.  However, taking over the editorship of the Independent, his departure for 
Africa, and the NBC news coverage of the trip almost entirely drove coverage of AIDS in Africa 
on those days.   
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These spikes also illustrate the cross-media effect of some celebrity sto es.  When NBC 
news focuses on Bono for two days, it results in a huge bump in broadcast coverage.  However, 
when Bono edits the Independent in print, it still receives a bump in broadcast media coverage.  
Broadcast outlets treat Bono’s editorship of a print newspaper as news itself.  
 Between May 29 and June 12, 2006, coverage peaked on June 5, the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the discovery of AIDS.  However, the focus on AIDS in Africa alone was 
dominated by a Nightline episode focusing on Alicia Keys and her work to raise awareness and 
raise money.   As illustrated in Table 3.10, 31 out of 83 broadcast stories made reference to 
Alicia Keys in the Nightline interview. 
 
Table 3.10 - Broadcast Coverage of AIDS in Africa and Keys Intervention 
Are these interventions statistically significant?   Table 3.11 offers some answers: 
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OLS Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers UK Newspapers
β t Stat β t Stat β t Stat
Intercept 4.91 4.25**** 1.16 6.75**** 1.65 7.54****
(1.16) (0.17) (0.22)
Pope Benedict 19.09 3.07*** 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.29
(6.22) (0.93) (1.24)
Angelina Jolie 9.59 2.14** -0.16 -0.24 -0.65 -0.73
(4.48) (0.67) (0.90)
Prince Harry 12.09 1.94* -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12
(6.22) (0.93) (1.24)
Bono 5.09 2.08** 1.15 3.16*** 1.16 2.12**
(2.45) (0.36) (0.55)
Bono, Blair, Brown 0.67 0.12 -0.31 -0.39 8.27 6.61****
(5.44) (0.81) (1.25)
Bill Clinton 4.59 0.74 0.84 0.91 -0.65 -0.52
(6.22) (0.93) (1.24)
Alicia Keys 38.59 6.20**** -1.16 -1.25 -0.65 -0.52
(6.22) (0.93) (1.24)
George W. Bush 2.42 0.47 -0.83 -1.08 -0.31 -0.31
(5.13) (0.76) (1.02)
Summary
N 90 90 90
R2 0.40 0.16 0.41
SEE 8.65 1.29 1.72
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 3.11 - Association between interventions of political actors and number of stories 
reported on AIDS in Africa: 4/29-5/29/2006 
In broadcast media, celebrity interventions were strong and statistically significant across 
the board.  The only political figure who compared was Pope Benedict (β = 19.09, p ≤ .01), 
whose effect was probably inflated by the presence of another major news story of the day, as 
mentioned above.  Still, even if his 19-story “bump” is cut in half, his intervention is quite 
powerful and statistically significant.  Of the celebrities, Alicia Keys’ appearance on Nightline is 
the most powerful (β = 38.59, p ≤ .001), followed by Angelina Jolie (β = 9.59, p ≤ .05), and 
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Bono (β = 5.09, p ≤ .05).  Prince Harry’s intervention is quite strong as well, straddling the line 
between celebrity and public official (β = 12.09, p ≤ .10).  In this media form, none of the 
traditional politicians drive media stories as well as the celebrities do. 
On the other hand, in UK newspapers, almost none of the celebrities which were 
significant in Broadcast Transcripts are significant here.  This may be because some of the 
interventions (such as interviews on CNN and NBC) may have been broadcast for US audiences 
and not UK audiences.  Having said that, UK newspapers were not following Prince Harry’s 
AIDS interventions as much as broadcast media.  The biggest drivers of this set were Bono 
acting alone (β = 1.16, p ≤ .05) and the meeting of Bono, Tony Blair, and Gordon Brown (β = 
8.27, p ≤ .001).  Whether the eight-story spike was produced by the celebrity/politician 
combination or by Bono alone is impossible to determine since Bono’s editorship of the 
Independent was already news before the meeting and all three were featured in the special issue 
of the Independent.  At any rate, either Bono alone drove media coverage during this time or 
Bono acting with the most prominent UK politicians.  No US politician or other celebrity 
approached this level of coverage or statistical significance. 
US newspaper results mirror UK newspapers where there is little statistical significance 
in the correlation between celebrities’ or politicians’ interventions and numbers of stories 
reported.  The major exception is Bono.  His interventions are correlated with a near doubling of 
the number of stories covered in US newspapers.  Line graphs for UK and US newspapers are 
not displayed here, but show a roughly similar pattern of spikes in respect to Bono’s 
interventions.  These interventions produce smaller spikes in the US media, in part because the 
AIDS in Africa story appears to be less salient in the US newspaper media as illustrated by Table 
3.12. 
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  Intercept  
  (Number of stories per day 4/14-7/12/2006) 
Broadcast Transcripts 4.91 
UK Newspapers 1.76 
US Newspapers 1.16 
Table 3.12 - Intercept comparison as a proxy for salience: AIDS in Africa 
 
The intercepts suggest that US newspapers are reporting approximately 1.16 stories a 
day, UK newspapers are reporting about 1.76 stories a day, and broadcast news is reporting 
about 4.91 stories a day.  In the case of US newspapers, if Bono appears in even one story as a
result of his intervention, coverage increases substantially relative to that event. 
 
AIDS in Africa – 2003 Broadcast News and US Newspaper Coverage 
 From Bono’s initial involvement in the debt relief movement, he was not only involved 
in public advocacy but also private lobbying of public officials.  After working with the Clinton 
administration, he made inroads with the Bush administration, personally meeting President 
Bush in 2002.  He developed a strong working relationship with Condoleezza Rice, where he 
was involved in the policy making process.  Their collective work led to the Millenn um 
Challenge, an effort to double aid to Africa, adding $5 billion dollars annually.  Bush invited 
Bono to attend the announcement of the initiative, but Bono was hesitant to attend unless they 
also committed to AIDS funding at historic levels.  The administration was not prepared to make 
a public statement on that yet, but Bush eventually announced a US Global AIDS Initiative 
known as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) at his 2003 State of the 
Union Address, a commitment of $15 billion dollars over five years to fight AIDS abroad.  “I 
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was genuinely amazed,” Bono said.  “To put this into context, in 2001 if you had told anyone on 
Capitol Hill that a Republican administration would get behind delivering anti-retro viral drugs 
to people with AIDS in Africa, they would have laughed in your face.  And they did laugh in my
face” (McCormick et al. 2006, 314). 
 By July 2003, the $3 billion dollars per years that was pledged for the initiative had been 
partially gutted by Congress, and the Bush administration reduced the amount requested for the 
first year to $2 billion dollars because, “we didn't think the program could ramp up fast enough 
to absorb that amount of money early” (USA Today 2003).  Bono and DATA disagreed, arguing 
that “the additional $1 billion could prevent 1.6 million HIV infections in Africa” (Kaiser Health 
News 2003).  He had an interview with USA today on September 15 and on September 16, Bush 
met with Bono where they had a “good old row” about how much should be spent.  Still, Bono’s 
press conference following the meeting was not an attempt to publicly shame President Bush.  
Bono acknowledged that Bush is “very passionate” about the problems plaguing Africa but, “I 
believe the capacity is there.  He doesn't.”  He insisted, however, that “Seven thousand people 
dying a day is not a cause - it's an emergency” (Batchelor 2003). 
 The Bush administration responded with its own public relations campaign.  From 
summer through September 2003, Bush emphasized the importance of fighting AIDS globally in 
a series of speeches and fundraisers.  Their efforts climaxed with a speech by Colin Powell at the 
United Nations urging a new resolution on AIDS and Bush formally pledging his support the 
following day.  Early October brought additional Congressional hearings focused on Africa and 
Bush hosted a meeting with the President of Kenya on October 6.  Table 3.13 summarizes the 
major events from this period and how they were covered in the broadcast media. 
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Table 3.13 - Broadcast News Coverage of AIDS in Africa by Bono 
  
Again, the blue line represents total stories about AIDS in Africa from broadcast 
transcripts.  The red line represents numbers of stories written about AIDS in Africa by 
referencing Bono.  Despite some high profile interventions and a visible correlati n be ween 
Bono’s interventions and coverage of stories on a given day, Bono’s interventions do not 
compare to those made by President Bush or Colin Powell.  One could say that at this time, the 
administration made the issue of AIDS in Africa their own. 
 This effort was fairly successful in the broadcast media as the regression analysis in 
Table 3.14 reveals.   
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OLS Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers
β t Stat β t Stat
Intercept 1.40 3.94**** 2.81 9.64****
(0.35) (0.29)
Bono 1.74 1.01 -1.21 -0.86
(1.71) (1.41)
Bush 2.74 3.32*** 0.77 1.14
(0.83) (0.68)
Powell 4.13 1.95* 1.11 0.64
(2.12) (1.74)
Congress 3.67 3.36*** -0.01 -0.01
(1.09) (0.90)
Powell and Bush 1.10 0.73 1.19 0.95
(1.51) (1.24)
Bono and Bush 0.74 0.43 -0.21 -0.15
(1.71) (1.41)
Summary
N 50 50
R2 0.48 0.16
SEE 2.08 1.71
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 3.14 - Association between interventions of political actors and number of stories 
reported on AIDS in Africa: 8/22-10/10/2003 
  
The politicians upstage Bono.  Colin Powell seems to garner the strongest effect, with the 
possibility of four additional stories on AIDS in Africa when he speaks (β = 4.13, p ≤ .10).  Bush 
(β = 2.74, p ≤ .01) and Congress (β = 3.67, p ≤ .01) also are likely to produce spikes in coverage 
in broadcast news when promoting the issue in this high profile manner.  Bono’s interventions do 
not register as statistically significant (β = 1.74, n.s.).  Even Bono and Bush’s joint meeting do 
not command significant attention (β  = 0.74, n.s.). 
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 The picture is starker for all political actors in US newspaper reporting.  None of the 
interventions by any political actor is statistically significant.  They all received some coverage 
for their efforts, but their actions do not seem to drive broader coverage of this issue during this 
time.  Bono has no advantage as a celebrity.  Bush has no advantage for the presidency. 
 While Bono may have lost the media battle and perhaps the battle over short term 
allocations, he won the war.  Ultimately, $18.8 billion dollars were spent fighting AIDS—a 
larger amount than was originally pledged—between fiscal years 2004 and 2008 (Itano 2008).  
Bush and Bono’s working relationship deepened over time.  On the Daily Show in 2012, Bono 
said of Bush that he did an “amazing” job in the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa.  
“I know that’s hard for you to accept, but George kind of knocked it out of the park. I can tell 
you, and I’m actually here to tell you that America now has 5 million people being kept alive by 
these drugs. That’s something that everyone should know” (Hughes 2013).  Of Bono, Bush said, 
“He was skeptical of me and frankly I was skeptical of him. And we became pals bec use we 
shared a common desire to help others on the continent of Africa. Bono’s the real deal” (Glueck 
2013). 
 
Mixed Results and Lingering Questions 
 Thus far, this study has concluded that celebrities are highly successful at commanding 
media attention, which goes a long way toward establishing that celebrities may be able to set 
agendas, at least in the media.  The last case, however, is instructive.  It reminds us that 
celebrities still play an outsider’s game for the most part, and that politicians set agendas for a 
living.  The fact that celebrities and politicians cannot garner attention equally in ll markets and 
across all forms of media leads to more questions than answers.  Clearly, celebrities are capable 
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of generating a lot of media attention across markets and media forms, but not all of the time.  
What makes the difference?  Why are they successful at some times and not at others?   
One answer may be that celebrities cannot cut through an atmosphere where politicians 
make a concentrated effort to dominate discourse.  A celebrity becomes one addition l vo ce in 
an environment already dominated by powerful actors.  As a result, maybe newspap rs take 
politicians more seriously than celebrities.  Pitt and Jolie’s incredible combined impact on 
broadcast media could not translate to newspapers.  Perhaps the newspapers were ls  likely to 
cover Pitt and Jolie’s African trip because they did not deem it newsworthy.  An upcoming birth 
announcement by a popular celebrity couple in a foreign country is tantalizing but ot a public 
policy issue.  Bono, likewise in the 2003 AIDS case, may well have known that Bush had a bully 
pulpit larger than the one that he could offer as a celebrity.  If a celebrity pe ceives that they will 
lose the public agenda setting battle, perhaps an “insider” strategy is best.13  Rather than staging 
a series of high profile events as Clooney did when he returned to Washington from Sudan, Bono 
chose his words and his battles carefully knowing that he had the attention of a public figre, 
President George W. Bush, and that Bush might allow him to continue the conversation on 
another day.  Still, Powell and Bush could not command newspaper attention even when they 
attempted to dominate that agenda.  They cracked broadcast media in the final case, but not 
newspapers.  In 2003, Bono was not able to command as much attention as major players in the 
political establishment.  In 2006 on the same issue, he was.   
In addition, US newspapers may treat politicians and celebrities with equal rspect (or 
disregard), likely privileging the story over the pseudo-event.  Perhaps “visual satisfaction” 
                                                
13 This is a clear implication of this case.  Proving this demonstrably is beyond the scope of this study and raises 
questions for future research.  On insider strategies, see Florini, Nihon Kokusai Koryu Senta, & Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 105; Khagram et al., 2002, p. 67; Naidoo, 2006, pp. 56–57; Rodrigues, 
2004. 
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matters more to broadcast media than it does to newspapers, implying that the audiences respond 
differently to print media and that newspapers do not have to be nearly as sensationalit in order 
to draw readers (Becker 2010; Cook 2005, 102; E. J. Epstein 1973, 261).  Perhaps a celebrity or 
a politician offering a press release, giving a speech, or making a statement is only relevant in the 
context of the unfolding action of the story itself.  Perhaps personalities and pseudo-events 
matter more in broadcast media (Boorstin 1992).  Jolie speaking alone about education and 
poverty may have translated well across media forms because she is a personality engaging in a 
pseudo-event speaking intelligently and credibly about an issue.  Once she offers som  
substance, her comments contribute to an issue narrative already established by newspaper 
coverage and communicating that issue to some who might not normally pay attention to serious 
news. 
Moreover, interventions by combinations of political actors and celebrities seem to have 
varying results.  Bono and Bush do not generate as much attention as Clooney and Obama.  
Multiple celebrity or multiple politician interventions seem to produce different outcomes.  Does 
the number or combination of types of political actors affect the “success” of an intervention? 
One major question remains:  who is the best at spotlighting?  Might the answer vary 
across media types?  Ultimately, answers to questions across cases may best be answered by 
analyzing aggregate data.  In the next chapter, I will analyze the data across cases to compile 
“wins” and “losses” for all political actors, compared across broadcast news and US newspapers, 
in an attempt to answer some of these questions. 
Chapter 4 - Competition in Media Agenda Setting 
 
 Can celebrities compete with public officials when it comes to gaining attention for 
political causes?  Politicians are established power brokers who are assumed to naturally attract 
media attention around political issues.  Celebrities attract media attention for their artistic 
endeavors and personal exploits.  They are very proficient at whatever media lies with n their 
expertise—television, films, music, or other art forms.  This gives them an advat ge in gaining 
media attention (Adorno 2002; Balliger 1999, 58; Boorstin 1992; Fenst r and Swiss 1999, 225; Gramsci 
2011; Marshall 1997; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008).  Still, the news has traditionally been a realm 
for learning about current events, issues of public importance, or the activities of public officials 
in a democracy (Corner and Pels 2003, 3–4).  Over time, the lines between what is traditional 
news and what is entertainment have blurred (Bennett 2012; Cook 2005, 2–3, 104; E. J. Epstein 
1973, 262).  In this environment, can celebrities point attention toward political issues?  Th  
previous chapter established that they can.  Celebrities can cut through the media noise and gain 
attention for their cause, affecting the agenda presented within the media.   
However, celebrities remain only one kind of agent competing for attention.  How do 
they compete with the traditional political power brokers?  Are some media outlets more 
sympathetic to celebrities than others?  Are newspapers equally disdainful of politicians and 
celebrities?  Do the chances of success increase with more celebrities?  More politicians?  
Combinations of both?  What factors lead to “victory?”  The purpose of this chapter is to look at 
the data in the aggregate in order to find some answers to these questions.   
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The Methodology of Win-Loss Ratios 
The figures and tables included in chapter 3 offer some of the best illustrations of the 
results from the time series analysis.  There were far more cases, line graphs, and regression 
models that illustrated the same patterns and relationships, many of them quite dramatic.  In this 
study, 88 intervention events with 123 intervention opportunities were analyzed.14  To generalize 
the comparisons, a dependent variable was created where all public figures were assigned a 
“win” or a “loss” (win = 1; loss = 0) for every intervention opportunity.  If the intervention has a 
p-value of p ≤ .05 on an event included in the OLS analysis and there is a visible spike on the 
line graph within a 1 day lag of the event, it is coded as a win.  Without those two criteria, th  
event is coded as a loss.  Wins and losses were separated according to media source type, 
providing a comparison between the successes or failures of certain political ac ors across types 
of media outlets.15   
The dichotomous dependent variables were analyzed using binary logistical regression.  
In one model, independent variables included celebrity intervention (celebrity present = 1; no 
celebrity = 0); politician intervention (politician present = 1; no politician = 0).  In another 
model, independent variables included number of celebrities, coded as the number of celebrities 
involved with the event; number of politicians, coded as the number of politicians involved with 
                                                
14 The total number of cases was 123:  a measure of each individual political actor’s opportunity to “win” or “lose.”  
The spreadsheet was set up and the regression models calculated so that all political actors’ wins and losses could be 
tallied, and so that conditions for all wins and losses could be associated with independent variables.  B cause there 
were 88 events, some of the events were counted multiple times, depending upon the number of participants 
involved.  Thus, an event involving Bush and Bono would have been calculated as two intervention opportunities to 
allow for the fact that both may have scored a “loss,” allowing a clean count for each political actor irrespective of 
his/her partner at a given event.  Since the dependent variable is a measure of wins and losses per individual’s 
intervention opportunity, and not a measure of winning or losing an entire event, this seemed an appropriate way to 
compute results. 
15 There were not enough intervention events in UK and Canadian newspapers to analyze them separately.   
91 
 
the event;16 and celebrity/politician combination, coded as a dummy variable (celebrity and 
politician present = 1; no celebrity and politician= 0). 
 
Results of the Win-Loss Ratio Analysis 
 Table 4.1 displays a summary of political actors’ win-loss records.  Each political actor 
had the opportunity to “win” or “lose” in a given intervention, whether they were the sole “star” 
or appeared with other celebrities and/or politicians.  Only those political actors that were 
involved in at least three interventions are displayed.  The first column represents “total wins 
across media types,” which includes Broadcast Transcripts and US Newspapers as w ll as UK 
and Canadian Newspapers on those cases where additional data was used in those markets.  
Content analyses of UK and Canadian Newspaper did not produce enough intervention 
opportunities to be statistically significant, so those results do not appear in the table below.  
Wins and losses were also tabulated in columns specific to Broadcast Transcripts and US 
Newspapers. 
                                                
16 Situations where specific congress people intervened were coded and counted by their name.  Numbers of 
politicians were capped at 6, equal to the highest number of celebrities at a given event.  The reason is that some 
institutions (such as the US Congress) drove some news events, and it is not easy to quantify a number in such 
circumstances.  If Congress intervenes, it does not realistically equate to 538 politicians when so many unnamed 
people produce an “intervention” in the media.   
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Total Wins Across All Cases Wins in Broadcast Transcripts
Political Actor Total N Total wins Total W/L % Political Actor BC N BC wins BC W/L %
George Clooney 36 20 55.56% Alicia Keys 3 3 100.00%
Alicia Keys 9 5 55.56% George Clooney 18 16 88.89%
Angelina Jolie 17 8 47.06% Angelina Jolie 6 5 83.33%
Barack Obama 19 8 42.11% Barack Obama 9 7 77.78%
Bono 53 20 37.74% Bill Clinton 3 2 66.67%
US Congress 13 4 30.77% US Congress 6 3 50.00%
Bill Clinton 7 2 28.57% Bono 21 9 42.86%
George W. Bush 22 4 18.18% George W. Bush 10 4 40.00%
Laura Bush 7 0 0.00% Laura Bush 3 0 0.00%
Wins in US Newspapers
Political Actor USNP N USNP wins USNP W/L %
Alicia Keys 3 2 66.67%
Angelina Jolie 6 3 50.00%
Bono 21 6 28.57%
George Clooney 18 4 22.22%
US Congress 6 1 16.67%
Barack Obama 9 1 11.11%
Bill Clinton 3 0 0.00%
George W. Bush 10 0 0.00%
Laura Bush 3 0 0.00%
 
Table 4.1 – Total Wins and Losses Across Media Types 
 Across all cases, the big “winners” are George Clooney and Alicia Keys, followed by 
Angelina Jolie.  What perhaps is most striking is that celebrities have better records than 
politicians across all media types.  In total wins, only Barack Obama ranks among the celebrities 
and Bono among the politicians, and both of them lie squarely in the middle of the results with 
celebrities on top and politicians on bottom.  The top winning percentage is 56%, a good record 
in baseball and quite good in this media environment where a political actor “wins” if they 
generate a spike and “loses” if the collective media turns away.  Even low percentages are 
positive in an environment when victory is attention and defeat is ignorance.  A “defeat” for one 
intervention may cost little and any political actor may have “victory” another day. 
A comparison of the win-loss record of political actors in broadcast media versus US 
newspapers reveals that most of the interventions have a 50% or higher success rate in bro dcast 
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media and 50% or lower in US newspapers.  This suggests that public figures in general have an 
easier time gaining attention in the broadcast media and a more difficult time in newspapers.  
With celebrities on top of broadcast and newspaper lists, it appears in both media that celebrities 
are more likely to have successful interventions than politicians are.   
 The win-loss records illustrate a high rate of success for celebrities.  Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between these interventions and wins and losses?  How do politicians and 
celebrities perform in competition across media types?  At the outset, one might assume that the 
serious and event-driven nature of newspapers would make them less likely to be susceptible to 
celebrity interventions than broadcast media, and that broadcast media would be more likely to 
follow the personalities and images associated with celebrity.  Table 4.2 rejects these 
assumptions.  This model compares celebrity versus politician interventions to see which is more 
likely to generate the win.   
Table 4.2 corroborates the win-loss findings:  that celebrities top all lists.  In broadcast 
media coverage, a celebrity intervention on a political issue increases the likelihood of 
heightened media coverage (β = 1.07, p ≤ .05).  Politicians’ interventions are not statistically 
significant in broadcast media (β = -0.13, n.s.).  What is surprising is that newspapers are more 
likely to pay attention to celebrity (β = 2.90, p ≤ .001) and politician interventions (β = 0.90, p ≤ 
.10) than broadcast media.  Across both media types, a celebrity intervention is more likely to 
produce a bump in coverage than a politician intervention. 
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Logistical Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers
β Wald χ2 β Wald χ2
Celebrity Intervention 1.07** 6.26 2.90**** 13.44
(0.43) (0.79)
Politician Intervention -0.13 0.09 0.90* 3.78
(0.42) (0.46)
Constant -0.09 0.04 -3.77**** 20.25
(0.46) (0.84)
Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.07 0.17
χ
2 8.21 23.07
N 123 123
*p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; **** p < .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 4.2 - Likelihood that a celebrity versus a politician intervention increases coverage 
 
This sample concludes that celebrities are more successful than politicians at gaining 
media attention when advocating political issues.  Does this effect increase with multiple actors?  
Do more celebrities increase the likelihood of coverage?  Does it help if politicians and 
celebrities “team up?”  Consistent with the conclusions in the previous table, Table 4.3 suggests 
that “more is better” when it comes to celebrities.   
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Logistical Regression Estimates
Broadcast Transcripts US Newspapers
β Wald χ2 β Wald χ2
No. of celebrities 0.74*** 8.93 0.83**** 21.13
(0.25) (0.18)
No. of politicians 0.01 0.01 0.18 1.00
(0.14) (0.18)
Celebrity and politician present at event together -0.31 0.37 1.14** 4.42
(0.51) (0.54)
Constant -0.17 0.29 -2.88**** 37.36
(0.31) (0.47)
Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.13 0.30
χ
2 17.33 43.38
N 123 123
*p < .10; ** p < .05; ***p < .01; **** p < .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 4.3 - Likelihood that multiples or combinations of celebrities and politicians increase 
coverage 
 
There is a positive correlation between number of celebrities and obtaining a “win.” The 
more celebrities involved in an intervention, the more likely they are to create a spike in 
coverage in both broadcast media (β = 0.74, p ≤ .01) and in US newspaper coverage (β = 0.83, p 
≤ .001).  More politicians do not create more coverage.  However, if a celebrity and a politician 
intervene together, they are likely to increase coverage in US newspapers (β = 1.14, p ≤ .05), but 
not necessarily in the broadcast media (β = -0.31, n.s).   
 
Implications 
The data in this chapter suggest that when it comes to gaining attention for a politic l 
cause, celebrity interventions are more likely to produce media coverage than politician 
interventions across media types and that more celebrities may increase th  effect.  Combinations 
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of celebrities and politicians acting together are also likely to gain someattention, particularly in 
US newspapers.  Politicians are more likely to affect coverage in US newspapers than in 
broadcast media, but do not perform as well as celebrities in any media form when itcomes to 
pointing public attention toward a political issue. 
That politicians have a difficult time producing spikes in both media markets is a rather
surprising finding.  Politicians, who need to advance their messages, communicate through
various media forms daily.  One might assume that democratically elected public officials are 
credible and should be able to produce a bigger spike than anyone else.  The President of the 
United States, arguably the most powerful political figure in the world, should produce the 
biggest spikes of all (Kernell 1997).  However, it is easy to forget that the president makes many 
statements.17  Some are flashy and exciting and relate directly to issues that concern the public.  
Others are ordinary.  A president’s ability to generate interest, or to distract from problematic 
issues, is also limited and he sometimes fails.  Even if a president thinks an issue is globally 
important, the issue may not resonate with the public or the media’s idea of what makes a good 
enough story to sell more units.  After all, media organizations are also businesses (Kuypers 
2013).  An individual editor’s first commitment may be to providing quality and accurate news.  
However, which stories, how many stories, and how prominent the stories appear may be a f ctor 
of not only how “big” the story is but also how the story might lead to higher circulation and 
greater sales and advertisement revenue (Bennett 2012; Cook 2005; E. J. Epstein 1973; Jowell et 
al. 2007; Lim 2012; J. C. Turner 1987).  If this is the case, politicians are “business as usual.”  
Newspapers in particular do not necessarily need statements from public officials to tell a story 
about a current event.  Broadcast news, which is more reliant on visuals and sound bites for
                                                
17 The notion that a politician may be “overexposed” and therefore, less potent, is consistent with the cel brity 
product endorsement literature (Roy 2012). 
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increased entertainment value, is more likely to desire personalities to provide c ntent in order to 
contextualize stories (Cook 2005; Kazin, Edwards, and Rothman 2011, 401).  Still, with 
hundreds of options to use as “talking heads,” politicians are in high supply and part of the 
routine of news making, even in broadcast news.   
If a politician wants to stand out, she will place herself next to a talking head that is lower 
in supply and higher in demand—a celebrity touting an issue that appeals to the politician.  A 
celebrity advocating on behalf of a public issue is a rare commodity:  far from business as usual.  
Celebrities are typically more likely to gain attention for their latest project, or for getting 
themselves into trouble.  When celebrities appear authentic and articulate when speaki g about a 
public issue, and when they utilize the skills that have made them popular in the first place, 
public policy advocacy marries the theater, a premise that will be explored further in chapter 5.  
Entertainment may not be news in this case, but the news becomes entertaining. 
The data presented above are consistent with this conclusion.  They imply that a celebrity 
does not need a politician to be legitimated in the media.  Since celebrity interventions are 
stronger than politician interventions, and that more celebrities generate a greater level of 
attention than more politicians, we might conclude on the contrary, that celebrities are the draw 
and politicians are the beneficiary when they appear together.  Through the celebrity, a politician 
gains special attention from the media.  If the celebrity plays the game right and coordinates well 
with her advocacy network, the celebrity may not only gain access to lobby high profile decision 
makers; she may also create an opening for her affiliated activists to become intimately involved 
in the policy process.  It is clear why Bono would seek out George W. Bush.  These data provide 
a reason why George W. Bush might want or need Bono.  Bono provides a means for Bush to 
gain attention on an issue he cares about.   
98 
 
The ranking of celebrities on each list might also provide some insights about why some 
interventions work and some do not.  In Broadcast Transcripts, Keys, Clooney, and Jolie are at 
the top of the list.  It is striking, though, that while Keys has only three low risk intervention 
opportunities, and yields a 100% success rate, and Jolie is at 86% for six intervention 
opportunities, Clooney manages to maintain an 89% record with 18 intervention opportunities.  
For other political actors, it appears that more opportunities may yield lower percentages.  Bono 
has the most intervention opportunities in this sample at 53.  He also is ranked among the lowest 
of the celebrities in terms of coverage in broadcast media.  In other words, there may be a fatigue 
effect where media organizations begin to see certain celebrities as routine and others as 
extraordinary (Roy 2012).  Just as a president may become “routine,” so might an overexp s d 
celebrity.  Likewise, the very qualities that make Bono more of a routine politician in broadcast 
media may make him more attractive in US newspapers, where he ranks among the most 
successful of the celebrities.  He is a routine policy insider, given his long track record of 
lobbying Congress, meeting presidents, attending G8 summits, and involving himself in detailed 
facets of the policy making process.  
Indeed, Clooney’s success might be tied to the fact that he is aware of overexposing 
himself in the wrong ways.  Clooney’s interventions tend to be high profile, dramatic events 
designed to attract a lot of attention.  He uses these events and his star power to provide 
opportunities and leverage to create an opportunity for his connected lobbyist and policy wonk, 
John Prendergast, to play an insider game.  Bono ultimately had to choose whether he wanted to 
primarily play the role of outraged celebrity activist or thoughtful insider.  He leans toward the 
latter.  As a result, he is much more cautious about his public statements and events, trying not to 
burn his bridges and upset his inside game.  Clooney, on the other hand, has the luxury of 
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choosing a strictly outsider strategy, yet sending in and accompanying Pre dergast, who can do 
the insider work for him.18  This gives him the freedom focus upon his core competency:  
playing the angry movie star in public, while allowing Prendergast to be the educated, yet 
zealous insider.  Prendergast could make thousands of appearances and there would be little 
Prendergast fatigue because no one notices him as much as they do Clooney.  Clooney can be 
selective about his interventions and stay “fresh” in the broadcast media. 
Another reason why the media may be turning to a star such as George Clooney so 
consistently may be implied in a statement Clooney made about the media’s coverage and the 
American public’s response to the Darfur crisis: 
The unfortunate truth of it is it’s not somehow sexy enough news and it’s hard.  It’s hard 
to look at, and after a while people don't want to see it.  And there's a lot of, I think, wear 
and tear on people seeing a lot of tragedy.  But while we don't pay attention to it ad sort 
of shut our eyes, there’s an awful lot of killing going on, an awful lot of rape going on.  
Here's the thing: We always see this now.  We have tragedy fatigue on television.  Every 
day, 20 kids [are] killed in Iraq or, you know, there’s always disaster (Clooney 2006). 
 
People may experience politician or celebrity fatigue.  They may also experi nce tragedy 
fatigue (Acampora and Cotten 2008, xi; Associated Press 2008).  However, perhaps the “sexy” 
part is the key to understanding the role of actors like Clooney and Jolie in broadcast media, a 
variable that is not lost on the advertising literature (Berscheid and Walster 1974; McGuire 
1985).  Clooney did not exactly say it in this way, but he implied it:  the media is about “sexy.”  
Perhaps there is no other way to make a tragedy in Africa sexy other than to put George 
Clooney’s face on it.  As indicated above, the pursuit of sound bites to make news more 
entertaining leads intelligent journalists to more attractive talking heads.  Jolie and Clooney may 
have a degree of credibility, but if they also exude “sexiness,” why not privilege th ir profiles 
                                                
18 See Clark, 2006; Khagram et al., 2002; Price, 1998; Torrance & Torrance, 2006 for literature on outsider 
strategies. 
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over that of an aging rocker like Bono or a stock photo of lesser known politicians?  A CNN 
headline underlines an answer to this question: “Clooney, senators urge action on Darfur.”  
Clooney was the headliner.  Senators in attendance included Sam Brownback and Barack Obma 
(CNN 2006).  Barack Obama may have become the president of the United States, but as a well-
known Senator, he was still Clooney’s sidekick on CNN.   
Newspapers seem to be different.  In print, might US newspapers privilege a Bono or 
Angelina Jolie, who have credentials in the political establishment and understand policy 
making, over Clooney, who is very intelligent and articulate about his issue but plays more of an 
outsider’s game?  Sexy does not translate as well in media that provide fewer pictures and is not 
an essential quality of print news. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided some answers to questions about whether celebrities could 
command attention in the mainstream media on political issues, whether they could compete 
with politicians, and the circumstances that make for a successful celebrity intervention.  It is 
possible for both celebrities and politicians to produce visible spikes in coverage in broadcast 
news and newspaper coverage.  It may be more difficult for both to penetrate newspapers and 
more likely for celebrities to be successful in both.  Indeed, more celebrities may lead to more 
coverage.  In US newspapers, politicians may gain an advantage by allying with celebrities, to 
advance their agenda or burnish their image on particular issues.  This provides an opening f r 
celebrities to gain access to politicians and the political process.  Thus, there may be a 
connection between the outsider game of gaining media attention and the insider game of ining 
access and advantage in the policymaking process.   
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The analyses of chapters 3 and 4 focused on the ability of celebrities to gain media 
attention for political issues.  The research suggests that celebrities have an bility to influence 
public agendas by shining a spotlight on a particular issue.  Where celebrities shine their 
spotlight, the media tends to look.  However, even the aggregate analysis of chapter 4 rises
some additional questions.  Once the public is paying attention to the celebrity, and the issue, can 
celebrities affect people’s attitudes?  Raising the profile of an issue is an impressive 
accomplishment.  But do people care about what the celebrity says? 
In addition, any celebrity may be able to gain attention, but can just any celebrity 
convince people that they ought to agree with him or her?  Being famous may be necessary to 
reach a broad audience, but certainly would not be sufficient to persuade that audience.  G orge 
Clooney, based on his patterns of success documented in the previous chapters, appears to be 
quite credible when discussing Sudan.  Dennis Rodman, on the other hand, is a joke when he 
talks about North Korea.  Does the perceived credibility of a celebrity matter?  Is credibility or 
success somehow linked to the celebrity’s artistic abilities?  Can a celebrity advocate just 
anything, or does it somehow have to be consistent with what people know or believe about that 
celebrity?  If celebrities are uniquely persuasive, over what types of isues do they have 
influence?  An ability to persuade would not only translate to success in agenda setting in the 
media, but also in personal lobbying efforts, which has important implications for insider 
strategies.  Thus, the next chapter will attempt to answer this question:  can a celebrity frame 
issues and prime audiences?  If this can be demonstrated, celebrities might rival politicians in 
power along an additional dimension.   
 
Chapter 5 - “I’m not George Harrison.”  Celebrity Framing and  Persuasion 
 
 In 1974, Father Bill Ayers wanted to start an organization to fight world hunger after a 
severe draught in Sub Saharan Africa.  He approached Harry Chapin, famous for his hit, “Cats in 
the Cradle” to do for world hunger what George Harrison had done to publicize the crisis in 
Bangladesh in 1971.  Chapin argued, “I’m not George Harrison.”  Chapin said it would take him 
fifty concerts to make as much as Harrison could make in one night.  So they connected with he 
United Nations and eventually started an organization called World Hunger Year (WHY) to raise 
money and heighten awareness of the problem.  Ultimately, Chapin wanted to lobby the US 
Congress to divert surplus US food supplies.  To learn to successfully how to access the powers 
in Washington and to establish meaningful alliances that might help support the effort, Chapin
reached out to Ralph Nader, who had successfully pressured Congress to enact public interest 
legislation.   
 Nader was not interested and not impressed.  He had solicited “concerned stars” such as 
Marlon Brando, Linda Ronstadt, and Robert Lamm of Chicago, who “had not been able to get 
beyond the point of doing a big splashy publicity thing” and make “a long-range commitment.”  
He thought Chapin would be just like them.  Chapin asked if Nader had heard any of his music.  
Nader said, no, so Chapin pulled out a guitar and sang “Cats in the Cradle.”   
“Well, that’s something I could listen to,” Nader said. 
 It was at that point that Nader reconsidered his affiliation with Chapin.  Chapin explained 
how he agreed with Nader’s skepticism of celebrity involvement:  “I mean, half the country 
thinks we solve our environmental problems on Earth Day, or racial problems with Peter, Paul 
and Mary singing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, or hunger with a Bangladesh concert.  
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You have to be working in the process.  Students ask me when world hunger will end and I tell 
them it’ll be decades before we really see a difference.” 
 Chapin persuaded Nader to give him a chance.  Chapin agreed to perform at fourteen 
Public Interest Research Group benefits as well as the national convention in Washi gton, D.C.  
In exchange he got Nader’s aid in organizing.  Ultimately the alliance provided access to some of 
the most powerful people in Congress, a seat on President Carter’s Presidential Commission on 
Domestic and International Hunger, and a congressional bill on food aid (Coan 2001, 280–285, 
381; Marsh 1978). 
 Chapin’s intents illustrate some of the methods of agenda setting described in chapters 3 
and 4.  These chapters established that not only were celebrities capable of commanding media 
attention, but their abilities at times exceeded those of conventional politicians.  In addition, the 
more celebrities that are involved in an intervention, the more likely the media ar  to t ke note.  
According to the data, politicians can dominate the media at times, but are not nearly as effective 
as raising awareness about specific political issues at discrete points consi tently over time. 
 These chapters illustrate the power of celebrities to attract media attention, which goes a 
long way toward explaining how they may be capable of setting public agendas.  Chapin, in his 
own words, was not George Harrison and could not attract the type of media attention that a 
Beatle could command.  However, his efforts did end with a degree of success.  The difference 
for Chapin was his ability to persuade key individuals and change minds in order to achieve his 
goals.  Thus far, the previous chapters do not address this ability.  They do not reveal whether
celebrities’ messages successfully persuade target audiences.  Attracting attention toward a 
political issue is a powerful ability.  Persuasion would add another dimension to that power.  
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Bono can attract a lot of attention.  Once people pay attention, are they prone to beli ve th  
message?  
 The impact of celebrity endorsements is not obvious (Brubaker 2011; M. C. Campbell 
2012; Garthwaite and Moore 2008; D. J. Jackson and Darrow 2005; Pease and Brewer 2008).  
Media messages have been known to mobilize or demobilize citizens (Aarts and Semetko 2003; 
Hillygus 2005; Schuck and Vreese 2009) and even influence undecided citizens on how to vote 
(Hillygus and Jackman 2003).  One assumes that politicians have credibility on political issues.  
Celebrities are entertainers.  Is it possible for entertainers to be persuasive on issues of public 
policy?  The purpose of this chapter is to discover whether a celebrity can change minds or even 
effectively call citizens to action.  If a celebrity delivering a message persuades the person 
receiving it, that celebrity, amplified through the media, has a significa t amount of power over 
an audience and thus public opinion, voters, and perhaps even policy makers.  The following 
section will explain the methods pursued to find answers to these questions. 
 
Methodology 
 To evaluate the ability of celebrities to persuade, two types of surveys were constructed.  
The first “authenticity and credibility survey” was created to discover how respondents perceive 
celebrities across a series of issues and how their credibility compares to  few high profile 
politicians.  The second was an experimental survey design intended to evaluate wheth r a 
celebrity advocating a particular issue could affect the attitudes of respondents in an 
experimental group compared to a control group.  The surveys will be described in detail i  
following sections.  First, there will be a description of the characteristics of the sample and a 
discussion of the process of selecting cases and celebrities for the surveys. 
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The Sample 
 The surveys were administered to 887 respondents.  Of the 887 respondents, 177 took a 
version of the authenticity and credibility survey and 831 took one of the experimental surveys.   
All instruments were made available in self-administered paper and pencil survey  as 
well as identical online surveys hosted by FluidSurvey.  Most of the sample came from adult 
students attending undergraduate and graduate classes at select universities in the Greater Kansas 
City area.  Of that group, most were graduate students, many about to receivetheir d gree.  Thus, 
the majority of the sample was comprised of well-educated professional and working class 
people.  A minority were full time students.  From the university samples, 569 students took he 
paper version.  Electronic versions of surveys were taken by 318 respondents, most of whom 
were online students.  Many of the online respondents also saw the survey posted on various 
websites and voluntarily agreed to take the survey.   
Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found. lists the 
characteristics of the sample.  The ratio of men to women in the sample is identical to the 
percentage in the general US population, using US Census figures from 2012 (The US Census 
Bureau Website Services & Coordination Staff n.d.).  While the sample has wide age diversity, 
the median age (31) is slightly younger than the US general population (37).  The numbers of 
those who self-identify racially as “white” is slightly overrepresented, but close to the US total 
percentage.  Blacks and Latinos appear to be underrepresented, although the survey did not 
distinguish between race and ethnicity as the US census does, which makes the comparison 
imperfect.  The percentage of whites is probably correct, while some of Latino ethnicity may 
have reported themselves white, black, or other.  The number of Democrats in the sample (32%) 
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is close to the same number reported by Gallup (31%) for the dates of August 7-11, 2013.  
Republicans are overrepresented (33% in the sample and 24% nationwide), although this is not 
surprising given the preponderance of respondents from suburban areas in the Greater Kansas 
City area, many of whom were business professionals.  Independents are also underrepresented 
in the survey (35% in the sample and 43% nationwide) (“Party Affiliation” 2014).   
Age Sample age US Pop.
Median Age 31 37.3
Youngest Participant 18
Oldest Participant 68
Gender % of sample % of US Pop.
Men 432 49 49
Women 455 51 51
Race
White 712 80 78
Black 83 9 13
Latino 22 2 17
Other 53 6 8
Education
Grade School/Some High School 2 ** 18
High School Diploma 29 3 30
Some College/No Degree 299 34 27
College Degree 403 45 18
Graduate Degree 154 17 9
Party Affiliation
Democrat 283 32 31
Republican 291 33 24
Independent or Other 312 35 43
N=887 ** Less than 1%
US Census Bureau Statistics, 2012.  Party Affiliation data were from Aug. 7-11, 2013, Gallup.  
Table 5.1 - Characteristics of the Sample 
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As expected, the most striking difference between the sample and the US population is 
the level of education.  The sample is comprised of highly educated respondents, most of whom 
have already received undergraduate or graduate degrees (62% combined) versus the US 
population (27% combined).  Likewise, the sample underrepresents those who have less 
education (only 3% have a high school diploma or less education) compared to the US 
population (48% have a high school diploma or less education).   
To the extent that differences in the survey may reflect differences in reult compared to 
the general population, one might conclude that the sample population may create a more 
difficult case for celebrity persuasion (Bartels 2002; Brady and Sniderman 1985; A. Campbell et 
al. 1980; Dancey and Goren 2010; Gaines et al. 2007).  If one assumes that party identificatio  is 
stronger in the sample and that there are fewer independents than in the general population, we 
might conclude that there are fewer “swing votes,” so to speak, who may be persuaded by 
celebrities.  That might reduce the mean differences between control and experim ntal group, 
assuming a fairly even distribution of these characteristics across frame and issue areas.   
In addition, if we assume that those who are more educated may be more informed about 
politics and savvy about their understanding of issues, they may be more inclined to think
independently than to be swayed by endorsers.  Indeed, there were many unsolicited wr tten 
responses on the surveys, indicating a high level of engagement with the questions.  Respondents 
were not simply responding to a frame; they were thinking deeply about these issues.  Wh ther 
this was due to the education level of the respondents or to a high degree of interest in the survey 
is not clear.  Some expressed skepticism about celebrities and politicians alike.  Many wrote 
nuanced comments that justified their answers to questions.  Others wrote simplistic slogans.  
Some of these comments have been included in the analysis below.  Overall, this high degree of 
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engagement decreases the likelihood that the respondents would be lightly manipulated by 
endorsements, which makes a more difficult case for celebrity persuasion. 
 
Case and Celebrity Selection 
To compare celebrity performance across cases, eight political issueswere elected:   
• Intervention in Syria 
• Federal support to combat AIDS in the developing world 
• Forgiving debt of developing countries 
• Ending the Cuban embargo 
• Death penalty for Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev  
• Federal relief for domestic disasters such as Hurricane Sandy 
• Gun control 
• Same-sex marriage 
These domestic and international issues had varying levels of salience (“MostImp r ant Problem 
| Gallup Historical Trends” 2013).  Some were perceived as “wedge issues” by at least one major 
political party, while some issues were more consensual (Kohut 2006).  
 A diversity of celebrities was chosen among musicians, actors, and athletes.  As 
illustrated in Table 5.2, ten celebrities were chosen as “endorsers” on the aforementioned issues. 
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Name Issues 
Angelina Jolie Federal Disaster Aid, Syrian Intervention 
Bono Federal Disaster Aid, Debt Relief 
Bruce Springsteen Gun Control 
Clint Eastwood Gun Control 
Ellen DeGeneres Same-Sex Marriage 
Elton John Federal Funding to Combat Global AIDS Crisis 
George Clooney Cuban Embargo, Syrian Intervention 
Lady Gaga Same-Sex Marriage 
Oprah Winfrey Death Penalty 
Tim Tebow Same-Sex Marriage 
Table 5.2 - List of Celebrity Endorsers 
The method of selection takes into account how different celebrities may affect di rent 
respondents.  Some celebrities are perceived to be quite liberal, some quite conservative, and 
some hard to tell.  They are all generally famous, although some respondents may have been 
more likely to recognize Oprah Winfrey over Tim Tebow or Lady Gaga over Bono depen ing 
upon their age, ethnicity, musical preferences, and whether they are a sports fan.  All of the 
celebrities have either been involved in advocating a political issue or candidate to v rying 
degrees or have been highly politicized themselves.   
Since it is possible that any celebrity could lose trust with part of the audience, if s/he is 
seen as a member of a political outgroup (Brubaker 2011), the experimental survey controls for 
this potential bias by asking respondents about their party identification, how they feel about the 
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celebrity, and by selecting celebrities from across the political spectrum.  The authenticity and 
credibility survey offers some hard data about how respondents perceive them.19  So e 
celebrities were expected to be highly credible with some demographics (such as Clint Eastwood 
with Republicans, Tim Tebow with conservative Christians, perhaps George Clooney with 
Democrats, etc.).  While Lady Gaga has been politically involved in issues regarding gay rights, 
her efforts are not commonly known and one might expect her to be taken less seriously as a 
young pop artist.  Oprah Winfrey is almost universally loved by women.  Someone like Bruc  
Springsteen, who has openly endorsed Democratic candidates, has often been interpreted 
favorably and his music co-opted by Republicans and Democrats alike (Grossberg 1987; 
Marshall 1997, 75). 
 Celebrities were matched with issues based on various criteria.  Some, such as Elton 
John, Bono, Ellen DeGeneres, and Lady Gaga are real activists for AIDS, debt relief, and same-
sex marriage.  Others, such as George Clooney and Angelina Jolie have advocated on various 
international issues and seemed to be a good fit for the Syria case but had not made public 
statements about it.  Tim Tebow has not made any specific public statements on same-sex 
marriage, but is viewed favorably by the conservative Christian community and might be seen as 
credible by some on that issue.  Bruce Springsteen and Clint Eastwood might be seen as lib ral 
and conservative representatives on opposite sides of the gun control issue, although their real 
positions are not commonly known.  Springsteen has said little about guns.  Ironically, 
Eastwood’s real statements have reflected a pro-gun control position despite hi  ublic 
endorsements of Republican candidates who are staunchly against gun control (Eastwood 2000).  
 
                                                
19 See Lammie (2007) on how respondents may react to celebrities differently based upon party affiliation. 
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Authenticity and Credibility Survey 
Respondents were asked three essential questions about the ten celebrities on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale with a range of 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).  Borrowing the idea that 
celebrities’ power may lie within their perceived “authenticity” (Bourdieu 1992, 130; Dyer and 
McDonald 1998; Jauss 2008, 153–181; Marshall 1997, 20, 52–56; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, 
and Huliaras 2011, 9; Weber 1968, 6, 1978, 241), the first question was about whether the 
celebrity’s “talents, abilities, and professional projects” uniquely make him/her an “authentic 
spokesperson.”  The purpose of this question is to determine whether the respondent believes th  
celebrity is “authentic,” and if that authenticity is tied to their entertainment ability rather than 
their credibility.  The second question asks whether the celebrity is a “credible spokesperson” on 
the issue, a proxy to measure relative expert power (Atkin and Block 1983; Becker 2010; French 
and Raven 1959; Raven 1993).  The third question asks whether the respondent believes the 
celebrity supports a particular position on that issue, to provide data on whether respondents 
believe that a celebrity would really advocate that position (Friedman and Friedman 1979; Kahle 
and Homer 1985; Kamins 1970; Lammie 2007; McCracken 1989). 
 Four politicians were selected for points of comparison against the celebriti s:  President 
Barack Obama, former Secretary of State and Senator Hillary Clinton, Speaker of the House 
John Boehner, and Senator Marco Rubio.  They were selected first for their positions of power. 
Obama and Boehner are the highest ranking political figures in their respective political parties.  
They all have relatively high name recognition.  Clinton and Rubio were also selected because 
they were considered by many to be early frontrunners in the 2016 presidential election and 
generated a lot of media buzz.  Since these politicians were public officials and not artists, 
respondents were not asked about how their talents and abilities made them authentic.  
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Respondents were also not asked about the politicians perceived positions on various political 
issues since most of them were fairly well known.  Instead, respondents were ask d the 
credibility question—whether the public official in question was perceived as credible when 
discussing the eight issues covered by this study.  In this way, Obama’s or Boehner’s credibility 
could be compared directly to Ellen DeGeneres’ or George Clooney’s along several public 
policy issues. 
Because of the long list of questions and subjects, the questions were broken into 
multiple surveys in order to prevent survey fatigue.  Survey questions were also mixed so that 
respondents would evaluate different mixes of subjects.  Mixing the questions and the order was 
an attempt to prevent biased patterns of answers based on consistent, ordered comparisons. 
 
Experimental Design Surveys 
In order to evaluate the effect of celebrity endorsements on subjects receiving the 
message, an experimental survey was deployed following a static-group comparis n research 
design (Babbie 2004, 228–230; Brubaker 2011; D. T. Campbell and Stanley 1963; M. D. Cobb 
and Kuklinski 1997; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000).  In this design, a 
control group was exposed to general information about a political issue.  An experimental group 
was exposed to exactly the same information, plus a frame.  All groups were asked exactly the 
same questions about how they feel about the issue.  If the experimental group responded 
differently from the control group, then we may conclude that the frame had an impacton the 
thinking of respondents.  Multiple versions of the survey were constructed, each one focusing on 
a different issue and a different celebrity. 
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Much scholarship in the media and public opinion literatures suggest that in experimental 
surveys, frames do affect the thinking of respondents (Brubaker 2011; M. D. Cobb and Kuklinski 
1997; Iyengar 1994; Jerit 2008; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Schuck and Vreese 2009, 2009; 
Zald 1996; Zaller 1992, 1996).  If a frame alone, without any celebrity or politician’s name 
attached, is capable of persuading a target audience, how can one determine that a celebri y 
making a statement will be more persuasive than the statement itself?  Two innovat ons were 
introduced into the design to address this question.  First, while the general information section 
was relatively brief, reasons to accept different policy options were summarized so that 
respondents would be forced to think intelligently about multiple policy options.  Experimental 
groups included a celebrity frame.  Thus, for a respondent to agree with a celebrity s/he would 
have to have already wrestled with the issue, making the introduction of the celebrity name the 
key difference between control and experimental groups, and making it less likely that the 
celebrity name or statement could manipulate them.  This also raised the bar for celebrity 
persuasion, ensuring that ideological and party identification cues might be allow d to fairly 
compete with a celebrity’s statement.20 
                                                
20 This bar is set very high for celebrity persuasion in this study.  The Elaboration Likelihood Model argues that 
there are two routes to persuasion: a central and peripheral route.  The central route assumes that the receiver is 
engaged and actively weighing the cues provided by the persuader, who is providing reasons to support an 
argument.  Source characteristics may be ignored.  Persuasion is more difficult because people are actively engaging 
with the information which may challenge core beliefs.  The peripheral route, on the other hand,  is marked by low 
involvement where an individual will weigh more source characteristics such as expertise, credibility, and 
attractiveness as crucial cues (Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).  It is an easier but less enduring route of 
persuasion, likened to using attractive models to sell beer in television commercials.  While expertise and credibility 
of celebrities is not well established, and is a topic of study in this chapter, attractiveness is often attributed to 
celebrities.  The easy case for celebrity persuasion w uld be for this methodology to simply put up a icture of the 
celebrity with an endorsement and very few cues providing reasons or evidence to support an argument.  While a 
celebrity photo was included on the feeling thermometer question, separate from the endorsement frame p g , the 
information and frames provided many cues that likely put respondents into a central persuasion route.  In this way, 
celebrities hypothetically could not rely upon good l oks alone.  This is a better analogy for celebrities’ involvement 
in the political environment since these otherwise attractive and charismatic figures suddenly are advocating 
positions that may require thought in order to change minds.  Therefore, if celebrities are able to persuade in even 
this very restrictive framework, a strong case can indeed be made. 
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 Second, a “super control” group was surveyed to compare their responses to control and 
experimental groups.  This group was treated to the same information and questions.  The 
difference was that the super control group’s framed statement was not attributed to a specific 
celebrity, but an unnamed “noted celebrity.”  In that way, the design compares respond nts 
exposed to no celebrity endorsement of an issue (control), respondents exposed to an unnamed 
celebrity endorsement (super control), and respondents exposed to a named celebrity
endorsement (experimental).  Introduction of the super control allows one group of respondents 
to be persuaded by the frame without celebrity attribution.  If the super control group is 
persuaded in a way that is different from the control group, it might be the frame alone doing the 
persuading.  If those from the experimental group produce significantly different responses from 
both control and super control, we may conclude that it really is a particular celeb ity doing the 
persuading:  not just the debate or frame itself.  As a result, the method may produce fewer 
significant results, but those results that are significant may be more definitiv .21   
 One set of questions attempted to measure attitudinal variation: can a celebrity affect the 
attitudes of those exposed to the frame?  A second set of questions attempted to measure 
respondents’ proclivity toward taking concrete action in response to the frame.  Assuming that 
respondents answer honestly, after exposure to a celebrity frame, are they more or less likely to 
give money and time to a cause or to vote for candidates who support a particular position?  
 To ensure that celebrities were positively identified, the participant responds to a photo 
and name of a celebrity accompanied by directions to rank that celebrity on a 100 degree “f eling 
thermometer” where ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees indicated a favorable nd warm 
feeling toward the person.  Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees indicated an unfavorable 
                                                
21 In this way, the design approaches a “least likely” methodological strategy, similar to case selection in chapter 3 
(Eckstein, 1998; Gerring, 2007).   
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feeling.  A rating of 50 degrees means that the respondent did not feel particularly warm or cold 
toward the person (General Social Survey n.d.; Lammie 2007).  When a respondent did not 
answer the feeling thermometer, they were presumed to not recognize the celebrity.   
Because of the ambiguity of some of the celebrities’ political orientations and positions, 
different versions of the experimental survey have celebrities “flipping sides.”  For example, on 
one experimental survey, George Clooney is quoted as being in favor of intervention in Syria.  In 
another, he is opposed to it.  With few exceptions, each celebrity plays both for and against 
his/her typecast role.22  Some have argued that if a target audience and a speaker share the same 
view, but the speaker advocates for a position against expectations, that s/he can be more
persuasive (Linder, Cooper, and Jones 1967; Nel, Helmreich, and Aronson 1969).  Others have 
argued that doubt produces stronger advocacy (Gal and Rucker 2010).  One would expect Tebow 
to be persuasive among those who like him when they share the same beliefs.  If Tebow is 
capable of changing attitudes despite an initial difference of positions, it impl es that a celebrity 
endorsement is quite powerful indeed.  In this way, the data can reveal whether celebrities are 
better at advocating on one side of the issue than the other or whether a celebrity’s perceived 
position is irrelevant to the outcome.   
For purpose of illustration, results from the surveys of two of the eight issue areas will be 
featured in this chapter.  The first is intervention in Syria.  All surveys focused on the Syrian 
intervention issue included this general information: 
Now we would like to get your reaction to the ongoing conflict in Syria.  Since March 15, 
2011, the country of Syria has been engaged in a civil war between forces loyal to the 
Syrian Ba'ath Party government led by President Bashar al-Assad and groups seeking to 
oust these government forces.  By April, the government was using armed force against
peaceful protesters, leading to condemnation by the Arab League, United States,
European Union, and other countries.  Since then an organized “Syrian Opposition” has 
                                                
22 Some, such as Ellen DeGeneres on Same Sex Marriage, Bono on Debt Relief, and Elton John on AIDS funding 
were not “flipped” since their true positions are alre dy very well known. 
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emerged, engaging government forces in combat across the country.  By February 2013, 
the estimated death toll was 70,000.  The Obama administration has indicated that if 
government forces use chemical weapons on their own people, the US will be compelled 
to intervene.  Recently, the administration announced that there was some evidence that 
chemical weapons have been used, but that the evidence is not compelling enough yet to 
intervene in Syria and that they want support from allies before planning any military 
action.  Many Republican lawmakers have attacked the president’s position, argui g that 
they should already have bombed Syrian air bases, armed the rebels and readied an 
international force to secure chemical weapons stocks. 
 
The control surveys received no additional information.  The super control and experimental 
groups receiving a pro-Syrian intervention survey read this frame at the bottom of he general 
information paragraph: 
 
“We already know the Assad regime has chemical weapons and has committed atrocities 
and human rights abuses against its own people.  In addition, an organized opposition is 
ready to take over the reins of government if Assad is pressured out of power.  Therefore, 
I believe the US should increase the pressure on the regime by militarily interve ing in 
Syria before more people die.” 
 
In pro-Syrian intervention super control groups, this quote was attributed to “a noted celebrity.”  
In one of the experimental groups, it was attributed to George Clooney.  In another experim ntal 
group, it was attributed to Angelina Jolie. 
 An anti-Syrian intervention quote was also constructed and included in additional super 
control and experimental groups.  This quote appeared at the bottom of the general inform tion 
paragraph in those surveys: 
“While I am concerned about the people of Syria, I am more concerned about making the 
same mistake we made when invading Iraq:  getting involved before we had the 
evidence, the proper strategy, and international support.  Without all of that, we’re sur  to 
alienate our allies and ultimately fail, potentially risking American lives.  Therefore, I am 
in favor of staying out of it.  We don’t need to get involved in another war.” 
 
Again, this quote was attributed to “a noted celebrity” in the super control groups, and to George 
Clooney and Angelina Jolie in two separate experimental groups.   
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 In all Syrian intervention surveys, respondents were asked these questions on a 5-poi t 
Likert-type scale with a range of 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely):23  
Syria
Very 
unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely
Very 
Likely
What is the likelihood that you would support US military 
intervention in Syria? 1 2 3 4 5
What is the likelihood that you would support a US militarily 
intervention without consultation or support from allies? 1 2 3 4 5
What is the likelihood that you would support a US military 
intervention to stop or prevent human rights abuses? 1 2 3 4 5
What is the likelihood that you would vote for a public official 
who supports military intervention in Syria? 1 2 3 4 5  
Table 5.3 - Questions on Syrian Intervention Surveys 
 The second issue of focus in this chapter is on same-sex marriage.  All surveys on this 
issue included the following general information: 
Now we would like to get your feelings about same-sex marriage.  Several jurisdictions 
in the United States recognize same-sex marriage.  Nine states prohibit it by law and 
thirty prohibit it by constitutional mandate. The Defense of Marriage Act prevents the 
federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages, although the constitutionality 
of the act is under court review.  Gay rights advocates argue that without the right to 
marry, they are stigmatized and treated differently than heterosexual couples and are 
denied legal access to certain benefits that are unique to married couples.  For example, 
legally married couples get special tax breaks, preferential insurance rtes, and are 
allowed to be involved in end of life issues with their spouses.  Same-sex couples receive 
none of these benefits.  They also argue that this would encourage monogamy and strong 
family values between gay couples and if they are allowed to adopt, more childrn may 
find loving homes.  On the other hand, opponents of same-sex marriage argue that 
marriage is an ancient religious institution that has always been defined as being between 
a man and a woman.  To legitimize same-sex marriage would weaken respect for this 
institution, confuse gender roles, and weaken the traditional family values some say are 
essential to society.  They argue that the homosexual lifestyle is sinful and leads to 
immorality, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, psychological disorders, and 
other problems.  The legalization of same-sex marriage could also lead to other 
unacceptable forms of marriage such as polygamy. 
 
                                                
23 Phrasing of the questions, design of the scales, and overall survey design were modeled after a number of studies 
from reputable social science sources (“American Nation l Election Studies” n.d.; Brubaker 2011; General Social 
Survey n.d.; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism 2005; Vagias 
2006). 
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As with the Syrian intervention case, control groups were only exposed to this information.  
Super control and experimental groups reading the pro-same-sex marriage surveys read this 
frame at the bottom of the previous paragraph: 
“God loves everyone.  I think it’s time to stop looking at homosexuals as freaks.  It 
doesn’t hurt me or anybody else if gay people get married.  And no law forces individual 
churches to marry gay people, so really it still would be up to each congregation whether 
or not they want to do it.  We need to legalize same-sex marriage to end discrimination 
and give gay couples the same rights as everybody else.  I encourage others to financially 
support organizations and candidates who will protect these rights.” 
 
The anti-same-sex marriage surveys included this quote instead: 
“Heterosexual marriage is the foundation of child rearing and family values in society.  
We can talk about ways to protect the rights of homosexuals as individuals.  But I don’t 
think we should just arbitrarily allow gay marriage.  We cannot allow the federal 
government to water down the sacred institution of marriage that God has defined as 
between a man and a woman.  I encourage others to financially support organizations and 
candidates who will protect the sanctity of marriage.” 
 
As noted above, these quotes were attributed to “a noted celebrity” in the super control gr ups.  
In separate experimental groups, these quotes were attributed to Lady Gaga and Tim Tebow.  
Another experimental group was exposed to a version of the pro-same-sex marriage frame 
attributed to Ellen DeGeneres.24 
 The following questions were asked of all respondents reading same-sex-marriage 
surveys: 
                                                
24 An Ellen DeGeneres experimental group was added lat  in the survey process to the pro-same-sex marriage side.  
This required a minor adjustment in the language of her frame.  Since she is openly gay, it made no sese for her to 
say something like, “It doesn’t hurt me or anybody else if gay people get married,” implying a separation between 
her and other homosexuals.  Thus, her frame was phrased like this:  “God loves everyone.  I think it’stime to stop 
looking at homosexuals as freaks.  And no law forces individual churches to marry gay people, so really it still 
would be up to each congregation whether or not they want to do it.  We need to legalize same-sex marriage to end 
discrimination and give gay couples the same rights as everybody else.  I encourage others to financially support 
organizations and candidates who will protect these rights.”  Other than the exclusion of that line, it is identical to 
the other celebrities’ frames. 
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Same-Sex Marriage
Very 
unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely
Very 
Likely
What is the likelihood that you would support legalization of 
same-sex marriage? 1 2 3 4 5
What is the likelihood that you would give money to 
organizations or vote for candidates that support same-sex 
marriage? 1 2 3 4 5
What is the likelihood that you would give money to 
organizations or vote for candidates that oppose same-sex 
marriage? 1 2 3 4 5  
Table 5.4 - Questions on Same-Sex Marriage Surveys 
 
Means Comparisons and Ordered Logistical Regression Models 
In order to graphically illustrate the differences in outcomes between control and 
experimental groups, tables were constructed illustrating the means differences.  Ordered 
logistical regression models were employed to discover whether the means in the experimental 
groups differed significantly from the control groups.  The dependent variable was r pre ented 
by respondents’ answers to the survey questions on the Likert scale, for example, how 
respondents in the Syria issue answered the question, “What is the likelihood that you would 
support US military intervention in Syria?”  A number of independent variables were input, most 
notably dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of a celebrity frame.  If, for 
example, respondents were treated to George Clooney advocating in favor of Syrian inte vention, 
it was coded as a 1.  If they did not, it was coded as a 0.  Super control variables were al o 
included in the model to discover if the frame itself, without a celebrity name attached, was 
sufficient to affect attitudes.  The control group on each issue served as a baseline for analysis.  
Additional variables such as age, gender, and party affiliation, were included to take into account 
competing hypotheses from the literature review.  Finally, the feeling thermometer measure was 
included to determine whether a respondent’s feelings about the celebrity would affect his/her 
inclination to agree with the celebrity. 
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The Results 
 The following sections summarize the major findings of the surveys described above.  
The first section illustrates how respondents compare the credibility of celebriti s and politicians 
on the selected issues.  The second section focuses on results of the survey in two issuearea :  
Syrian intervention and same-sex marriage.   
 
Credibility Comparison 
Respondents were asked about whether they believed that a particular “public fig re” was 
a “credible spokesperson” on the issues in the study.  One might expect politicians to dominate 
here since they are publicly elected officials with a degree of expertise across a variety of 
political issues.  A president might have the most consistent results.  Given the party 
identification bias of the sample, one might also expect Republicans to be perceived as most 
credible.  Table 5.5 reports the mixed results.   
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N
Mean 
Credibility N
Mean 
Credibility
Syrian Intervention Same-Sex Marriage
Hillary Clinton 42 3.29 Ellen DeGeneres 41 3.98
Barack Obama 57 3.02 Barack Obama 57 3.19
John Boehner 43 2.81 Hillary Clinton 42 3.07
George Clooney 60 2.63 Lady Gaga 42 2.66
Angelina Jolie 44 2.61 Marco Rubio 44 2.37
Marco Rubio 40 2.53 Tim Tebow 41 2.37
John Boehner 43 2.33
Gun Control Federal Disaster Relief
Barack Obama 57 3.07 Barack Obama 56 3.5
John Boehner 43 3 Hillary Clinton 42 3.38
Hillary Clinton 42 3 Angelina Jolie 44 2.89
Clint Eastwood 52 2.63 Bono 49 2.88
Marco Rubio 44 2.55 John Boehner 43 2.84
Bruce Springsteen 47 2.36 Marco Rubio 43 2.63
AIDS Debt Relief
Elton John 45 3.76 Hillary Clinton 42 3.4
Hillary Clinton 42 3.21 Bono 49 3
Barack Obama 57 2.96 Barack Obama 57 2.88
John Boehner 43 2.6 John Boehner 42 2.81
Marco Rubio 43 2.58 Marco Rubio 44 2.64
Capital Punishment Cuban Embargo
Hillary Clinton 42 3.1 Hillary Clinton 48 3.38
Barack Obama 57 2.93 Barack Obama 56 3.25
John Boehner 42 2.9 Marco Rubio 39 2.92
Marco Rubio 44 2.7 John Boehner 43 2.77
Oprah Winfrey 52 2.58 George Clooney 42 2.5 
Table 5.5 - Credibility comparisons between celebrities and politicians 
 
Not surprisingly, the president is in the number one or number two position on all of the 
lists.  However, Hillary Clinton tops more lists than Barack Obama, which may not be surprising 
given Obama’s low and Clinton’s high popularity rating at the time of the survey.  Clinton is also 
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a likely presidential candidate in 2016.  What is surprising is that Republicans do not rank more 
highly on the list given that Republicans comprise a larger than average portion of the sample.  
John Boehner had a relatively high ranking on gun control.  Marco Rubio is a the bottom of most 
lists.  Politicians dominate the list in general are perceived as most credible on issues such as 
Syria, gun control, federal disaster relief, capital punishment, and the Cuban embargo.   
Celebrities still perform above expectations.  Two celebriti s were considered most 
credible on two of the issues (Ellen DeGeneres on same-sex marriage and Elton John on AIDS) 
and other celebrities ranked higher than some politicians.  For example, the same-sex marriage 
issue finds Lady Gaga more credible than Boehner or Rubio.  Rock star Bono is ranked second 
on the debt relief list, behind former Secretary of State Clinton and ahead of President Obama.  
Even on the politician dominant issue of Syria, George Clooney a d Angelina Jolie rank higher 
than Rubio. 
While it is not clear why some celebrities rank higher than te competing politicians, 
there are reasons they may be considered credible irrespective of comparisons.  Ellen 
DeGeneres, a well-respected homosexual, is quite public about her orientation.  Both she and 
Lady Gaga have been involved with various organizations in advocacy on behalf of 
homosexuals.  Elton John, another famous homosexual, started the Elton John AIDS Foundation 
in 1992 and has lobbied the US Congress to increase funding.  Indeed, the pro-federal funding 
frame for the AIDS issue was paraphrased from quotes by EltonJoh .  Finally, Bono is one of 
the highest profile celebrity activists in the world with a long history of founding and supporting 
institutions, as well as lobbying public officials to provide ebt relief for the developing world.  
Celebrities who have no known connection to real advocacy on an issue—such as Springsteen 
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and Eastwood on gun control, Winfrey on capital punishment, and George Clooney on the Cuban 
embargo—are ranked poorly. 
Based on Table 5.5 and the characteristics of the sample, one might expect celebrity 
persuasion to be difficult.  Indeed, if the credibility lists are any indication of how well 
celebrities are able to persuade, we would expect credible celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres, 
Elton John, and Bono to be persuasive in their respective issu areas.  Those celebrities that have 
lower credibility on an issue should be less persuasive on their issues.  The next sections will 
address this hypothesis by focusing on two cases—Syrian intervention and same-sex marriage—
to compare the results of a least likely and a most likely case for celebrity persuasion. 
 
Syrian Intervention 
 The first and central question in the Syrian intervention case compares the attitudes of 
respondents in a control group who are not exposed to the celebrity endorsement frame to the 
attitudes of those in the experimental group.  Table 5.6 presents the results of answers to the 
question, "What is the likelihood that you would support US military intervention in Syria?"  On 
the pro-Syrian intervention frame, all celebrities perform better than the control.  When George 
Clooney (  = 3.2) and Angelina Jolie ( = 2.8) advocate in favor of intervention the mean scores 
reported by the experimental group exceed that of the control group (  = 2.73).  On the anti-
Syrian intervention frame, Clooney ( = 2.64) and Jolie ( = 2.29) perform better than the 
control.  In this frame, Jolie performs better than Clooney. 
 
 
124 
 
 
Table 5.6 - Likelihood of supporting a military intervention 
 
 Are the means in the experimental groups significantly different from the control?  Are 
other variables more likely to affect the outcome than an endorsement from a celebrity?  Table 
5.7 reports that Clooney’s pro-intervention endorsement is stati tically significant and distinct 
from the control (β = 1.073, p ≤ .01).  Because the super control variable is not significant, it is 
clear that the frame alone is not persuasive.  It is the frame plus Clooney that makes the 
difference.  On the anti-intervention frame, younger people are slightly more likely to oppose 
intervention than older people (β = -0.02, p ≤ .01).  Still, Jolie (β = -1.206, p ≤ .001) and 
Clooney’s (β = -0.746, p ≤ .01) anti-intervention endorsements are also statistically significant.  
Even the feelings respondents have about a celebrity, data derived from the feeling thermometer, 
are not correlated to changes in the mean outcomes. 
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Ordered Logit Estimates
Pro-Syria Intervention Treatment Anti-Syria Intervention Treatment
Estimate Estimate
Jolie-Pro Intervention Frame 0.416Jolie-Anti Intervention Frame -1.206****
(0.374) (0.377)
Clooney-Pro Intervention Frame 1.073*** Clooney-Anti Intervention Frame -0.746***
(0.386) (0.361)
Super Control-Pro Intervention Frame 0.403Super Control-Anti Intervention Frame 0.094
(0.36) (0.388)
Age -0.014Age -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
Gender -0.294Gender -0.286
(0.26) (0.256)
Republican 0.276Republican 0.374
(0.305) (0.304)
Democrat 0.025Democrat 0.125
(0.313) (0.315)
Feeling about celebrity 0.001Feeling about celebrity 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Ancillary Parameters Ancillary Parameters
_cut1 -2.107**** _cut1 -2.703****
(0.555) (0.533)
_cut2 -.787 _cut2 -1.348***
(0.534) (0.505)
_cut3 .907* _cut3 0.378
(0.536) (0.496)
_cut4 2.844**** _cut4 2.313****
(0.599) (0.559)
Summary Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.057 Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.081
χ
2 12.745 χ2 18.302
N 216 N 216
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.
For the dependent variable, respondents were asked, "What is the likelihood that you would support US military intervention in Syria?"  
Table 5.7 - Likelihood that Respondent Will Support Intervention in Syria 
 
The next question asks the respondent to take a hypothetical action in response to the 
frame and the results are reported in 
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Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 - Likelihood of supporting a pro-intervention public official 
 
 When asked about the likelihood that a respondent would support a ublic official 
supporting intervention, Clooney’s ( = 3.06, β = 0.559, n.s.) and Jolie’s ( = 2.94, β = 0.264, 
n.s.) means on the pro-Syrian intervention frame are higher than the control ( = 2.81).  
However, when controlling for other variables, they are not statistically significant as Table 5.9 
reveals.  Indeed, Republican Party affiliation is a stronger determinant of a respondent’s 
likelihood to support a pro-intervention public official.  Both Clooney’s (  = 2.66, β = -0.638, p 
≤ .10) and Jolie’s ( = 2.58, β = -0.728, p ≤ .10) means are lower than the control group when 
advocating against intervention, and both frames are statistic lly significant.  This suggests that 
Clooney and Jolie are more likely than the control group to convince respondents not to support 
a public official supporting intervention. 
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Ordered Logit Estimates
Pro-Syria Intervention Treatment Anti-Syria Intervention Treatment
Estimate Estimate
Jolie-Pro Intervention Frame 0.264 Jolie-Anti Intervention Frame -0.728*
(0.392) (0.388)
Clooney-Pro Intervention Frame 0.599 Clooney-Anti Intervention Frame -0.638*
(0.399) (0.377)
Super Control-Pro Intervention Frame -0.007 Super Control-Anti Intervention Frame 0.41
(0.382) (0.409)
Age -0.01 Age -0.011
(0.011) (0.01)
Gender -0.39 Gender -0.371
(0.273) (0.27)
Republican 0.611* Republican 0.699**
(0.323) (0.323)
Democrat 0.173 Democrat 0.3
(0.331) (0.333)
Feeling about celebrity -0.006 Feeling about celebrity -0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Ancillary Parameters Ancillary Parameters
_cut1 -2.592**** _cut1 -2.745****
(0.592) (0.56)
_cut2 -1.463* _cut2 -1.606***
(0.568) (0.533)
_cut3 1.043 _cut3 0.96**
(0.564) (0.524)
_cut4 2.649**** _cut4 2.587****
(0.624) (0.589)
Summary Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.051 Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.074
χ
2 11.109 χ2 16.384
N 214 N 214
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.
For the dependent variable, respondents were asked, "What is the likelihood that you would vote for a public official who supports 
military intervention in Syria?"  
Table 5.9 - Likelihood that Respondent Will Support Public Oficials Who Advocate 
Intervention 
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Same-sex marriage 
Table 5.10 summarizes the initial findings from the same-sex marriage cs .  When exposed to 
the pro-same-sex marriage frame, only Ellen DeGeneres ( = 4.00) produced means that were 
greater than the control ( = 3.71), suggesting that she was able to persuade respondents i the 
experimental group to legalize same-sex marriage compared to the control group.  Because she 
was the only one to have a difference in the correct direction, i  also implies that the celebrity, 
not the frame, was moving attitudes.  When exposed to the anti-same ex marriage frame, Lady 
Gaga (  = 2.80) and Tim Tebow ( = 3.05) produced lower means than the control group mean, 
implying that Gaga and Tebow were capable of persuading respondents to oppose same-sex 
marriage, or that the frame itself was persuasive to the targt udience.25 
                                                
25 Ellen DeGeneres was not portrayed as advocating against same-sex marriage. 
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Table 5.10 - Likelihood to support legalization of same-sex marriage 
 
Table 5.11 assesses the statistical significance of these relationships.  DeGeneres’ 
advocacy of same-sex marriage resonated with the experimental group and was statistically 
significant (β = 0.953, p ≤ .05).  Despite Lady Gaga’s strong performance on opposition to same-
sex marriage in the means comparisons, when controlling for a number of additional variables, 
Tebow is statistically significant (β = -0.932, p ≤ .05) while Gaga is not (β = -0.532, n.s.).26  
When exposed to either frame, “feeling about celebrity” affects a respondent’s likelihood 
to accept the frame (p ≤ .01).  Positive feelings about the celebrity make respondents more likely 
to support the direction advocated by the celebrity while negative feelings make them less likely.  
The other key variable affecting responses was Republican Party affiliation.  If respondents self-
identified as Republicans, they were largely resistant to appeals to legalize same-sex marriage 
and likely to oppose it, independent of most other factors (p ≤ .001).   
                                                
26 At p = .157, Gaga is not statistically significant, although the results still imply that her means result is 84% likely. 
131 
 
Ordered Logit Estimates
Pro-Same-Sex Marriage Treatment Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Treatment
Estimate Estimate
Gaga-Pro Intervention Frame 0.197 Gaga-Anti Intervention Frame -0.532
(0.346) (0.376)
Tebow-Pro Intervention Frame 0.022 Tebow-Anti Intervention Frame -0.932**
(0.38) (0.373)
DeGeneres-Pro Intervention Frame 0.953** DeGeneres-Anti Intervention Frame -
(0.409) -
Super Control-Pro Intervention Frame 0.102 Super Control-Anti Intervention Frame 0.115
(0.367) (0.4)
Age -0.022** Age -0.028**
(0.011) (0.011)
Gender 0.081 Gender -0.022
(0.241) (0.244)
Republican -1.159**** Republican -1.272****
(0.288) (0.284)
Democrat -0.025 Democrat -0.104
(0.295) (0.288)
Feeling about celebrity 0.013*** Feeling about celebrity 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005)
Ancillary Parameters Ancillary Parameters
_cut1 -1.713*** _cut1 -2.261****
(0.508) (0.525)
_cut2 -1.209** _cut2 -1.754****
(0.501) (0.517)
_cut3 -0.331 _cut3 -0.865*
(0.495) (0.507)
_cut4 0.416 _cut4 -0.112
(0.496) (0.505)
Summary Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.172 Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.178
χ
2 47.799 χ2 49.817
N 254 N 254
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.
For the dependent variable, respondents were asked, "What is the likelihood that you would support legalization of same-sex marriage?"  
Table 5.11 - Likelihood that Respondent Will Support Same Sex Marriage 
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 The following two tables illustrate comparative answers to a question calling respondents 
to implicit action.  In this case, the questions are about wheher respondents would be willing to 
vote for candidates or give money to groups that support pro- or anti-same sex marriage. 
 
 
Table 5.12 - Likelihood to support candidates or give money to pro-same-sex marriage 
organizations 
According to Table 5.12, when exposed to the pro-same sex marriage frame, no celebrity 
endorsements (including the super control) were able to produce a mean in the experimental 
group higher than that of the control group.  Thus, no one could convince the experimental group 
that they ought to give money to pro-same-sex marriage organizations or vote for those 
candidates.  However, all celebrities were able to “beat” the control mean (  = 2.97) on the 
opposite side, suggesting that celebrity advocacy of the anti-s me-sex marriage frame kept 
people from wanting to give money to these groups and kept th m from wanting to support 
candidates advocating pro-same-sex marriage.   
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Table 5.13 addresses the same question, only targeted toward anti-same-sex marriage groups.  
Ironically, one would expect the pro-same-sex marriage control group to be less likely to support 
anti-gay candidates and anti-gay groups.  The opposite seems to be true.  They appear to be more 
likely to give money to same-sex marriage groups than to resist.  On the anti-same-sex marriage 
frame, celebrities fare much better.  All of their scores are higher than the control  
(  = 2.14), suggesting that Tebow (= 2.33) and Gaga ( = 2.86) are capable of persuading 
respondents to give to anti-gay groups and support anti-gy candidates. 
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Table 5.13 - Likelihood to support candidates or give money to anti-same-sex marriage 
organizations 
 
Only the anti-same-sex marriage treatments from the previous f gures produced 
significant results, so only those results are reproduced in Table 5.14 below.   
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Ordered Logit Estimates
Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Treatment Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Treatment
Estimate1 Estimate2
Gaga-Anti Intervention Frame -0.072 Gaga-Anti Intervention Frame 0.823**
(0.377) (0.376)
Tebow-Anti Intervention Frame -0.666* Tebow-Anti Interv ntion Frame 0.159
(0.376) (0.371)
Super Control-Anti Intervention Frame -0.346 Super Control-Anti Intervention Frame -0.187
(0.402) (0.4)
Age -0.03*** Age 0.01
(0.011) (0.011)
Gender 0.077 Gender -0.011
(0.242) (0.243)
Republican
-1.097****
Republican
1.409****
(0.287) (0.287)
Democrat 0.533* Democrat 0.334
(0.282) (0.289)
Feeling about celebrity 0.011** Feeling about celebrity 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Ancillary Parameters Ancillary Parameters
_cut1 -1.603*** _cut1 0.458
(0.516) (0.505)
_cut2 -0.963* _cut2 1.089
(0.509) (0.509)
_cut3 0.371 _cut3 2.522
(0.507) (0.53)
_cut4 1.163** _cut4 3.501
(0.516) (0.555)
Summary Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.183 Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.123
χ
2 51.328 χ2 33.263
N 254 N 253
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.
1For the dependent variable, respondents were asked, "What is the likelihood that you would give money to organizations or vote for 
candidates that support same-sex marriage?"
2For the dependent variable, respondents were asked, "What is the likelihood that you would give money to organizations or vote for 
candidates that oppose same-sex marriage?"  
Table 5.14 - Likelihood that respondents will give money to organizations or vote for 
candidates who support same-sex marriage (Anti-same-sex marriage frame) 
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The left column corresponds to ordered logit estimates relating to the question in Table 
5.12 and the column on the right relates to the question in 
Table 5.13.  When respondents in the anti-same sex marriage experimental group were asked 
about the likelihood they would give money to pro-gay organizations or support pro-gay 
candidates, Tim Tebow (β = -0.666, p ≤ .10) was most likely to persuade respondents to resist.  
This result controls for a number of factors, including the tendency for older people (β = -0.030, 
p ≤ .01) and Republicans (β = -1.097, p ≤ .001) to independently resist.  Likewise, Lady Gaga (β 
= 0.823, p ≤ .05) was most likely to convince respondents in the experimental group to support 
anti-gay groups and candidates, controlling for the independent tendency of Republicans to do so 
without prompting (β = 1.409, p ≤ .001). 
 
Implications 
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The previous cases illustrate that celebrities are capable of p rsuasion.  Some of the cases 
offer strong examples of how celebrities can affect attitudes in a target audience and move them 
toward some hypothetical action.  Their abilities to change attitudes appear to be stronger than 
their abilities to inspire action.  This is not surprising, given that the study cannot measure 
whether a respondent will really act upon an endorsement, and given the assumption that 
changing behaviors might just be more inherently difficult than changing minds.  This tension 
was illustrated in some of the written comments on the surveys.  When respondents were asked if 
they were more likely to give money to pro-gun control groups, one respondent marked a low 
score, but wrote next to that response, “I’m poor,” implying that she would if she thought she 
could afford it.  Another participant, responding to a question about likelihood to volunteer 
money and time to help victims of hurricanes wrote, “Not all of us are super rich and have 
nothing better to do with our time.”  In many cases, participants implied a desire to act on 
various issues, but seemed upset or conflicted about questions that asked for personal sacrifice. 
While there is some strong evidence of celebrity persuasion on the Syria and same-sex 
marriage cases, some of the results beg for additional clarification.  For example, Table 5.5’s 
credibility mean score comparison suggests that celebritis are credible in some cases but not 
others.  Credibility may be associated with a celebrity’s connection or experience with the issue 
they advocated.  Elton John with AIDS and Ellen DeGeneres with same-sex marriage—topped 
their respective credibility lists.  This lends some support to the hypothesis presented in chapter 2 
that credibility and expertise can be constructed if celebriti s create genuine experiences that 
connect them to those they hope to represent.  However, Elton John did not prove to be 
persuasive on the issue of AIDS while Ellen DeGeneres was persuasive on the issue of same-sex 
marriage.  With variance across the eight subject areas, an obvious question arises:  why are 
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celebrities persuasive in some areas and not in others?  Chapter 6 will address this question by 
analyzing the data in the aggregate.
 
Chapter 6 - Conditions of Successful Celebrity Persuasion 
 
Chapter 5 made a strong case for celebrity persuasion in two issue areas.  However, many 
cases did not produce clear results.  One might reasonably assume that celebrities may not 
always be persuasive.  If a celebrity is capable of affecting public attitudes, it is also important to 
isolate conditions of success and failure.  Is there a level of credibility that is necessary for 
celebrities to be persuasive?  Is an ability to persuade link d more to perceived knowledge of an 
issue or their abilities as entertainers?  Are celebrities who are more connected to established 
institutions and transnational advocacy networks more likely to persuade than those who have 
few connections and are acting alone?  Are celebrities more persuasive when they advocate in a 
manner consistent with or against expectations?  Are some celebriti s more likely to persuade 
than others?  Are there certain types of issues where celebriti s are more or less likely to 
persuade?  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the results of the experimental survey in the 
aggregate in an attempt to discover what kinds of variables re correlated with the likelihood of 
celebrities to persuade a target audience. 
 
 
Aggregate Analysis Methodology 
If celebrities are at all capable of persuasion in individual cases, such as the Syrian 
intervention and same-sex marriage case, further analysis is necessary to determine what 
variables affect a celebrity’s ability to be persuasive.  Presumably, there will be variance across 
cases where celebrities may be more successful in some instance  than in others.  What causes 
this variance? 
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To this end, an aggregate analysis of results from all cases was computed.  There were 61 
celebrity/question/frame combinations over eight issue areas.  The unit of analysis is the 
celebrity/question/frame combination and the dependent variable represents whether the 
celebrity successfully persuaded respondents on that particul  question.  For example, one of the 
61 variations measures how Angelina Jolie (the celebrity) performed on the question about 
whether the respondent supports Syrian intervention (the question) when exposed to the pro-
Syrian argument (the frame).  Another measures her performance on the same question with the 
anti-Syrian frame.  Thus, each unit is based on celebrity, question, and frame direction.  Does the 
frame succeed on that issue in the correct direction when the fram  is attributed to a celebrity? 
As in chapter 4, the ability to persuade or not can be operationalized as a dummy variable 
into “wins” (1) and “losses” (0).  A celebrity/question/frame combination is operationalized as a 
“win” if (A) the celebrity moved attitudes in a direction consistent with the celebrity frame and 
(B) the mean is significantly different from the control and super control (p ≤ .10), it is registered 
as a “win.”  If not, it was coded as a loss.   
Does the celebrity drive success or failure?  Or are there issu or environmental 
circumstances that contribute to wins and losses?  To answer thes  questions, a number of 
independent variables were run against the dependent variable in a binary logistical regression 
analysis. The first set of variables operationalized enviro mental variables.  The second set 
pertained to celebrity characteristics. 
Two issue/environmental independent variables were included in the analysis.  The first 
was “issue importance.”  This variable was derived from answers to a Gallup poll question in the 
summer of 2013 when the surveys were deployed:  “What do you think is the most important 
problem facing the country today?”  The importance score was computed by adding the 
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percentage of Americans concerned about these problems.27  I portance scores are listed in 
Table 6.1.  Of the issues listed below, the summer of 2013 was a time when media coverage 
focused significantly on same-sex marriage and the associ ted Supreme Court case and the 
escalating conflict in Syria, it anecdotally makes sense that they would be toward the top of this 
list.  
Issue Associated Problems in Gallup Poll
Importance 
Score
AIDS Not listed 0
Cuban Embargo International issues, problems 1
Death Penalty Crime, Violence 2
Debt Relief Foreign Aid/Focus Overseas 3
Federal Disaster Relief Not listed 0
Gun Control
Guns/Gun Control/School Shootings/Crime, 
Violence 3.5
Same-Sex Marriage Gay Rights Issues/Ethics, Moral, Religious Decline 6.5
Syria
War/Conflict With Middle East Nations/War (non-
specific)/ Foreign Aid/Focus Overseas 5 
Table 6.1 - Computation of Importance Scores (% of respondents mentioning the issue as 
“important” in Gallup polls) 
The second issue/environmental independent variable was called “wedge polarity,” a 
measure of polarization.  While wedge issues are divisive, they may not be equally important to 
both major political parties.  For example, oppositi n to gay marriage is very likely to mobilize 
Republicans to vote.  While Democrats generally support gay marriage, they are not nearly as 
threatened by the issue as Republicans are, so the issu  is less likely to provoke them to action 
(Kohut 2006). Thus, a simple scale of wedge polarity was constructed using the results from a 
logistical analysis of the experimental data.  If party ID was statistically significant in the 
                                                
27 Data was taken from 7-11 August 2013.  If the issue was less than 1 percent, a 0.5 was added to the ttal. While 
not all issues registered specifically on the list,many pertained to the issues in the surveys.  The question was open 
ended, so there were dozens of responses and many of the issues listed had very low values in terms of percentage of 
people who believed an issue was important.   
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logistical analyses, and the result was correlated in the direction consistent with party 
expectations, one could conclude that party ID played a strong role in respondents’ attitudes 
toward that issue.  If party identification had no effect on the results (implying no polarization), it 
was coded with a 1.  If party ID was statistically significant for Democrats or Republicans 
(implying a wedge issue for one party or the other), it was coded with a 2.  If party ID was 
statistically significant for both parties and the parties are on opposite sides of the issue 
(implying a high level of polarization), it was coded with a 3.  Independents were the baseline. 
Four independent variables pertaining to celebrity characteristics were also included in 
the analysis.  The authenticity and credibility variables were taken from the first survey.  This 
survey also collected data about whether celebrities w re perceived to support a particular 
direction on an issue or not.  These three variables provide key data about the qualities of 
specific celebrities:  are they perceived as authentic based on their art, talent, or ability to 
entertain?  Do they have credibility in a particular issue area?  Do respondents believe that 
celebrities are articulating their true beliefs when they present a frame? 
One additional celebrity attribute variable was constructed based on secondary research 
to answer a key question raised by chapter 4: does the level of institutionalization of a celebrity 
positively affect his/her ability to persuade?  That is, are celebrities who are more embedded in 
domestic and transnational advocacy networks more likely to persuade?  This is a more objective 
measure of credibility than asking respondents about their subjective feelings about the 
credibility of a celebrity.  For each institution the celebrity founded or co-founded (OCF), the 
celebrity was given three points.  For each organization in which the celebrity is an involved 
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member or participant (OA), s/he receives one point.  Celebrities officially affiliated with the 
United Nations (UN) also receive one point.28   
Table 6.2 summarizes the results.  The columns to the right are summary columns, 
computing the level of institutionalization according to the standards specified above.   
Celebrity Issues
Organizations co-
founded (OCF) Organization affiliations (OA) OCF OA UN Total
Angelina Jolie
Education in 
Africa, AIDS, 
Syria, Disaster 
Relief
Maddox Jolie-Pitt 
Foundation (MJP)
Human Rights Watch (HRW), UN 
Millennium Project, ONE, Alliance 
for the Lost Boys of Sudan, Clinton 
Global Initiative, Millennium Promise, 
Yéle Haiti, Millennium Villages 
Project, UNHCR, UNICEF 3 10 1 14
Bono
AIDS, Debt 
Relief, Disaster 
Relief
DATA, ONE, 
EDUN , Product 
Red
WITNESS; Jubilee 2000, Amnesty 
International, NetAid, YouthAIDS, 
Millennium Promise, Clinton Global 
Initiative, Millennium Villages Project, 
Keep a Child Alive, Not on Our 
Watch, UN Millennium Project 12 11 0 23
Bruce Springsteen Gun Control 0 0 0 0
Clint Eastwood Gun Control 0 0 0 0
Ellen DeGeneres
Same-sex 
marriage
Elton John AIDS Foundation, 
GLSEN, It Gets Better Project, 
ONE, the Trevor Project 0 5 0 5
Elton John AIDS
Elton John AIDS 
Foundation AIDSLife, YouthAIDS 3 2 0 5
George Clooney
Sudan, Syria, 
Cuban Embargo Not on Our Watch
ONE, Make Poverty History, 
American Foundation for AIDS 
Research, Enough Project, UN 
World Food Programme 3 5 1 9
Lady Gaga
Same-sex 
marriage
Born this Way 
Foundation
American Foundation for AIDS 
Research, GLSEN, It Gets Better 
Project, Mac AIDS Fund, the Trevor 
Project 3 5 0 8
Oprah Winfrey
Capital 
Punishment 0 0 0 0
Tim Tebow
Same-sex 
marriage 0 0 0 0 
Table 6.2 - Institutionalization Level of Celebrities 
                                                
28 Celebrities only received points for their founding or affiliation with organizations that were relevant to the issue 
areas covered in the time series and/or experimental design surveys.  This was based on the assumption that a 
celebrity such as Bono might be credible when speaking about AIDS or debt relief but not necessarily on gun 
control.   
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The far right column indicates a total score as of 2013, the time that the surveys were 
administered.  By this count, Bono is highly institutionalized in this issue with a score of 23.  
Bruce Springsteen is not.  In actuality, Springsteen is connected to institutions advocating on 
behalf of Vietnam veterans, Amnesty International, anti-nuclear energy, and revitalization of 
urban areas in New Jersey.  None of these are relatd to gun control and as mentioned above, 
Springsteen has no official position on gun control outside of sympathy for victims of gun 
violence expressed in concert appearances.  Likewise, Oprah Winfrey is connected to many 
charities and causes but is not involved in any anti-death penalty campaigns other than featuring 
activists on her show. 
 
Aggregate Analysis Results  
The Syrian intervention and same-sex marriage cases illustrate the capacity of celebrities 
to persuade respondents under experimental conditios.  Celebrities are capable of not only 
moving target audiences toward agreeing with their position, but also toward hypothetical action.  
Having said that, celebrities are not persuasive in all cases in this study.  Under what conditions 
are celebrities likely to persuade?   
The aggregate analysis described above in the methodology section is an attempt to 
provide more definitive answers to some of these questions.  The results are summarized in 
Table 6.3.29   
                                                
29 “Feeling about the celebrity” was not included in the aggregate analysis because it was computed in every ordered 
logit estimate, and it was positive and significant in only a few cases.  It was significant in some of the same-sex-
marriage tables.  Ironically, in most cases where it was significant, it was usually in cases where the celebrity was 
not persuasive.  One of the handwritten responses to a survey illustrates the point.  The respondent ra ked Bono 
highly on the feeling thermometer and even wrote, "Great Guy!  :)"  When, on the following page, the respondent 
was asked to respond to Bono’s endorsement, he indicated that he did not agree, writing, “Bono does a lot, is 
talented—but that doesn't make him right.”  Respondents like Bono, but they did not follow him on debt relief.  
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Binary Logistical Regression Estimates
Estimate
Intercept -19.00**
(8.21)
Mean credibility score -3.19
(2.12)
Level of institutionalization 0.20*
(0.11)
Perceived authenticity 7.21**
(3.39)
Consistency with respondents' expectations -1.33
(1.35)
Perceived importance of issue 1.89**
(0.80)
High Wedge Polarity -2.74*
(1.44)
Summary
Pseudo R-Square - Cox and Snell 0.37
χ
2 27.88
N 61
*p ≤ .10; ** p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; **** p ≤ .001
Standard Error is in parentheses.  
Table 6.3 - Correlates of "wins" in celebrity persuasion (p ≤ .10) 
The table affirms that the comparative measure of credibility is not a determinant in 
celebrity success (β = -3.19, n.s.).  The mean credibility score is negatively correlated with 
“wins” and not significant.  The first results section compared the relative credibility of political 
candidates with selected celebrities.  In some cases, th  celebrities ranked highly, and in others, 
they did not.  Jolie and Clooney were at the bottom of the Syria list and performed well in the 
experimental survey.  A brief summary of other cases illustrates that those celebrities who 
ranked highly in terms of credibility were not consistently able to persuade respondents in 
experimental groups.  Ellen DeGeneres was highly credible and capable of persuading 
respondents on the same-sex marriage frame.  Elton Joh ’s pro-federal funding for AIDS frame 
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and Bono’s pro-debt relief frame did not produce signif cant differences in mean compared to 
their control groups.  When people report politicians and celebrities as “credible,” it does not 
necessarily mean that they find them uniquely convincing on that issue.  Expert power for 
celebrities may be better expressed by the institutionalization variable.  Level of 
institutionalization is correlated with celebrity persuasion (β = 0.20, p ≤ .10), implying that 
celebrities that are connected to advocacy networks are more persuasive than those that are not.   
Likewise, whether a celebrity advocates for or against expectations is also not significant 
(β = -1.33, n.s.).  Angelina Jolie is more persuasive wh n advocating against Syrian intervention 
while George Clooney seems to move attitudes when advocating either position.  Both of them 
command hypothetical action more persuasively when advocating against intervention.  Tim 
Tebow and Lady Gaga seem to be most persuasive when advocating against same-sex marriage.  
This might be a natural fit for Tebow, whom many Christian conservatives like because of his 
public prayer position in the end zone known as “Tebowing.”  Similarly, advocating for same-
sex marriage may be an uncomfortable fit for him.  Next to the pro-same-sex marriage frame, 
one conservative participant in an experimental group wrote, “Did Tebow really say this?  If this 
is true I have lost a significant amount of respect for him.”  Likewise, based on Gaga’s public 
advocacy of pro-gay issues, one would expect her to be less credible and “playing against type” 
when making anti-gay statements.  A contrary result i  surprising. 
One of the strongest relationships appears to be authenticity (β = 7.21, p ≤ .05), implying 
that respondents were more likely to respond favorably to how a celebrity’s talents and abilities 
made them seem more genuine when speaking on the issue.  The perceived importance of the 
issue is also positively related to celebrity success (β = 1.89, p ≤ .05).  The more prominent the 
issue is in the minds of the general populace, the more persuasive celebrities are.  Finally, highly 
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polarized issues seem to be negatively correlated with celebrity success, suggesting that 
celebrities are more successful in advocacy on topics that are not wedge issues for either major 
political party (β = -2.74, p ≤ .10).   
 
Implications 
As chapter 5 indicates, not all celebrities are persuasive all of the time.  Under what 
circumstances are they persuasive?  What variables matter?  The aggregate analysis concludes 
that credibility, as measured by these surveys, is not necessary for celebrities to be persuasive.  It 
makes sense that when it comes to credibility and expertise, the public measures celebrities 
according to a different yardstick than they do politicians, a point consistent with some of the 
findings in the academic literature (Atkin and Block 1983; Becker 2010; Freiden 1984).  Perhaps 
the credibility variable matters more for those political actors who pursue an insider strategy and 
regularly involve themselves in policymaking. 
What seems to be more important is a celebrity’s institutionalization within a larger 
political movement, along with the support and associated credible activists that accompany it.  
A cursory glance at the credibility means comparison in chapter 5 illustrates that more 
institutionalized celebrities such as Bono, Lady Gaga, George Clooney, and Angelina Jolie rank 
higher than some competing politicians.  The aggregate analysis illustrates a positive correlation 
between institutionalization and persuasion across ca es, suggesting that institutionalization may 
be another path toward gaining expert power, as suggested in chapter 2.   
Moreover, people are more likely to respond positively to a celebrity’s appeals if they 
perceive that s/he is authentic.  This authenticity s not tied to an understanding of expertise or 
politics, but to a perception that the celebrity’s gifts, talents, and art make the person special.   
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Celebrities are also most likely to be persuasive wh n the issue already has some 
perceived importance and is not a wedge issue.  The wedge issues drew a lot of written 
comments and caveats from respondents.  The gun control question, for example, drew slogans 
such as “People kill, not guns” or statements such as “Those that want guns will still get them.”  
It is unlikely that any celebrity advocating for gun control will convince respondents such as 
these.  In short, celebrities do better when there is some room for attitudinal change.  If people 
have already made their mind up about an issue, celbrities are less likely to affect attitudes. 
The data presented in these chapters have painted a picture of celebrities who are capable 
of commanding media attention and who are, in varying circumstances, quite capable of 
persuading target audiences to support a cause.  Th final chapter will summarize the major 
discoveries of this study, discuss further implications, and consider directions for future research. 
Chapter 7 - The Times They Are A-Changin’:  Celebrity Power Revisited 
 In 1969, John Lennon, one of the most recognizable cel brities in the world, privately left 
the Beatles to engage in a solo career and a series of political events that, for a celebrity, had not
been witnessed since the days of the great singer, actor, and athlete, Paul Robeson.  Robeson had 
been blacklisted in the 1950s because of his strong pro-civil rights stances and criticism of the 
American government.  After years of harassment by the CIA, he retired in seclusion in 1963 
(Dorinson and Pencak 2004; Duberman 1996, 537, 563–564; Freedomways 1998; Robeson 
1988).  Lennon hoped to fare better.  However, the news media establishment of the 1960s was 
still fairly hostile to youth culture, as evidenced by the 1967 CBS documentary “The Hippie 
Temptation” (Reasoner and Wallace 1967), and the political environment was characterized by 
government crackdowns on protesters such as at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago (Edy 2006; Kusch 2004). 
While Lennon and the other Beatles had been openly opinionated about polemic political 
issues such as civil rights and the Vietnam War, Lennon’s departure from the Beatles signaled 
his desire for radical activism.  At a “Bed-In” for peace in Montreal with his new wife, artist 
Yoko Ono, Lennon said “You gotta remember, establishment, it’s just a name for evil.  The 
monster doesn't care whether it kills all the students or whether there's a revolution.”  By 1971, 
Lennon’s “Power to the People,” articulated a lyrical response to the “monster” that had been 
expressed through his performance art and political protests for the previous two years:  “Say 
you want a revolution?  We better get it on right away.  Well, you get on your feet and into the 
street” (Leaf and Scheinfeld 2007; Whitehead 2000). 
Organized left-wing radicals, such as Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Black Panther 
Chairman Bobby Seale, gravitated toward Lennon and began organizing a series of concerts 
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running up to the 1972 Republican National Convention o gain media attention, change public 
opinion, and oust President Richard Nixon at the polls.  All of this was planned under FBI 
surveillance.  Declassified files reveal intrusive spying and a paranoid Nixon administration 
seeking to “neutralize” Lennon because of concerns that he might disrupt his chances for re-
election (A. Cohen 2006; Gross 2010; Leaf and Scheinfeld 2007; Parker 2003; Partridge 2005; 
Whitehead 2000; Wiener 2000, 2010).30   
 The concert strategy was attempted on a small scale in December 1971.  Instead of 
focusing on Nixon and the election, the organization ook on the cause of John Sinclair, the 
White Panther leader who was sentenced to 10 years in p ison for possession of two marijuana 
cigarettes in 1969.  Lennon and his associates organized a concert in Ann Arbor, the “John 
Sinclair Freedom Rally,” which featured John Lennon in his first live US performance since 
1966, but also starred Stevie Wonder, Phil Ochs, and Bob Seger and the Silver Bullet Band.  The 
musical performances were interspersed with speeches by Lennon, Rubin, Seales, poet Allen 
Ginsberg, and others.  Three days later, Sinclair ws released.  Three months later on March 9, 
1972, the US Supreme Court overturned the law used to penalize Sinclair, liberalizing the 
sentencing of marijuana use (Buchanan 2011; “FREED POET HAILS MICHIGAN RULING; 
Sees Victory in Reversal of Marijuana Conviction” 1972; Salpukas 1971; Thomson and Gutman 
1987, 190–194; Wiener 2010).   
 The anti-Nixon tour, however, was never to be.  In response to this victory, the Nixon 
administration attempted to deport Lennon.  The administration argued that he had been admitted 
to the United States improperly since immigration law banned the admission of anyone 
convicted of any drug offense, referring to Lennon’s guilty plea to a misdemeanor cannabis 
                                                
30 Nixon has never been directly linked to the attempt to “neutralize” Lennon, but Nixon’s chief of staff, H.R. 
Haldeman was intimately involved in the operation. 
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possession charge in London in 1968.  An organization of celebrity artists appealed to the INS on 
Lennon’s behalf including singers Joan Baez and Bob Dylan; beat poet Gregory Corso; writers 
John Updike, Jospeh Heller, and Joyce Carol Oates; painter Jasper Johns; actor Tony Curtis; and 
composers John Cage and Leonard Bernstein.  New York mayor John Lindsay supported 
Lennon, and thousands wrote letters in his defense, solicited by the liner notes in Lennon’s 1972 
Some Time in New York City album (Thomson and Gutman 1987, 191; Wiener 1991, 20 0).   
The deportation hearings continued for as long as Nixon remained in office.  In 1975, a 
three-judge panel ruled that Lennon’s London conviction did not meet America’s standards of 
justice, and granted his green card (Wiener 2010).  At that point, however, it was too late for 
Lennon’s anti-establishment efforts.  The hearings may not have deported Lennon, but they did 
distract, stymie, and exhaust his attempts to organize.  There were no political concerts after the 
Ann Arbor event.  His energy was focused on staying in the country, a fighting a battle that took 
a toll on his marriage and his health.  By the time he received his green card, Lennon was not 
only finished with activism, he had retired from the music business to be a “house husband,” 
living at home with his infant son, Sean, while Ono oversaw his business responsibilities (Leaf 
and Scheinfeld 2007). 
 While the case of John Lennon is not a perfect analogy that illustrates every lesson 
learned from this dissertation, it highlights the promise and limitations of celebrity activism as 
revealed through this dissertation.  A concerned celebrity commits himself to a cause.  He 
utilizes his media skills and art to persuade others to follow his cause.  He connects himself to 
organizers.  He attracts media attention.31  His efforts can even be connected to a political result, 
the release of John Sinclair.  Lennon’s ability to w rk with his advocacy group to organize and 
                                                
31 While this case was not part of the time series analysis from chapter 3, the New York Times covered many of 
Lennon’s activities, particularly the “Free John Siclair” concert and the subsequent events (“FREED POET HAILS 
MICHIGAN RULING; Sees Victory in Reversal of Marijuana Conviction” 1972; Salpukas 1971). 
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achieve results were even threatening enough for the president of the United States to spy on him 
and mobilize a government agency to block his efforts.  This final point is important:  there are 
limits to celebrity activism and powerful politicians and government institutions can still 
dominate or shut down their efforts (Sikkink 2004, 156).  
The purpose of this final chapter is to take stock f this dissertation’s results.  It has 
sought to highlight the potential for celebrity power by focusing upon the ability of celebrities to 
set public agendas through spotlighting and persuasion.  Lennon’s story is consistent with the 
findings of this dissertation, but it also pushes its boundaries.  In the following sections, the case 
of John Lennon will be revisited as this final chapter probes this work’s findings and limitations, 
along with broader implications and areas for future research. 
 
The Puzzle: Two Presidents and Three Celebrities 
 The last chapter of this dissertation begins with the realistic picture of a president of the 
United States crushing the efforts of a potentially powerful rock star activist rival.  It contrasts 
with the first chapter of the dissertation:  a ridiculous picture of the president of the United States 
jokingly standing at attention, while he seriously engages with a rock star activist.  The contrast 
illustrates the central puzzle of this dissertation.  It is not at all surprising that the Nixon 
administration would turn the establishment against John Lennon and win.  What is more 
surprising is that Lennon scores some victories and that the Nixon administration sees him as a 
genuine threat.  The truly cynical would predict that Lennon would have little impact, certainly 
in 1971, when tabloid television news is still a fairly distant prospect and celebrity headlines 
belong in the entertainment news (Walls 2001). 
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 For this reason, the puzzle is a modern one and a result of the changing times, as implied 
by the discussion in chapter 2 about the transforming news media and entertainment business.  
Celebrities have become more acceptable in newsrooms and the oval office than they were in 
1972.  Nixon’s encounter with a friendlier celebrity is illustrative of this difference.  Elvis 
Presley requested a meeting with President Nixon, held on December 21, 1970.  In that meeting, 
Presley told Nixon that “the Beatles had been a real force for anti-American spirit” and that “the 
Beatles came to this country, made their money, and then returned to England where they 
promoted an anti-American theme.”  Nixon expressed “ urprise” about Presley’s comments.  It is 
not clear whether Presley’s comments persuaded Nixon that Lennon was a threat.  Presley’s 
concern was in part about anti-Americanism, but prima ly about what he perceived as a drug 
problem associated with anti-establishmentarianism, a theme consistent with Nixon’s campaign 
to increase criminalization of drug use.  As opposed to giving speeches, Presley promised to 
reach kids with his anti-drug message in his own way by “just singing” (Krogh 1970).  
Reportedly at Presley’s request, the meeting was kept secret, although Nixon probably agreed 
with the secrecy as he repeatedly expressed his concern that Presley needed to “retain his 
credibility.”  Nixon probably assumed that Presley’s credibility would be undermined if the 
meeting were made public.  A year later, the story was leaked, but it did not become big news.  
The now famous photo of Presley and Nixon shaking hands was not released until 1988.  That 
the story was not made public, and more importantly, did not make serious headlines in 1971 
when it was leaked, suggests a media environment that was not nearly as receptive to celebrity 
news as it is today (Carlson 2010).  Moreover, no oe assumes that Nixon would have taken 
Presley seriously on political strategy or policy.  Despite a media and political environment that 
was either neutral or hostile to celebrities, Lennon was still able to capitalize on that environment 
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in a way that made a presidential administration nervous.  Nixon’s victories over Lennon buried 
the historical narrative that a celebrity had the potential for significant power, even in the early 
1970s.  Lennon was sidelined, just as Robeson had been twenty years earlier. 
 When Bono appears with Bush at Gleneagles over thirty years later, the media and 
political environment had changed substantially, as summarized in chapter 2.  The “pseudo” 
media environment described by Boorstin (1992) had come to fruition.  “Infotainment” merged 
tabloid-style journalism, salacious “reality” stories, and celebrity gossip and public relations, 
with traditional political news.  Not only did enter ainment and news merge, stories with high 
entertainment value began to compete with less-interes ing stories of public importance.  Boring 
stories were sensationalized (Adorno 2002; Balliger 1999; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 
2008; Bennett 2012; Boczkowski 2009; Bourdieu 1996; Cook 2005; E. J. Epstein 1973; Fenster 
and Swiss 1999; Jowell et al. 2007; Lim 2012; Marshll 1997; G. Turner 2004; Weaver et al. 
2007; West and Orman 2003; Wheeler 2013).  By 2005, the incongruous pictures of the rock star 
and the conservative politician was not completely surprising, but definitely interesting.  Bono 
had the potential to bring attention and excitement to a boring G8 conference that focused on an 
issue that carried little interest to most Americans, debt relief to developing countries. 
Bono’s approach was also different from Lennon’s (Easterly 2010).  Lennon was at odds 
with the establishment and at that time, a president would not treat a celebrity as a serious policy 
partner.  In 2005, Bono hoped to ally with the presid nt, push the president to accept his agenda, 
and persuade him.  This strategy was illustrative of an ther major transformation in the 
entertainment and news industries:  that the celebrity and politician both became identifiable 
commodities for hungry media consumers.  Both capitalized on fame and the fertilization of a 
public image (Corner and Pels 2003; Marshall 1997; West and Orman 2003).  Bono could 
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approach Bush as someone who was powerful in a realm th t overlapped with Bush’s.  Thus, no 
one in the media or the public in 2005 was interestd in burying or ignoring Bono’s potential 
power as with Lennon in 1972.  Instead, Bono’s involvement became a tantalizing news story.   
Ironically, while the media, the public, and even the politicians began to take celebrities 
seriously, the cynical scholars were the holdouts.  Few scholars in 2005 expected that Bono 
could make a difference, because the study of political science is biased toward a picture of the 
world that presumes that those with the most political power are most likely to set the public 
agenda (Kernell 1997).  Political scientists expect a world where activists have great difficulty 
advancing their political interests (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Tarrow 1996).  The 
Nixon-Lennon model, at face value, seems more plausible.  It is easy to dismiss Lennon’s 
successes.  Non-traditional political actors such as celebrities are curiosities for tabloid 
entertainment news that are, in the words of Sabato, only to be taken seriously by “blithering 
idiots” (Ross 2004).  Bono and Bush as long-term policy partners seemed so far-fetched that the 
phenomenon of celebrity power has been a non-issue n political science literature until recent 
years.  One purpose of this dissertation was to tes th  bounds of this cynicism.  Were the cynics 
correct?   
This dissertation suggests that the changing nature of the media environment has created 
new opportunities for celebrities to engage meaningfully in activism and that their ability to 
spotlight and persuade illustrates their potential for public agenda setting.  These findings 
potentially upend what many political scientists asume about power, particularly scholars who 
study policymaking, policy entrepreneurship, and social movements.  Politicians do not 
necessarily have an edge in media manipulation, and activists, working with celebrity policy 
entrepreneurs, may make mobilization, media attention, access, and persuasion more achievable.  
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The next section details the findings of this dissertation as they pertain to the potential for 
celebrity power. 
 
What Power? 
 Lennon and Bono do not have the same power as Nixon or Bush.  However, the cases 
from this study imply that celebrities such as these do have a degree of power.  In order to 
understand how Lennon could be a threat to Nixon or how Bono could be an asset to Bush, 
chapter 2 offered French and Raven’s typology (French and Raven 1959; Raven 1993), to 
compare the potential powers of celebrities and politicians across several dimensions:  legitimate 
power, expert power, reward/coercive power, informational, and referent power.  The following 
sections will itemize these forms of power and use them as a structure for summarizing the major 
findings of this dissertation. 
 
No Legitimacy 
Legitimate power is, by definition, the domain of public officials.  Nixon and Bush have 
institutional power that Lennon or Bono could not access.  As a result, those celebrities that do 
not seek public office are essentially activists.  The main difference between celebrities and 
regular activists is that celebrities have greater resources and visibility than other activists.  This 
may bring greater advantages to a movement, but may also jeopardize the legitimacy of the 
movement if they are not completely committed, if they fail to stay on message, or if their 
personal lives damage their public image (Crosby and Bender 2000; Rosamond 2011; de Waal 
2008).   
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Expertise compensated 
Celebrities do not compete well with politicians in expert power.  Celebrities generally 
engage in activism as an avocation.  They are musician , athletes, and actors first.  Lennon and 
Bono may be passionate, but they do not have the political and policy expertise of presidents.  
Public officials not only have legitimacy.  They also immerse themselves in their political 
careers on a full time basis, learning what they need in order to satisfy their constituents.  The 
advertising literature argues that celebrities thatare perceived as expert may have an advantage 
in selling a product, but that for the most part, celebrities are not perceived as expert, credible, 
believable, or effective (Atkin and Block 1983; Freid n 1984).  Data presented in chapter 5 are 
consistent with these conclusions.  Politicians are consistently ranked higher than celebrities 
regarding expertise and credibility on issues of public importance.  Moreover, the aggregate 
analysis in that chapter reveals that credibility, measured as expertise on an issue, is not 
significantly correlated to celebrities’ ability topersuade.   
Chapter 2 summarizes two alternative approaches for celebrities to substitute expertise: 
experience and institutionalization.  Data in chapter 6 offer support for the idea that these are 
appropriate substitutes.  While experiences such as Clooney’s visits to camps in Sudan were not 
quantified, the credibility mean scores illustrate that those celebrities with deeper experience or a 
stronger identity with an issue—such as Bono, Elton J hn, Lady Gaga, George Clooney, and 
Angelina Jolie—may rank higher than those who do not.  This is an area, however, that requires 
further research. 
Chapter 6 also concludes that institutionalization is positively correlated with a 
celebrity’s ability to persuade, implying that those celebrities who are connected to a dense 
transnational advocacy network may be perceived as “credible” in a way that substitutes for 
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subject expertise.  What a celebrity lacks in subject expertise and even legitimacy can be 
substituted by an affiliation with a broad network f experts and professional lobbyists and 
activists.  As discussed elsewhere, Bono does not act alone.  He surrounds himself with experts 
who educate him and do the groundwork necessary to advance the cause.  Likewise, whether 
Lennon’s connections with Rubin and Seales translated to perceived expertise, his affiliation 
with them automatically connected him to a network that had already been working on radical 
causes since the mid-1960s.  Therefore, if expertise is measured in this way, it is quite likely that 
a celebrity’s “expert power” may be instrumental in h s/her ability to persuade, which has some 
effect on his/her ability to engage in agenda setting. 
 
Conditional coercive and reward power 
 Public officials have definite coercive and reward power.  The fact that the Nixon 
administration could utilize bureaucracies to neutralize Lennon is not surprising.  However, 
celebrities have the capacity to coerce or reward public officials.  One way is through simple 
money and resources.  Most celebrities have these in abundance, which gives them a means to 
give money or threaten to cut it off from campaigns of public officials.  There are documented 
cases of celebrity political donations, but it is as difficult to document the connection between 
money and outcomes in these cases as it is in the iterest group literature.  If money is the source 
of a celebrity’s power, that makes them no different from other citizens who have money, but 
lack the skills, abilities, and fame of celebrities (Marshall 1997; West and Orman 2003).  
Therefore, this is a possible source of celebrity power, but it is not a unique power and it is not 
easily measurable. 
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 Celebrities’ abilities to coerce or reward may lie more in language and public access than 
in material resources.  Celebrities, like activists, may engage in leverage or accountability 
politics by holding public officials to promises or p essuring them to change policies (Batliwala 
and Brown 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; M. G. M. Rodrigues 2004; Shaw 2005).  Chapter 2 
offered some empirical examples of celebrities effectiv ly “shaming” the powerful.  The actions 
of Lennon and his associates at the John Sinclair Freedom Rally involved shaming as well, to 
some apparent positive effect.  However, if celebrities’ power of coercion and reward is linked to 
gaining public attention and persuading others, then  final two sources of power, referent and 
information power, become extremely important; they explain why and how a celebrity connects 
with an audience and how they utilize information t a tract attention and persuade.  Thus, cases 
such as those where Bono or Van Zandt engaged in shaming of public officials or powerful 
players in the entertainment industry are supported by evidence in chapters 3-6.  Nevertheless, 
more research is necessary to connect spotlighting and persuasion to coercive and reward 
politics.  Hypothetically, one would have to engage in process tracing and some contextual 
research (Bates et al. 1998) in order to illustrate that these skills were indeed key to success in 
these cases. 
 
Informational power: spotlighting and persuasion 
Informational power refers to the ability of political actors to quickly generate politically 
usable information and deliver it to the places where it is most effective.  Because of Lennon’s 
celebrity status, he could grab the attention of the public.  He deliberately constructed pseudo-
events in the form of performance art, such as staging bed-ins, public recording sessions, films, 
or appearing at press conferences in a bag, in order to capture media attention.  At times when 
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the traditional news media paid less attention, he turned his albums into sources of political 
information and even bought billboard space in every major city in the world with the printed 
slogan, “War is Over! If You Want It” (Athey and Deit r 2009; G. Matthews and Goodman 
2013, 34; Mesch 2013, 78; Wiener 1991).  Clearly, the Free John Sinclair concert was well 
placed, powerful, and persuasive.  However, little s known exactly about the inside causes and 
circumstances that led to Sinclair’s release or if this event affected the judge’s opinion. 
Similarly, anecdotal cases offer optimistic views of celebrity interventions and some 
research emphasizes positive effects (Njoroge 2011; Rosamond 2011; Wheeler 2011), but other 
scholars present a skeptical or ambiguous view of celebrities’ abilities to draw media attention 
toward political issues (Hawkins 2011; Strine 2004; Tait 2011).  Chapter 3 offered strong 
evidence that celebrity interventions in advocacy campaigns result in significantly increased 
media coverage.  This increased coverage is not only specific to the intervention event or in 
ongoing references to the celebrity’s involvement.  It represents an overall spike in stories on the 
issue.  This relationship was statistically significant in case after case, from Bono advocating on 
AIDS or debt relief to Angelina Jolie discussing children’s education or George Clooney 
protesting the violence in Darfur.  Granted, celebrities are not the only figures who can generate 
a buzz by giving an interview or planning an event.  Politicians are extremely adept at gaining 
attention, and the data reflect this reality, too.   
However, chapter 4 produces the surprising conclusion that celebrities may be more 
effective at capturing media attention on political issues than politicians are.  One would expect 
celebrities to be experts at parading their own projects.  Politicians should be better at promoting 
political causes.  Nevertheless, the data in chapter 4 r veal that celebrities perform better than 
politicians across media types and that the results are statistically significant.  The relationship 
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not only holds true in broadcast media where one might expect a bias toward celebrities with 
their demand for a higher degree of sensationalism and interest in avoiding the “visually 
unsatisfactory” stories; it is also true for newspapers where concerns about static talking heads 
and providing enough action footage are irrelevant (Cook 2005, 2–3, 104; E. J. Epstein 1973, 
261–263).  Indeed, a story that is heavily covered in broadcast media, but not covered at all in 
newspapers, such as the birth of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie’s child in Namibia, can 
nevertheless increase the coverage of African education stories in newspapers without specific 
reference to Jolie or Pitt at all.  A general public interest emerges around a topic that seems to 
cross media types. 
One possible reason why celebrities gain more coverage than politicians may be their 
uniqueness.  Politicians advocate on policies and issues of public importance all of the time.  
Celebrities do it rarely and in focused events.  A celebrity gives a media organization an excuse 
to talk about a serious issue and to show their viewers something unusual and potentially 
attractive.  To some extent, this is consistent with advertising research suggesting that 
overexposure might limit ones’ media power (Roy 2012).  An underexposed celebrity may trump 
an overexposed politician.  However, it also implies that an overexposed celebrity may not have 
traction, either.  This might explain why Bono’s spikes in chapter 3 are not as consistent or as 
large as George Clooney’s or Alicia Keys’.  Bono is a longtime advocate and policy insider who 
is consistently visible when discussing challenges of the developing world.  Clooney consistently 
advocates on Sudan, but seems less exposed and more selective about his interventions.  Keys is 
a consistent advocate who has not received as much coverage.  Moreover, when viewers 
experience “tragedy fatigue” (Acampora and Cotten 2008, xi; Associated Press 2008) or are 
overexposed to an issue, perhaps an attractive, even sexy face can draw attention back toward it, 
162 
 
again, a finding consistent with advertising research (Berscheid and Walster 1974; McGuire 
1985).  While the data from chapters 3 and 4 clearly imply these conclusions, the design does not 
absolutely verify them.  Do overexposed celebrities and politicians attract less attention?  Do 
more attractive faces revitalize a story?  More resarch is necessary to explicate these 
hypotheses.   
In addition, the more celebrities that are involved in an intervention, the more likely the 
intervention is to capture media attention.  The same cannot be said for multiple politicians 
involved in intervention events.  Contrary to expectations, celebrities do not necessarily need 
politicians in order to increase attention on an issue.  Indeed, politicians are the ones who likely 
benefit from “being seen” with celebrities, particularly in newspapers.  To some extent, this 
answers the question, “why would Bush take Bono seriously?”  Besides the possible policy 
expertise he brings with his transnational advocacy network, the answer may be that Bono is 
better at spotlighting an issue than Bush is.  In exchange for the attention gained on an issue 
where they have like interests, Bush may be willing to ive Bono a seat at the table.  Once at the 
table, he may have the opportunity to establish himself as a policy insider, which may make him 
valuable in a way that extends beyond his ability to command media attention. 
Thus, persuasion, another important expression of if rmational power, becomes a 
potentially important aspect of agenda setting and even policy making.  Celebrities can spotlight 
issues and can gain access to the highest levels of power.  Once celebrities gain attention, can 
they get people to agree with them?  Advertising research is cautious in suggesting that 
celebrities are particularly persuasive, even in product endorsements (Atkin and Block 1983; 
Miciah and Shanklin 1994).  Recent political scienc literature illustrates how celebrity 
endorsement of candidates can be effective in some circumstances (Brubaker 2011; Garthwaite 
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and Moore 2008; Lammie 2007; Pease and Brewer 2008).  However, very little has been 
concluded about the effect of celebrity issue endorsements (Becker 2010).   
Chapter 5 demonstrates some strengths and limitations of celebrity persuasion.  First, 
some celebrities are very persuasive.  Respondents who were exposed to celebrity frames such as 
George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, Ellen DeGeneres, Lady Gaga, and Tim Tebow were more 
likely to accept their frame of the issue than contr l respondents who received information about 
an issue, but no frame.  These findings were statistically significant.  The inclusion of a super 
control group that was exposed to the frame but no celebrity name ensured that it was the 
celebrity and not the frame itself that was persuasive.  In addition, the design addressed 
participants’ central route of persuasion, which put those respondents in a more critical mental 
state when evaluating the issues (Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).  Despite a very difficult 
crucial design, many celebrities were quite persuasive. 
However, not all celebrities were persuasive, or at le st persuasive enough.  While many 
celebrity endorsements affected attitudes of respondents in predictable directions, means 
differences were not statistically significant in all cases.  Perhaps if the study had been designed 
to prepare respondents to accept a peripheral routeof p rsuasion, the celebrities might have been 
more effective by capitalizing more on one of their key strengths:  their attractiveness.  Indeed, 
advertising often attempts to appeal to audiences through a peripheral route to prevent 
individuals from actively and intellectually engagin  with the message (Petty, Cacioppo, and 
Schumann 1983).  A different design might have produce  more favorable results, particularly a 
design that might have involved more symbolic attempts at persuasion (Edelman 1985; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Perloff 2013).  However, political debate is a messy business.  People often 
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engage on many levels.  This methodology illustrated how celebrities can be persuasive under 
the most challenging of conditions. 
Moreover, when advocating on issues, celebrities “flipped sides” across experimental 
groups.  For example, George Clooney would advocate in favor of Syrian intervention on a 
survey given to one experimental group.  He would advocate against on a different survey before 
a different group.  Clooney was capable of persuading participants whether he argued for or 
against the issue.  Indeed, the aggregate analysis concluded that the perceived position of the 
celebrity did not affect his/her ability to persuade.  One would expect Clooney to be less credible 
when advocating against participants’ expectations.  However, where celebrities advocated on 
both sides of an issue, this expectation did not seem to hamper their success. 
Chapter 6 also concludes that celebrities were more pe suasive on issues that participants 
perceived as important, rather than those that wereless salient.  This implies a connection 
between celebrities’ ability to spotlight and their ability to persuade.  Issues that are more salient 
have greater potential for celebrity persuasion.  That implies that the more effectively a celebrity 
spotlights an issue, the more persuasive they are on that issue.  However, more research is 
needed to confirm this implication. 
 
Referent power: connecting to audiences and communicati g authenticity 
 Referent power is the ability to be likable and relatable, an ability that most celebrities 
have.  One cannot easily entertain without having a degree of attractiveness, charisma, or an 
ability to draw attention (Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoul s, and Huliaras 2011; Weber 1968).  
Celebrities also are admired for their authenticity, the way that a celebrity’s art or ability can 
connect to their image to his/her inner emotions, feelings, and personality to communicate a 
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sense of honesty and sincerity (Balliger 1999, 61; Fenster and Swiss 1999, 228; Huddart 2005).  
Some scholars are skeptical of whether celebrities ar  genuinely perceived as authentic by an 
increasingly media exposed and jaded audience or if their likability translates to real power 
(Couldry and Markham 2007; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011). 
There is no doubt that Lennon had referent power.  B tween the power of his music and 
the power of his personality, Lennon had as much charisma as an entertainer can have.  What can 
one do with referent power?  In practice, referent power connects a leader with followers—or in 
this case the image of a celebrity or politician as a consumable product with distant audiences.  
When celebrities or politicians connect, the result is often that people speak about these distant 
figures as if they were personal acquaintances, and even emulate or live vicariously through the 
public figure to make up for the life or qualities regular people lack (Dyer and McDonald 1998; 
Marshall 1997).  The effect is likely more pronounced for celebrities than for most politicians, 
although more research is necessary to come to this conclusion.   
 Chapters 5 and 6 call into question the notion that a celebrity’s likability translates to 
persuasion.  Data derived from the “feeling thermometer” indicate no clear positive relationship 
between the way a person feels about a celebrity and the way that a person may feel about a 
political issue.  Likability does not clearly translate to persuasion.  Some celebrities seem to 
persuade whether they rank highly on the feeling thermometer, which means that other variables 
are driving persuasion.  Moreover, on polemic “wedge” issues, party identification seems to have 
a stronger influence on attitudes than celebrity interventions.  The power of party identification is 
well documented in the literature, so this finding s not surprising (Bartels 2002; Brady and 
Sniderman 1985; A. Campbell et al. 1980; Dancey and Goren 2010; Gaines et al. 2007; Nelson 
and Garst 2005). 
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 While likability and positive feelings may not be correlated to celebrity persuasiveness, 
chapter 6 demonstrates that authenticity is.  Thus, what is important for the participants in this 
study is not whether the celebrity is likable, but that s/he is sincere and that the skills and abilities 
s/he provides as an entertainer or artist feed into that sincerity.  This is somewhat consistent with 
the finding mentioned above that institutionalization s linked to persuasion.  A celebrity may not 
have issue expertise or credibility, but s/he may hve experience or an affiliated network that 
makes up for it.  Participants in the study responded positively to celebrities who were connected 
to institutions rather their subjective feelings about the celebrity.  Therefore, a celebrity’s 
authenticity, a function of his/her referent power, and institutionalization, a compensated form of 
expertise, relate to his/her ability to convince some ne to accept a political position. 
If institutionalization and authenticity underlie a celebrity’s power of persuasion, it might 
also offer an additional explanation about why Bush might ally with Bono.  If Bush lacked 
authenticity on the issue of assistance to Africa, he might benefit from being seen discussing the 
issue with Bono.  Perhaps Bono’s authenticity could legitimate Bush.  Through Bono, he could 
publicize his desire to take aid to the poorer parts of the world.  He could communicate his 
genuine interest in real reform by taking seriously a man, supported by advocacy institutions, 
who not only wanted to deliver maximum benefits to the developing world, but during the 
Clinton administration proved himself capable of melting the staunchest conservatives of the 
Republican Party (Busby 2007).  In this way, an alliance with a celebrity allows a politician to 
not only gain attention for a particular issue, but perhaps even to recast his image on that issue by 
associating with a celebrity activist. 
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Can celebrities set a public agenda? 
If one were able to “connect the dots” between Lennon’s efforts to draw attention to 
Sinclair’s imprisonment and his release, we could reasonably conclude that he raised the profile 
of that issue, placing it on the public agenda and producing the desired result.  Even without the 
process tracing necessary to prove that Lennon’s intervention and the release of Sinclair are more 
than just correlation, the timing of both events seems more than coincidental.  The anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that Bono’s efforts to raise cons iousness about debt relief was successful is 
better documented and more compelling.  This dissertation provides hard evidence that 
celebrities are quite adept at spotlighting public issues and many celebrities are quite persuasive.  
How persuasive they are depends upon who the celebrity is, what the issue is, how much 
authenticity they have, and whether they are connected to transnational advocacy groups.  It 
would certainly be an overstatement to argue that any celebrity can set the agenda any time.  But 
there is enough evidence here to suggest that Bono is not “wasting his breath,” so to speak.  
Many celebrities compete well versus politicians at agenda setting and some may even be better 
at it. 
When celebrities attempt to attract attention to their issue or engage in acts of persuasion, 
they are taking part in the sorts of strategies and t ctics utilized by activist policy entrepreneurs.  
They deploy a set of “shakeout strategies” to disrupt the status quo or capitalize on a disruption 
as a means to focus important actors on their issue.  Sp cifically, they spotlight important issues 
and policies, gain access to powerful players and the policymaking process, hold public officials 
accountable to their words, utilize leverage to push public officials to change their positions, 
symbolically mobilize audiences to connect or separate from politicians and policies, and 
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convince target audiences of the validity of their positions.  In that sense, celebrities are no 
different than other activists or policy entrepreneurs.   
Moreover, like activists and policy entrepreneurs, celebrities deploy strategies to reduce 
the personal risk associated with their involvement in activism.  Depending upon the celebrity, 
many choose to connect with organizations in order to support, advance, and maintain focus on 
the issue.  While the celebrity may lose some control over their vision by including more people, 
success and longevity of the effort depend upon coordination.  In addition, celebrities can 
moderate their time and resource commitments if they know that an existing institution can 
continue their work, calling upon the celebrity to deploy their skills when necessary. 
The major difference between celebrities and regular activists or policy entrepreneurs has 
to do with the “power of a persona” (DeMars 2005, 9).  All of the branding and publicity 
associated with building a celebrity image amplifies their abilities to engage in “shakeout.”  They 
attract more attention to an issue and, through their unique abilities and resources, potentially 
enchant target audiences.  As has been documented elsewh re in this dissertation, celebrities can 
grab headlines in ways that would be difficult without them, gain access to public figures that 
typical activists and entrepreneurs cannot, and even cr ate compelling arguments as to why 
members of the public or powerful officials should agree with them.  The increased resources, 
money, and fame, along with the “persona” described above also means that they may be able to 
reduce risk more easily than a typical activist or entrepreneur.  More money equates with more 
power, more flexibility, more time—resources that are not in abundance for typical volunteer 
citizen activists and not easily accessible to professional organizers.  Because of the power of 
persona, celebrities are also more likely to achieve some of these goals of access and persuasion, 
which means that time and resources are less likely to be wasted. 
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Granted, not all celebrities become politically involved, so the drive to advocate on 
behalf of a political issue is dependent upon the desire and ability to do so.  Risk cuts both ways.  
A celebrity does not just have to want to sacrifice th ir time and/or resources, s/he has to be 
willing to calculate the damage or benefit of involvement to his/her image and career (Becker 
2010; Duvall 2010; Meyer and Gamson 1995; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, and Huliaras 2011).  
Rock and folk musicians, in particular, have had a greater degree of autonomy since the 1960s 
because of the way in which political expression was normatively linked to the artist’s 
authenticity (Huddart 2005; Marshall 1997).  Actors and athletes had less autonomy because of 
the more restrictive nature of their contracts and their connections to potential commercial 
advertisements (A. W. Campbell 1994; Williamson 2011; Zirin 2009).  It is likely not a 
coincidence that among those who appealed to the INS on John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s behalf 
that most were musicians and writers.  There were no athletes.  Only one actor, Tony Curtis, 
made a statement.  The rise of actor activists suchas George Clooney and Angelina Jolie suggest 
that many Hollywood actors have more autonomy than in past years (Huliaras and Tzifakis 
2011), although actors and athletes still seem to be more attached to the contracts and advertising 
inherent in that industry than do musicians and other artists.   
 
Avenues for Future Research 
 Thus far, this chapter has revisited the central puzzle of this dissertation and implications, 
summarized the major findings, and specified the limitations from the research.  Already, several 
areas for additional research have been mentioned.  The following sections will detail several 
additional areas for potential research along with some limited data drawn from the studies to 
offer some “teasers” about possible results. 
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Activism and Multilevel Governance across Time 
 This chapter began by arguing that this dissertation addresses a “modern” puzzle—why 
would a president care about a rock star?  It appears modern, particularly when compared to the 
case of Lennon and the Nixon administration.  However, more research is needed to demonstrate 
whether this genuinely is a modern puzzle.  One way to address this concern is to replicate the 
time series analysis over time.  In preparation for this dissertation, data was gathered on cases of 
celebrity intervention from 1935 through the 1960s including interventions by Paul Robeson, 
Marian Anderson, Harry Belafonte, Nat King Cole, Louis Armstrong, Jackie Robinson, and Lena 
Horne.  By utilizing the same methodology from chapters 3 and 4, one could first discover 
whether these celebrity interventions gained much media traction at the time.  One interesting 
variable to consider is race.  All of the figures listed above are African Americans and most of 
them were involved in civil rights advocacy.  Would a potentially hostile media cover these 
artists’ activism in any depth?  By looking at many cases over time, one could also document the 
rise of celebrity influence in the media—was it a gr dual phenomenon or was there a threshold 
where celebrities suddenly had more access? 
Moreover, assuming that the media and political enviro ments in 1971 really were 
substantially different from 2005, what conditions make a political environment receptive to 
celebrity activism?  One potential answer comes from the transnational advocacy network and 
social movement literatures.  Scholars have constructed frameworks to explain how activists 
exploit interacting international and domestic opportunity structures, which vary over time, 
geography, and issue area.  As illustrated inError! Reference source not found.Error! 
Reference source not found., institutions are relatively more accessible in an open structure.  
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Likewise, strict laws or even repression can block a cess in a closed structure.  If institutions are 
closed at domestic and international levels, chances of activism are diminished.  If domestic and 
international institutions are open, activists may act according to an “insider/outsider coalition 
model” where activists may primarily act on the domestic level but “will keep international 
activism as a complementary and compensatory option” (Sikkink 2004, 165).  In the case of 
closed domestic institutions and open international institutions, activists employ a “boomerang 
pattern and ‘spiral model’.”  A boomerang pattern describes how domestic actors, when unable 
to access national or local institutions may connect with transnational coalitions to bring pressure 
upon those institutions.  A spiral model suggests that activists pursue these efforts to create 
enough domestic openness to allow for activism at th t level.  Therefore, a successful 
boomerang/spiral may result in a system that is open on both domestic and international levels.  
Open domestic opportunity structures and closed interna ional opportunity structures are often 
characterized by “defensive transnationalization” activism, where activists may employ pressure 
on domestic institutions in order open or democratize international institutions or to prevent 
transfers of power to these more opaque institutions (Sikkink 2004, 161–164). 
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Table 7.1: Dynamic Multilevel Governance 
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 Additional research would be needed to specify this model in the context of celebrities, 
but it is certainly plausible to assume that the US government was much more “closed” to 
celebrity activism at the domestic level in 1971 that it is today.  Likewise, in the early 1970s, 
there would be few opportunities for Lennon and his as ociates to connect to activists overseas to 
shame the US government from the outside in a meaningful way.  Complex internationalism and 
globalization have increased the ability of activis networks to connect transnationally.  In 2005, 
Bono benefitted from a friendly and open set of global leaders at a G8 conference, open domestic 
structures in congresses, legislatures, and among executives, and an open and connected activist 
environment in which he could employ an insider/outsider coalition model.  He could, at one 
point, turn to the media for attention and then work behind the scenes with leaders and policy 
makers to engage in agenda setting. 
 
Insider Strategies 
 This dissertation established a distinction in agenda setting between “insider” and 
“outsider” strategies (Clark 2006; Florini, Nihon Kokusai Koryu Senta, and Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 2000; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Naidoo 2006; 
della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Price 1998; Sikkink 2004; Torrance and Torrance 2006).  Lennon 
deployed an outsider strategy.  An insider strategy would have been extremely unlikely.  Bono, 
on the other hand, had the flexibility to engage in both kinds of approaches. 
For the most part, this research focused on outsider trategies.  The methodology tested 
whether celebrity policy entrepreneurs could make headlines by intervening on political issues 
and create a contagion effect in the media surrounding the issue.  It also tested whether they 
could persuade target audiences through exposure to writ en content.  Celebrities use their power 
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to raise the salience of issues and to persuade outsiders (the public and the media).  The intended 
result is to pressure insiders (policy makers) to address the issue in question.  Research has 
concluded that successful media agenda setting is often correlated with policy results (Hopmann 
et al. 2010; Mortensen 2010), and one can assume that a celebrity that is persuasive with a study 
participant might also be persuasive with a policy maker, given the chance.  Some work has 
focused on specific cases (Busby 2007), but more res arch is necessary to illustrate this 
relationship, particularly as it relates to the process of influencing policymakers and 
policymaking.   
 Another approach to this question would be to study he correlates of access.  What 
qualities and resources of a celebrity make celebriti s likely to gain access to the policymaker?  
To answer this question, the data from this study was tentatively analyzed.  The unit of analysis 
was the celebrity.  The dependent variable was the number of times a celebrity appeared with a 
policymaker in the news.  Independent variables included credibility, authenticity, and 
institutionalization.  Unfortunately, this study only had data on 10 celebrities and of those 10 
celebrities, only two had appeared with a public official multiple times.  Still, using a 
bootstrapped OLS regression model (N=902), results were consistent with some of the other 
findings from this dissertation—particularly that credibility did not increase the likelihood of 
access.  Authenticity was positively correlated, but not significant (β = 2.42, n.s.) and 
Institutionalization was positively correlated and significant (β = 0.28, p ≤ .10), arriving at the 
intuitive conclusion that better-connected and better-supported celebrities are more likely to gain 
access.  The results are not particularly reliable, but they do open the possibility for further 
research in this area. 
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 One final implication about insider strategies relat s to persuasion.  This study concludes 
that perceived importance of an issue is positively correlated to a celebrity’s ability to persuade.  
If this is the case, then importance is subjective.  Based on Gallup polling, issues such as debt 
relief and AIDS prevention did not matter to the public at the time of the study.  However, what 
is important to the public may not be the same as what may be important to a policy maker.  In 
this study, Bono and Elton John are both credible and authentic on those issues where they are 
real life advocates.  However, they did not advocate on issues that were important to the public 
and were ineffective at persuading respondents.  Both, h wever, involve themselves in insider 
lobbying in Congress.  Bono, in particular, is reported to be very persuasive among politicians.  
In short, perhaps Bono and Elton John are not persuasive with this sample of respondents.  
However, they may be persuasive to policymakers if they already think the issue is important.  
Likewise, the design of the information and frames in the experimental study did not attempt to 
convince respondents that an issue was important.  It just offered both sides of an issue and 
ended with a celebrity endorsement of one side or the o her.  What if part of the frame included a 
justification from a celebrity about why the issue is important?  Would it amplify the effect of 
the celebrity frame?  An answer to these questions might increase an understanding of how 
celebrities persuade both citizens and policymakers. 
 
Celebrity framing 
 Celebrities were persuasive under specific conditions, as summarized above.  Are there 
conditions that might make them more persuasive?  Some research has already suggested that 
video appeals by celebrities are more effective than written appeals (Becker 2010, 112, 116).  
This could be an area of further exploration.  Some res arch has also suggested that political 
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endorsements have a stronger effect when voters have limited information about candidates 
(Weaver-Lariscy and Tinkham, 1991; Converse, 1962).  This implies that political knowledge 
may be a variable in how easily celebrities can persuade.  Moreover, the sample from the 
experimental study trended toward more educated respondents.  Might the results have been 
different with a less educated sample?  Future resea ch might benefit from focusing on 
respondents who know less about issues and/or have less ducation in general.  In addition, this 
dissertation focused on the difference between celebrity framing in an experimental group 
compared to controls and super controls with no frame or no celebrity.  An alternative for future 
research could be to also include surveys with politicians making the same statements to see if, 
say, Barack Obama is more persuasive than George Clooney.   
 
Types of interventions 
 This dissertation made distinctions about predictors of the success of celebrity 
interventions.  One predictor that was not quantitatively tested was intervention type.  One of the 
most effective types of interventions revealed in the time series analysis was when celebrities 
such as Bono and Bob Geldof took over a newspaper.  Clooney’s arrest at the Sudanese embassy 
received and incredible amount of press.  Is a television interview more effective than an op ed?  
Should more celebrities try to get themselves arrested?   
 Another possible research direction could be to focus on a particular type of event.  One 
early idea in the design of this dissertation was to focus on the effect of political concerts.  
Anecdotally, Lennon’s John Sinclair Freedom Concert may have had some effect on media 
coverage and perhaps upon Sinclair’s release.  How effectively did similar events such as the 
Concert for Bangladesh, Live Aid, or Live 8 draw atten ion toward their respective issue?  Did 
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that vary over time?  Perhaps the Concert for Bangladesh got less coverage in 1971 than Live 
Aid did in 1985 because of the media’s increased interest in celebrity activism.  Perhaps Live 8 
in 2005 had less coverage because of the increased fragmentation and choices among television 
stations compared to 1985.  Already, this dissertation has concluded that more celebrities equal 
more media attention.  Perhaps these mass, multi-celebrity events generate more publicity than 
single celebrity interventions. 
 
Celebrity institutionalization 
 Throughout this dissertation, much discussion has focused on celebrities’ efforts to 
connect with advocacy networks.  Additional study could further illuminate the ways that 
institutionalization affects persuasion or other dependent variables.  Moreover, it could also 
illuminate the historical normative process of celebrity attachment to advocacy organizations.  
Effective celebrity advocates rarely act alone.  Jackie Robinson’s civil rights interventions were 
generally organized as events and fundraisers for the NAACP.  Harry Belafonte’s interventions 
were coordinated with advice from Martin Luther King.  George Harrison’s Concert for 
Bangladesh, which was to be administered by UNICEF in response to the refugee crisis there, 
suffered because his management failed to apply for tax exempt status, causing most of the 
money to sit in an IRS escrow account for ten years (Clayson 2001; Harrison 1980).  Despite its 
setbacks, it became the template for subsequent benefit concerts.  Harry Chapin learned from 
those failures when planning his benefit concerts.  Ultimately, when Bob Geldof organized Live 
Aid, he drew upon the example of Bangladesh and consulted with Harrison himself to avoid 
potential mistakes (Fine 2002).  He also directly drew organizers from Chapin’s and Harrison’s 
groups to build upon their previous experience (Coan 2001; Crosby and Bender 2000).  Given 
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the emergence of so many benefit concerts since that time, one could make the case that a semi-
permanent transnational network emerged for organizing successful benefit concerts.  If there is 
evidence of an increasing permanence and professionalization of these efforts, it is an interesting 
alternative hypothesis to the media transformation argument advanced in chapter 2.  Rather than 
changes in the business and technology of the media causing the elevation of celebrities into the 
political world, perhaps music industry professionals’, concert promoters’, and artists’ deliberate 
efforts to organize played a significant role.  This d ssertation does not preclude this possibility, 
but it also is not the focus of this work. 
 
Musicians and authenticity 
 At the beginning of this research project, 437 celebrity political interventions were 
identified over a long historical period, in keeping with Huddart’s description of the three waves 
of modern celebrity activism.  The first wave began in the late 1950s with the civil rights 
movement in the late 1950s.  The second wave responded to the anti-war movement in the late 
1960s.  A third wave was marked by a series of large scale concerts, first initiated by Bob Geldof 
and others in response to the Ethiopian famine, borrowing from the earlier efforts Harrison and 
Chapin.  This wave gave rise to the branding of celebrity causes and its merger with capitalism in 
the form of projects such as Product RED, where consumers purchase celebrity endorsed 
products to raise money to assist world development (Coan 2001; Crosby and Bender 2000; 
Grow 2014; Harrison 1980; Huddart 2005; Lyons 2005; Marsh 1978; Richey and Ponte 2008; 
Shankar 2005; Swimmer 2005). 
 When data collection began, vast numbers of documented celebrity interventions were 
discovered, stretching back to the 1930s.  Error! Reference source not found.Error! 
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Reference source not found. only represents the interventions discovered in the preparatory 
stages of this research study, before narrowing case selection.  This table illustrates the trend of 
celebrity involvement by decades.32 
Athletes Actors Musicians
1930-1939 0 0 14
1940-1949 0 0 44
1950-1959 5 0 22
1960-1969 7 3 35
1970-1979 3 6 32
1980-1989 5 5 54
1990-1999 5 11 54
2000-2009 5 63 64
Total 30 88 319  
Table 7.2 – Numbers of Celebrity Interventions by Decade 
 This table illustrates how celebrity activism has been on an upward trend as the media 
has become more globalized and more inclined toward “infotainment.”  Clearly, musician 
interventions dominate the list and the overall numbers have grown over the years.  In the early 
years, the vast majority of those interventions were generated by one person: Paul Robeson, with 
72 interventions between 1935 and 1959.33  From 1957-1963, most of the interventions involved 
Harry Belafonte, although he frequently mobilized other musicians and actors where possible.  
The numbers on Robeson and Belafonte are likely skewed, because the data set does not include 
interventions by musicians who should appear more frequently with deeper research, such as 
Pete Seeger or Woody Guthrie.   
                                                
32 Table 7.2 does not represent the universe of interventions, and it does not take into account the longer term 
commitments that some celebrities have made to institutional causes for many years.  It also operates on a loose 
definition of what a celebrity intervention entails, because it includes some interventions that may be considered 
more “charitable” than “political.”   
33 Paul Robeson, appearing in many interventions from the 1930s through the 1950s, was categorized as a musician 
because most of his intervention events involved him singing in concert rather than acting or referencing his earlier 
days in sports.  As someone who was an athlete, actor, and musician, he could have been counted three imes for 
each intervention.  This could be a challenge for operationalizing variables, although there are very f w celebrities in 
history who were extremely successful in all three of these categories.  If celebrities were as successful at gaining 
political attention in the 1930s as they are today, perhaps Robeson’s exceptional status across celebrity professions 
played an important role in launching the idea of acelebrity as political activist.  Perhaps few others who had such 
broad appeal could have been able to survive as long as he did. 
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From the mid-1960s onward, the number of musicians involved in interventions 
increases, and it is more difficult to argue that any one musician dominates them.  These trends 
are consistent with the argument that the Beatles’ commercial dominance from 1964-1970, 
coupled with Bob Dylan’s folk ethic influence on popular music, likely created an artistic and 
commercial space for more musicians to express themselves politically without being 
normatively “punished.”  It also offers some support f  the existence of an authenticity norm for 
musicians (Balliger 1999, 61; Fenster and Swiss 1999, 228; Huddart 2005).  However, more 
research would have to be conducted to affirm this.
Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found. also 
illustrates how athletes are the least inclined to get politically involved, a phenomenon that might 
well be explained by contractual restrictions discussed above (Bush, Martin, and Bush 2004; 
Williamson 2011; Zirin 2009).  Indeed, in most decades, nearly all of the interventions were 
made by only a few athletes whose names are not surpri ing:  Jackie Robinson, Muhammad Ali, 
and Billie Jean King.  As the decades go on, a wider diversity of athletes seem to be involved in 
these interventions, but the total number is flat. 
Actors are scarcely involved throughout the twentieth century, and then their involvement 
spikes at the turn of the century.  By 2009, actor interventions rival musician interventions.  One 
potential area for research would trace the reasons for this change.  Thus far, the research 
presented in this dissertation strongly suggests that it is likely to be associated with celebrity 
autonomy, particularly from commercial contracts.  Television stars may likely be more 
restricted than film actors because of the demands of commercial advertisers that sponsor shows.  
More research is necessary to demonstrate the potential relationship between entertainment type 
and potential autonomy.  However, the authenticity scores derived from the surveys and 
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displayed in Table 7.3 imply another possible argument: actors have achieved a level of 
authenticity that rivals musicians, at least among this sample.  Again, this table is illustrative, not
determinant, and offers an interesting hypothesis about what might be driving the increase in 
celebrity intervention or even the potential effectiveness of interventions. 
Authenticity Scores N= Mean Authenticity Score
Ellen DeGeneres 41 3.51
Oprah Winfrey 52 3.13
Elton John 63 3
George Clooney 71 2.9
Bono 56 2.88
Angelina Jolie 44 2.86
Bruce Springsteen 47 2.81
Tim Tebow 41 2.78
Clint Eastwood 52 2.69
Lady Gaga 40 2.45
Respondents were asked to respond to this statement, "This public figure's talents, 
abilit ies, and professional projects uniquely make him/her an authentic spokesperson." 
Table 7.3 - Mean Authenticity Scores 
The strength of musicians on this list is also consistent with research suggesting that 
music is a unique form of potential referent power.  While some political scientists have 
addressed this assertion (Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Mattern 1998; Street, Hague, and Savigny 
2008; Street 1986, 1997), most of the literature on the multiple connections between music and 
power comes from other disciplines.  Historians and philosophers from ancient times argued that 
music was attached to spiritual and political power and was assumed to be the most subversive of 
arts because of its potential to unify and disconnect the masses from reason (Gray 2004, 261–
262; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008; Plato 1983, 26, 1985, 96–109).  From medieval troubadours 
to modern protesters across cultures and continents, music has always been an instrument of 
subversion (Balliger 1999, 60–61; Benjamin 1969; Gray 2004, 151; Mattern 1998, 18, 62; 
Schoonmaker 2003a, 2003b; Veal 2000).  From Catholic mass to military units and patriotic 
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anthems, music has also always been a form of propaganda to psychologically control the masses 
(Balliger 1999; Gray 2004, 45; Said 1993; Winstock 1970).  Democracies, including the US, 
have sought to discourage, ban, or limit forms of musical expression deemed threatening or 
destabilizing (Balliger 1999, 58; Brackett 1999, 133–134; Fischlin 2003, 32; Fuchs 1999; Martin 
and Segrave 1993, 183). 
Many have argued that musicians may have an authenticity edge over other celebrities 
because of the nature of music itself.  The first way in which music is fairly unique is the way 
that it creates a sense of community that separates and unifies certain groups (Brackett 1999; 
Fischlin 2003, 11; Mattern 1998; Small 1987).  Individuals who feel attached to an artist or a 
kind of music may even become more open and tolerant to the experi nces of others who are 
different than they are because they reside in the same ideational community.  Moreover, 
attitudes within a community can change if a musician creatively and skillfully challenges 
his/her audience (Ballantine 1984; Mattern 1998, 22–23; Small 1987).   
On the other hand, music also creates lines of demarcation between groups, separating 
self and other along identity lines that are created or reinforced by music and musicians.  For 
example, Irish are Irish in part because of their distinct music, which forms a communicative 
cultural part of their identity.  The virtual creation of the“t enager” in the 1950s illustrates the 
establishment of a youth identity which created the social sp ce to stand counter to adult 
identities and therefore, in opposition to dominant values (Brake 1990; Weinstein 1999, 103).  
So Irish teenagers may perceive themselves as separate from Irish adults, and the demarcation 
may relate to musical artists and styles, which provide meaning and role modeling for social 
behavior.  Some Irish rebel songs, such as “The Fields of Athenry,” have different meanings 
depending upon their context, which make different sub-identiti s salient.  The lyrics to “Fields 
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of Athenry” relates a story of suffering during the Great F mine as a man is deported to 
Australia.  In the abstract, it is a song about Irish history.  At a modern football match, fans shout 
it as a song of victory for scoring a goal or winning a game, uniting the nation behind the Irish 
team.  To Irish Republicans, the song unifies them in their resentment of the oppression of the 
Irish by the British during the famine as Loyalist landlords exported potatoes to be sold outside 
of Ireland for a profit and native Irish starved.  Its informal chants of “Sinn Fein!” and “IRA!” by 
have traditionally provoked offense and hostility toward Irish Loyalists.   
The second way in which music uniquely generates authenticity lies in its unique 
participatory nature.  While athletes play sports, audiences ch er.  While actors act out a scene at 
a play or on film, audiences watch.  In both cases, the experienc  is emotional, but the audience 
generally does not actually participate in the action.  At a concert, audiences may not be able to 
play instruments or use microphones, but they dance, sing, clap, or sway at a concert, in a dance 
hall, in the privacy of their home, or anywhere attached to their ipods.  Because audiences play 
such a participatory role in the shared performance of music, the distinction between entertainer 
and listener is less formal.  The audience becomes both vested in the singer and music as well as 
a part owner of the artistic experience which they can repeat at will by playing and singing along 
with recordings at their leisure and using the music for theiown purposes (Packman 2010).  The 
repetitiveness of music means that “Each work of music recaptures and re-creates past 
experience, refashioning it according to present creative nd practical interests and goals” 
(Mattern 1998, 17). 
One reason why music is participatory is because of its mental a d even physical effect 
on the individual.  Music produces messages that can often no be expressed in words—moods, 
emotions, and messages that are sometimes less ambiguous than lyrics.  Musicians and 
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composers understand that when people, even from divergent cultures, hear music played in 
minor keys they may feel mournful.  Blues musicians bend string  to create a crying sound; 
Andean bamboo flute players bend notes to similar effect (Ma tern 1998, 19).  In addition, 
audiences physically feel music with their bodies as sound waves (Grossberg 1987; Mattern 
1998, 1998, 17, 151; T. Rose 1994, 138; Walser 1993, 2; Williams 2012).  Good musical 
performers and soundmen know that by projecting a bass frequency at the proper level, they can 
create a vibration in one’s chest that, combined with darkness and feelings of anonymity in dense 
crowds, is known to manipulate and stimulate people to dance.  The combination of the physical 
musical experience, coupled with atmospheric lighting, and pcking hundreds of people into a 
small space made Rolling Stones and Doors concerts often susceptible to violence, and made 
their audiences subject to manipulation (Hopkins and Sugerman 1995; Morgen 2013). 
These ideas call into question the role of fame as a key source f power for celebrities.  
As suggested elsewhere in this dissertation, fame was a necessary but not sufficient means of 
capturing attention.  Celebrities are, by definition, famous.  More research could focus on the 
question of whether those who are more famous attract more attention than those who do not, or 
if other factors are more significant.  This dissertation assumes that fame is important, but does 
not measure it directly.  However, if the relationship betwen music and power has more to do 
with the building of identity communities and even the physiological effect of music on a subject 
and less to do with fame, it is also possible that new areas of re earch may be opened on the local 
uses of music in politics.  If fame alone explains the potential referent power of musicians, why 
would local or regional movements utilize relatively unknow  musicians in their efforts?  Fame 
did not empower or assist the Swansea Assembly Supporters wh n they recorded and sold a CD 
and created a theme song to promote Swansea as the seat of national Welsh power, albeit 
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unsuccessfully (Swansea Assembly Supporters 1997).  It did not empower Richard G. Jeffrey to 
record a CD and sell his protest music, appearing with Eurosceptic activists on the streets of 
Oxford, in order to challenge the British government on moves toward greater integration with 
the European Union (Jeffrey 2001).  It did not empower Gianluc  Zanna in his efforts to sell his 
music, promote concerts, and lobby other musicians to mobilize m nutemen in their xenophobic 
mission in the American southwest (Glass 2006; Zanna 2011).  It did not empower teenage 
cellist Jason Crowe to raise awareness about ethnic cleansing i  Bosnia (Jewell 2007).  It did not 
empower Green Elvis, who spreads environmentally sensitive messages by adapting an Elvis 
Presley impersonation and converting popular Elvis songs into humorous ecology anthems 
(Smith 2010).  These musicians had no significant fame to speak of prior to, during, or after their 
political involvement.  Yet their unusual skills give them an undeniable identity—that of artist or 
entertainer.34 
One of the general findings of this dissertation is that power is more broadly distributed 
than many political scientists believe and that this power may be concentrated in certain kinds of 
public figures that are not often considered to be powerful o political.  One of the implications 
of this finding is that power may also come from unusual sources.  Is it possible that musicians 
have some sort of uniquely powerful effect on target audiences that makes them somehow 
different from other forms of celebrity?  How does music create identity communities that unify 
and divide people?  What qualities of music, physical or social psychological, allow powerful 
individuals to mobilize audiences?  With few exceptions, these arguments are anecdotal and 
hypothetical.  Already, politicians seem at least loosely aware of this power of music as certain 
playlists are assembled to provoke feelings in the crowd prior to candidates’ speeches, for 
                                                
34 This was the purpose of Mattern’s (1998) work in which he focused on how normative communities were built
around music and how it affected their political involvement. 
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example.  More empirical research could open new types of research on political persuasion and 
manipulation.   
 
Coda 
We came here not only to help John and to spotlight what's going on, but also to show 
and to say to all of you that apathy isn't it, and that we can do something.  Okay, so 
flower power didn't work.  So what?  We start again. 
 -John Lennon, John Sinclair Freedom Rally, December 10, 1971 
 
Prospects for celebrity activism improved from the time that John Lennon demonstrated 
for peace and agitated for the release of John Sinclair to the time that Bono lobbied some of the 
world’s most powerful leaders to forgive the debts of some of the world’s poorest countries.  
Ironically, the political and media environment allowed Bono a d dozens of other celebrities to 
advantageously utilize what many believe is the worst aspect of modern news—its tendency to 
sensationalize and oversimplify the political world.   
Changes in news and entertainment media have illustrated two sources of power 
potentially present in celebrities even before Lennon’s time:  their ability to shine a spotlight on 
issues of public concern and to persuade audiences.  By providing evidence to support these 
abilities, this dissertation has illustrated how celebrities are also able to engage in agenda setting, 
a practice assumed to be easier for politicians given their power and media access than for 
typical activists with fewer resources.  Surprisingly, celebrities, acting as political entrepreneurs, 
are potentially as capable as politicians at using the media for agenda setting. 
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Since the study of celebrity politics is still relatively new to political science, the findings 
of this dissertation open potential avenues for additional research.  Further exploration of this 
topic might allow scholars to learn more about what kinds of domestic and international 
opportunity structures may facilitate or hamper celebrity activism.  More can be learned about 
the relative success of celebrities across time and what kinds of variables affect success and 
failure during those times, including whether certain types of interventions are more effective 
than others.  This dissertation did not focus directly on insider strategies, so more research can 
illuminate the ways in which celebrity political entrepreneurs operate when they are lobbying 
public officials or engaging in formal policy makers.  Through additional framing experiments, 
future studies can also reveal more about celebrities’ ability to persuade.  A particularly fertile 
area of development is the potential for directly comparing differences in respondents’ attitudes 
if they are exposed to a celebrity’s endorsement of an issue versus a politician’s endorsement of 
the same issue.  One of the biggest questions underlying this dissertation is the tension between 
fame and authenticity.  How is it that famous celebrities can obtain an intimate and persuasive 
relationship with distant observers?  More research into the relative authenticity of different 
types of celebrity and into their arts, such as music, may provide meaningful answers. 
Future research will benefit from recognizing that celebrities have more power than 
previously assumed.  Even if celebrities cannot successfully potlight or persuade in every 
circumstance, the possibility that they can direct media attention and change minds in many 
circumstances means that they have the potential to affect the public agenda.  That information 
alone is valuable, at least to affirm that celebrity activism s not in vain, and that advocacy 
networks and affiliated organizations may benefit from affili tions with celebrities.  While there 
is no doubt that many scholars will continue to be skeptical about celebrities’ involvement in 
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public life, this dissertation demonstrates that celebrities are capable of doing what was once 
thought extremely unlikely in Lennon’s time, the ability of a concerned celebrity to make a 
difference in the minds of policy makers and the public.  If their efforts do not always work, at 
least they communicate that “apathy isn’t it…we can do something…we start again.” 
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Appendix A - Summaries of Celebrities’ Political Activities in the 
Time Series Analysis 
 
Angelina Jolie:   Actor Angelina Jolie was United Nations Goodwill Ambassador for ten years 
and now serves as Special Envoy of High Commissioner Guterres.  She has been involved in 
building “millennium villages” in developing countries in accordance with UN development 
goals through the Maddox Jolie-Pitt Foundation (MJP) (Bella 2009, 45).  In addition, she 
advocated for the UN across a number of issues including status of refugees and prevention of 
sexual violence in military zones (Hom 2012; Nichols 2013).  In her role with the UN, she has 
lobbied the US Congress on at least 20 occasions (Swibel 2006).  She has also raised awareness 
about genetic screening for cancer since the revelation of her double mastectomy.  Time referred 
to her ability to command attention on this issue as the “Angelina Effect” (Kluger and Park 
2013).  She is perhaps best known for supporting improved educational opportunities for African 
children and efforts to fight AIDS in Africa.  She supports the One Campaign, the non-profit 
organization co-founded by Bono focused on forgiving debt, nding poverty, and fighting AIDS 
in developing countries. 
 
George Clooney:  Actor George Clooney has served as a United Nations Messenger for Peace 
since 2008 and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (R. Roberts and Argetsinger 
2010).  He co-founded the Not on Our Watch Project, an international organization intended to 
prevent mass atrocities (Karimi 2010).  His political involvement has included fundraising for a 
variety of disasters and filming documentaries to raise awareness about political issues.  He 
supports gay rights and supported Barack Obama’s political campaigns in 2008 and 2012 (Avlon 
2012).  His highest profile work has been in turning the world’s attention toward the genocide in 
Sudan. 
 
Bono:  Rock musician Bono has been politically involved since his earliest days as lead singer of 
the band, U2.  Their 1983 song, “Sunday Bloody Sunday,” advocated peace in Northern Ireland 
and in 1998, they played a role in bringing together leaders from opposing sides as they worked 
on the Good Friday Agreement (Kootnikoff 2010, 101; Rolston 2001; White Lucy 1983).  They 
performed on the Band Aid promotional single to benefit famine victims in Ethiopia and the 
subsequent benefit concert, Live Aid (Bordowitz 2003, 156).  They played on Amnesty 
International’s Conspiracy of Hope tour and were involved in protesting the Sellafield Nuclear 
Plant with Greenpeace (Shirley 1992).  Bono has also advocated on behalf of many global issues 
independently of his work with U2, most notably on debt and AIDS in the developing world. 
 
Brad Pitt:  Actor Brad Pitt’s partnership with Angelina Jolie as co-founder of the Maddox Jolie-
Pitt Foundation (MJP), friendship with George Clooney and co-founder of Not on Our Watch, 
and support of the ONE campaign with Bono make him a regular activist for education in Africa, 
the conflict in Sudan, and AIDS.  He has also been involved in fundraising for many 
humanitarian causes. 
 
Don Cheadle:    Since 2010, Actor Don Cheadle has served as the United Nations’ U.N. 
Environment Program Goodwill Ambassador.  He is best known for raising awareness about the 
genocide in Rwanda through his role in the film Hotel Rwanda.  He also is a co-founder of Not 
On Our Watch. 
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Matt Damon: Actor Matt Damon founded the H2O Africa Foundation to raise wareness about 
clean water initiatives in Africa.  He also supports the OneCampaign and is a co-founder of Not 
On Our Watch.  All of these activities put him at the center of African development activism. 
 
Muhammad Ali:  Former professional boxer Muhammad Ali was a controversial figure in the 
1960s when he attempted to resist the draft on religious grounds and was ultimately jailed.  Ali 
was part of the promotional team supporting Jubilee 2000 to persuade the world’s major powers 
and institutions to forgive debt of the developing world.  During a time when this issue received 
very little media attention, Ali teamed with Bono to raise awareness. 
 
Bob Geldof:  Rock musician Bob Geldof has been a longtime advocate of ending poverty in 
Africa, beginning with his organization of the Band Aid and Live Aid fundraisers for the famine 
in Ethiopia, and continuing with the Live8 concerts in 2005 to pressure G8 leaders in Gleneagles, 
Scotland to forgive the debt of developing countries.  His overlap with Bono on issues regarding 
poverty, debt, and AIDS in Africa make them occasional partners. 
 
Quincy Jones: Record producer and composer Quincy Jones’ philanthropic work has mostly 
consisted of endeavors to encourage the arts in poor communities.  Bono has made appearances 
at these events.  Jones, along with Geldof and Bono, appealed to Pope John Paul II to encourage 
debt forgiveness for the developing world in 1999 on behalf of Jubilee 2000. 
 
Wyclef Jean: Rapper/R&B musician Wyclef Jean’s primary political interests have been to 
provide aid to his native Haiti through the organization he founded, Yéle Haiti.  It provided 
scholarships, school funding, meals, earthquake, and hurricane relief to poor Haitians.  The New 
York Attorney General’s office alleged mismanagement and improper payments to Jean and his 
family, which led to the closure of the charity and subsequent lawsuits in Haiti for unpaid debts.  
Jean announced his candidacy for the presidency of Haiti in 2010 but was rejected on residency 
grounds.  Jean and Bono wrote a song, “New Day,” and performed tog ther at NetAid in 1999, 
an effort to raise funds and awareness for refugees in Kosovo and Africa. 
 
Prince Harry:  Not truly a political figure or a professional celebrity, Prince Harry’s position 
with the British royal family has made him the subject of frequent media attention.  In 2006, he 
announced his support to fight AIDS in Africa through co-founding Sentebale with Prince Seeiso 
of the Lesotho Royal Family. 
 
Alicia Keys: R&B singer-songwriter Alicia Keys is a global ambassador for Keep a Child Alive, 
an organization that provides medicine to poor African families suffering from HIV/AIDS.  She 
initiated EMPOWERED, a campaign sponsored by Greater ThanAIDS to educate American 
women about HIV/AIDS.  Keys was featured in an interview on Nightline on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the discovery of AIDS.  She also performed, alongside Sudanese rapper 
Emmanuel Jal, in the “We Want Peace” music video, produced with George Clooney to raise 
awareness about the genocide in Darfur.  The video also featured appearances by the Elders, a 
group of international world statesmen including Jimmy Carter and Kofi Anan (Kaufman 2010). 
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Peter Gabriel: A long-time associate of Amnesty International, performing in all of their benefit 
concerts, rock musician Peter Gabriel also co-founded Witness, an international organization that 
equips and trains local organizations to uncover human rights abuses using video equipment.  He 
authorized the use of his song, “Don’t Give Up,” to the One Campaign for Bono and Alicia Keys 
to perform in a music video, raising awareness of the impact of AIDS in Africa.  He also 
appeared in the “We Want Peace” video, featuring Alicia Keys and produced by George Clooney 
(Kaufman 2010). 
 
Elton John: Rock musician Elton John founded the Elton John AIDS Foundation in 1992, which 
has sponsored many fundraisers to create an “AIDS-free future.” John has personally lobbied the 
US Congress on funding for AIDS issues on several occasions (“Elton John AIDS Foundation” 
n.d.; D. Matthews 2013). 
 
Dikembe Mutombo: Basketball player and Congo native Dikembe Mutombo of the Houston 
Rockets led a group of current and former NBA players for basketball instruction in 
Johannesberg, South Africa in 2005 as part of Basketball Without Borders.  Supporting him were 
Maciej Lampe of the New Orleans Hornets, Jerome Williams of the New York Knicks, 
Mamadou N’diaye of the Los Angeles Clippers, Marcus Camby of the Denver Nuggets, Darvin 
Ham of the Detroit Pistons, and Jim Jackson of the Phoenix Suns.  Approximately 350 NBA 
basketball players are involved in Basketball without Borders (BWB), a community outreach 
program to “promote the sport and encourage positive social change in the areas of education, 
health, and wellness” (“Basketball Without Borders Mission” n.d.).   
 
Usher: R&B singer Usher has been involved primarily in education campaigns, but has also been 
involved in AIDS fundraisers. 
 
John Mayer: Rock musician John Mayer is most often involved in environmental causes, but has 
also raised money for AIDS organizations. 
 
Cynthia Nixon: Actor Cynthia Nixon, a breast cancer survivor, is an advocate for Susan G. 
Komen for the Cure.  She also has taken part in AIDS fundraisers. 
 
Jessica Alba: Actor Jessica Alba has been involved in some fundraising efforts or AIDS 
charities. 
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Appendix B - Details on Content Analysis Searches in Lexis-Nexis 
 
Selection of Search Terms 
When engaging in the time series content analysis, the intent was to choose search terms 
that would capture as many stories as possible on the issues tudied while screening out other 
stories that were not relevant to the issue.  The following repres nt search strings employed to 
record story counts in the spreadsheet. 
 
Debt and Poverty in Africa 
• January-March 1999; June 1999 - debt and (poorest or poverty) and not ("pro-bono" or 
"pro bono") and not (earnings or quarter)) 
• August-October 1999 - debt and (poorest or poverty or poor) and not ("pro-bono" or "pro 
bono") and not (earnings or quarter) or farm) 
 
Africa and Debt 
• June-July 2007 - (Africa and debt) and not "pro-bono") 
 
Poverty in Africa 
• April-June 2002; January-March 2006 - ((africa and (poverty and not (earnings or 
quarter)) 
 
Debt and AIDS in Africa  
• April-July 2006 - africa and (debt or hiv) and not (earnings or Darfur or Zuma or chimp 
or chimpanzee or "25 years" or "bin laden" or plane or "pro-bono" or "pro bono") 
•  April-May 2010 - africa and (debt or aids) and not (earnings or textbook or "w ld cup" 
or plane or "pro bono" or "pro-bono") 
 
AIDS in Africa  
• August-October 2003- ((AIDS and africa) and not "pro-bono") 
• September-November 2005 - (hiv and africa) and not "pro-bono" or "pro bono" or 
chastity or earnings 
 
Education in Africa  
• April-May 2006 - (africa and education)) and not (earnings) 
 
Sudan 
• September 2010-February 2011; February-April 2012 - Sudan and not earnings or quarter 
 
In some cases, additional modifiers such as “not” were used in order to cut stories that 
appeared in the results but had no relation to the issue.  Giventhe volume of stories, the 
methodology assumes that some stories would appear in the results that were unrelated, but that 
the modifiers would limit these to a minimum.  Manual checks of st ries verified this 
assumption.  In other cases, modifiers were unable to filter unrelated stories without eliminating 
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relevant ones.  In those cases, such as the Education in Africa and the Debt and Poverty in Africa 
cases, coders looked at every story in a sequence of events and manually discounted those that 
did not relate to the issue.  For example, when searching for “debt” and “poverty” in “Africa” in 
1999, there were still many stories about US domestic politics talking about poor African 
Americans in debt or the national debt in the US and how it related to poverty.  On one day, a 
story about a fire in Sudan, Texas had to be manually filtered out.  Given the limitations of the 
search tools, manual checks were, at times, necessary in order to adjust the numbers.   
The different issues and search terms selected for analysis in chapter 3 represent subtle 
differences in the ways the issues were reported at the time.  Wh n discussing development 
issues, the word “development” is rarely used.  Occasionally, the media focuses more on AIDS.  
At other times, the focus is on debt or poverty.  The search terms r flected subtle changes in the 
language.  The words “earnings” and “quarter” were eliminated from many searches because 
doing so eliminated stories about businesses’ quarterly ea nings in Africa.  “Pro Bono” and “Pro-
Bono” were often used in stories about developing countries as legal alternatives for the poor.  
Searching for “Bono” without these limiters led to many false positives.  Using “U2” as an 
additional limiter took out too many instances of Bono’s appe rances.  After a certain point in 
time, media sources ceased referring to Bono with the appositive, “lead singer of the band U2.”  
In some cases, other terms were used to exclude unrelated stori s.  When other big stories were 
captured by the general search terms that did not relate to th issue studied, words were chosen to 
exclude stories on those topics such as “world cup,” “Zuma,” or “chimpanzee.” 
 
Use of Broadcast Transcripts 
The Lexis-Nexis Broadcast Transcripts search engine includes a host of broadcast 
sources, mostly comprised of US sources, but containing someforeign sources as well.  On 
balance, US media sources were most likely to appear in Broadcast Transcript searches.  Thus, 
the kinds of stories that appear in search results not only include major national news coverage, 
but some international coverage, some coverage of US government activity, and a sizable 
amount of local and entertainment news coverage.   
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Appendix C - Notes on Coding and Spreadsheet Design in the Time 
Series Analysis 
 
When recording the number of stories reported on a given day, one column represented 
the number of stories on that issue appearing in US newspaper .  Another represented the 
number of stories appearing in broadcast transcripts.  Other columns were added if Canadian or 
UK newspapers were searched.  The second search was reflected in a series of columns 
representing the presence of a celebrity in a story pertaining to that issue.  Thus, additional 
columns reflected how many stories a celebrity appeared in as a subset of each of the previously 
mentioned columns (i.e.: Bono’s appearance in US newspapers in reference to AIDS in Africa, 
Bono’s appearance in broadcast transcripts in reference to AIDS in Africa, etc.)  This data was 
then converted to a series of line graphs.  Each graph illustrated the rise and fall in numbers of 
stories across time on each of the searches.  When a spike appeared in the number of stories, 
coders read the stories for that day to determine what was driving the spike.  Was it mostly one 
major story or a series of unrelated stories that were still within the issue area?  If there were one 
or two major drivers, they were labeled on the line graphs. Labels were also inserted on the 
graphs indicating when a celebrity intervened in the timeline.   
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Appendix D - Additional Line Graphs from the AIDS Time Series 
Analysis 
 
 
Table D.1 - UK Newspaper Coverage of AIDS in Africa and Bono Interventions 
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Table D.2 - US Newspaper Coverage of AIDS in Africa and Bono Interventions 
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Table D.3 - Broadcast Coverage of AIDS in Africa and Jolie/Bono Intervention 
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Appendix E - Sample of survey format used in experimental study 
 
The following pages give two examples of the surveys used to derive data in the experimental 
study.   
 
The first is an example of the credibility and authenticity surveys.  The survey contains the basic 
format but does not list every celebrity or politician about whom data was gathered.  Multiple 
surveys with different celebrities, sometimes mixed up from one survey to the next, were 
distributed over various groups in order to prevent survey fatigue and to prevent a possible bias 
that could result from seeing the same public figures in the same order. 
 
The second is an example of the experimental survey itself.  The survey’s format was uniform 
across groups.  What changed in each survey was the celebrity and frame in the middle and the 
topic of the control or super control frame at the end. 
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Credibility and Authenticity of Public Figures 
Mark Harvey 
Principal Investigator 
 
The purpose of this study is to gather data about how people get information and develop 
opinions on issues of importance.  While your participation will not benefit you directly, the 
information I gather will be useful in evaluating public and private approaches to political 
issues and will give you the opportunity to voice your opinions and concerns.   The survey 
should take 10 minutes or less of your time.  If you choose not to take part in this study, 
please return the blank survey.  Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary; you 
may withdraw at any time without explanation, penalty, or loss of benefits or academic 
standing to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
The data I am gathering may be used in academic conference papers and articles submitted 
to scholarly journals and other publications on public policy.  If you have questions or 
would be interested in the results when they become available, feel free to contact Mark 
Harvey at harveyinstructor@gmail.com.  
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Demographic Information 
 
Gender:        Female  
 Male 
 
Race/Ethnicity:       American Indian or Alaskan Native  
 Asian 
 Black or African American  
 Hispanic   
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
 White 
 
Age: ________ 
 
 
Occupation:  _________________________________ 
 
 
 
Education Level:      Grade School/Some High School 
 High School Diploma 
 Some College/No Degree 
 College Degree 
 Graduate Degree 
 
 
Political Party Affiliation:    Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent   
 Other ___________________ 
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The following questions feature a series of names and photographs of public figures.  We 
are interested in knowing how these figures are perceived in the media.  Therefore, we are 
not looking for “correct” answers.  We are more interested in what you may have heard 
through the media and how you feel about these public figures and these issues.  Please 
circle the numbers that best reflect how you feel.   
 
 
John Boehner 
 
Do you know who John Boehner is? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
If you recognize this person, do you agree or disagree that this public figure is a credible 
spokesperson on the following political issues? 
 
Issue Credibility 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
AIDS 1 2 3 4 5 
Capital Punishment 1 2 3 4 5 
Debt Relief to the Developing World 1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental Protection 1 2 3 4 5 
Federal Disaster Relief 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic Screening for Cancer 1 2 3 4 5 
Genocide in Darfur 1 2 3 4 5 
Gun Control 1 2 3 4 5 
Income Inequality 1 2 3 4 5 
Legalization of Marijuana 1 2 3 4 5 
Same-Sex Marriage 1 2 3 4 5 
Syrian Crisis 1 2 3 4 5 
Cuban Embargo 1 2 3 4 5 
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Bruce Springsteen 
  
Do you know who Bruce Springsteen is? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If you recognize this person, do you agree or disagree that this public figure is a credible 
spokesperson on the following political issues? 
 
 
 
Public figure Credibility and Authenticity 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
This public figure's talents, abilities, and professional projects 
uniquely make him an authentic spokesperson. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure is a credible spokesperson on gun control. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure supports gun control. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure is a credible spokesperson on income 
inequality. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure supports policies to end income inequality. 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Tim Tebow 
     
Do you know who Tim Tebow is? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If you recognize this person, do you agree or disagree that this public figure is a credible 
spokesperson on the following political issues? 
 
 
Public figure Credibility and Authenticity 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
This public figure's talents, abilities, and professional projects 
uniquely make him an authentic spokesperson. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure is a credible spokesperson on same-sex 
marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure supports same-sex marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Lady Gaga 
 
 
Do you know who Lady Gaga is? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If you recognize this person, do you agree or disagree that this public figure is a credible 
spokesperson on the following political issues? 
 
Public figure Credibility and Authenticity 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
Agree or 
Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
This public figure's talents, abilities, and professional projects 
uniquely make her an authentic spokesperson. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure is a credible spokesperson on same-sex 
marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
This public figure supports same-sex marriage. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Public Opinion on Current Issues 
Mark Harvey 
Principal Investigator 
 
The purpose of this study is to gather data about how people get information and develop 
opinions on issues of importance.  While your participation will not benefit you directly, the 
information I gather will be useful in evaluating public and private approaches to political 
issues and will give you the opportunity to voice your opinions and concerns.   The survey 
should take 10 minutes or less of your time.  If you choose not to take part in this study, 
please return the blank survey. 
 
The data I am gathering will contribute to the completion of my Ph.D. dissertation and may 
be used in academic conference papers and articles submitted to scholarly journals and 
other publications on public policy.  If you have questions or would be interested in the 
results when they become available, feel free to contact Mark Harvey at 
harveyinstructor@gmail.com.  
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Demographic Information 
 
Gender:        Female  
 Male 
 
Race/Ethnicity:       American Indian or Alaskan Native  
 Asian 
 Black or African American  
 Hispanic 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
 White 
 
Age: ________ 
 
 
Occupation:  _________________________________ 
 
 
Education Level:      Grade School/Some High School 
 High School Diploma 
 Some College/No Degree 
 College Degree 
 Graduate Degree 
 
 
Political Party Affiliation:    Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent   
 Other ___________________ 
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We have a set of questions concerning the American political system. We want to see how 
much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the 
like.   
 
1. Which political party is currently in the majority in the U.S. House of 
Representatives?  
A. Conservatives 
B. Democrats 
C. Independents 
D. Liberals 
E. Libertarians 
F. Republicans 
G. Tea Party 
H. Don’t know 
 
2. Who is the current Vice President of the United States? 
A. Joe Biden 
B. John Boehner 
C. Dick Cheney 
D. Hillary Clinton 
E. Mitch McConnell 
F. Nancy Pelosi 
G. Harry Reid 
H. Don’t know 
 
3. Who is the current Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court? 
A. John Jay 
B. John Marshall 
C. Thurgood Marshall 
D. William Rehnquist 
E. John Roberts 
F. Antonin Scalia 
G. Clarence Thomas 
H. Don’t know 
 
4. Who is the current Secretary of State of the United States? 
A. Sam Brownback 
B. Hillary Clinton 
C. Chuck Hagel 
D. Eric Holder 
E. John Kerry 
F. Colin Powell 
G. Condoleezza Rice 
H. Don’t Know 
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We would like to get your feelings toward some people who are 
in the news these days using something we call the feeling 
thermometer.  Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees 
mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person.  
Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't 
feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too 
much for that person.  You would rate the person at the 50 
degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward 
the person.  Please circle the temperature on the left that best 
reflects how you feel.  If you do not recognize the person, you 
don't need to answer.   
 
George Clooney 
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Now we would like to get your reaction to the ongoing conflict in Syria.  Since March 15, 2011, the 
country of Syria has been engaged in a civil war between forces loyal to the Syrian Ba'ath Party 
government led by President Bashar al-Assad and groups seeking to oust these government forces.  By 
April, the government was using armed force against peaceful protesters, leading to condemnation by the 
Arab League, United States, European Union, and other countries.  Since then an organized “Syrian 
Opposition” has emerged, engaging government forces in combat across the country.  By February 2013, 
the estimated death toll was 70,000.  The Obama administration has indicated that if government forces 
use chemical weapons on their own people, the US will be compelled to intervene.  Recently, the 
administration announced that there was some evidence that chemical weapons have been used, but that 
the evidence is not compelling enough yet to intervene in Syria and that they want support from allies 
before planning any military action.  Many Republican lawmakers have attacked the president’s position, 
arguing that they should already have bombed Syrian air bases, armed the rebels and readied an 
international force to secure chemical weapons stocks. 
Recently, George Clooney said, “We already know the Assad regime has chemical weapons and 
has committed atrocities and human rights abuses against its own people.  In addition, an organized 
opposition is ready to take over the reins of government if Assad is pressured out of power.  Therefore, I 
believe the US should increase the pressure on the regime by militarily intervening in Syria before more 
people die.” 
Syria 
Very 
unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely 
Very 
Likely 
What is the likelihood that you would support US military 
intervention in Syria? 1 2 3 4 5 
What is the likelihood that you would support a US militarily 
intervention without consultation or support from allies? 1 2 3 4 5 
What is the likelihood that you would support a US military 
intervention to stop or prevent human rights abuses? 1 2 3 4 5 
What is the likelihood that you would vote for a public official 
who supports military intervention in Syria? 1 2 3 4 5 
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Next, we have a set of questions concerning the media. We want to see what kinds of media 
are consumed by the public. 
 
From what sources do you receive your information about news and popular culture?   
(Check all that apply.) 
 Website  
 Magazine 
 Newspaper   
 Books   
 Television 
 Radio 
 Government Agencies 
 Family 
 Friends/Colleagues 
 Social Media 
 Phone Apps 
 Class 
 Email 
 Other _________________________ 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to report the news fairly? 
 Just about always  
 Most of the time 
 Only some of the time   
 Almost never   
 
News Consumption None 
Very 
little Some 
Quite 
a bit 
A great 
deal 
How much attention do you pay to political news? 1 2 3 4 5 
How much attention do you pay to celebrity news? 1 2 3 4 5 
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Now we would like to get your feelings about same-sex marriage.  Several 
jurisdictions in the United States recognize same-sex marriage.  Nine states prohibit it by 
law and thirty prohibit it by constitutional mandate. The Defense of Marriage Act prevents 
the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages, although the 
constitutionality of the act is under court review.  Gay rights advocates argue that without 
the right to marry, they are stigmatized and treated differently than heterosexual couples 
and are denied legal access to certain benefits that are unique to married couples.  For 
example, legally married couples get special tax breaks, preferential insurance rates, and 
are allowed to be involved in end of life issues with their spouses.  Same-sex couples 
receive none of these benefits.  They also argue that this would encourage monogamy and 
strong family values between gay couples and if they are allowed to adopt, more children 
may find loving homes.  On the other hand, opponents of same-sex marriage argue that 
marriage is an ancient religious institution that has always been defined as being between a 
man and a woman.  To legitimize same-sex marriage would weaken respect for this 
institution, confuse gender roles, and weaken the traditional family values some say are 
essential to society.  They argue that the homosexual lifestyle is sinful and leads to 
immorality, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, psychological disorders, and other 
problems.  The legalization of same-sex marriage could also lead to other unacceptable 
forms of marriage such as polygamy. 
 A noted celebrity recently weighed in on the debate:  “Heterosexual marriage is the 
foundation of child rearing and family values in society.  We can talk about ways to protect 
the rights of homosexuals as individuals.  But I don’t think we should just arbitrarily allow 
gay marriage.  We cannot allow the federal government to water down the sacred 
institution of marriage that God has defined as between a man and a woman.  I encourage 
others to financially support organizations and candidates who will protect the sanctity of 
marriage.” 
 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Very 
unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely 
Very 
Likely 
What is the likelihood that you would support legalization of 
same-sex marriage? 1 2 3 4 5 
What is the likelihood that you would give money to 
organizations or vote for candidates that support same-sex 
marriage? 1 2 3 4 5 
What is the likelihood that you would give money to 
organizations or vote for candidates that oppose same-sex 
marriage? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
